Massachusetts Neighborhood Improvement Program by Lew, Jennie Fay
MASSACHUSETTS NEIGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
by
JENNIE F. LEW
A.B., University of California,
Berkeley
1975
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF CITY PLANNING
of the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
MAY 1977
Signature of Author
Certified by
Depart of Urban Stdies and Planning
IT May , 1977
U ~ Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by
Chairman, Departmental Committee on
Graduate Students
(o MAA 18
M ITLibries
Document Services
Room 14-0551
77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139
Ph: 617.253.2800
Email: docs@mit.edu
http://Iibraries.mit.edu/docs
DISCLAIMER OF QUALITY
Due to the condition of the original material, there are unavoidable
flaws in this reproduction. We have made every effort possible to
provide you with the best copy available. If you are dissatisfied with
this product and find it unusable, please contact Document Services as
soon as possible.
Thank you.
The images contained in this document are of
the best quality available.
.ABSTRACT
The Massachusetts Neighborhood Improvement Program
Jennie Lew
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of
Master of City Planning,
Through the study and analysis of the Massachusetts
Neighborhood Improvement Program, an investigation into
the realms of program implementation are related to the
role of the State. The perspective undertaken by the au
thor specifically focuses on the State's administrat'ion
of a complex strategy for neighborhood revitalization in
the older, declining communities throughout the State.
NIP,comprised of the Chapter 705 and 707 housing pro-
grams, illustrates a complex, widely comprehensive program
that struggles with both the need to be workable and yet
rapidly implementable. Created to meet the crucial needs
of deteriorating neighborhoods, as well as the needs of the
State to "launch" an -innovative program aimed at "moving"
a source of funds long stalled in its attempts to attractt
local interest, NIP presently lies in its early phaes of
implementation where unkept "promises" (i.e. commitments)
are only beginning to surface.
A thorough study is undertaken by the author to trace
it origin and early planning phases in an attempt to re-
late its experience to the implementation and management
of public programs. A discussion of the non-bureaucratic
versus bureaucratic approach to public administration is
not initiated to advocate for or against either perspec-
tive ao much as it is used to demonstrate the assets and
liabilities of bolth approaches and its implications for-the
lQn'gterm viability of such programs as NIP.
In this study the need for accountability, and the
ability to gauge the strengths and weaknesses of a stra-
tegy early in the planning phases are embhasizdd. Pro-
grams'founded on high lioes- and good intentions face the
risk of encountering unforeseen obstacles it is little
prepared to cope with, thus maximizing the potential for
great disappointment and frustration.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Focus of Study:
It is not uncommon in the practice of planning and
administering public programs that policy sometimes be-
comes seperated from implementation. Often in the flurry
to launch the programs of new administrations, policy ma-
kers and program designers are quick to analyze problems
and offer hypothetical solutions without insuring a basis
from which such often grandeoise and thoroughly complex
"masterplans" are to be implementid.
The Neighborhood Improvement Program (NIP) , as admini-
stered by the Massachusetts Department of Community Affairs,
is one such intricate and ambitious program created for
"launching". Provided with limited resources, Chapter 705
Scattered-site Low-income Family Housi' and Chapter 707
Rental Assistance funds, NIP Nas-designed'to meet a variety
of far-reaching objectives for neighborhood revitalization.
Nonetheless just as NIP was created to alleviate the plight
of certain targeted declining neighborhooods, NIP was also
created as a mechanism by which long-stalled 705 State funds
could be finally expended among the local communities. In
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an effort to "get RIP moving", the two initial directors of
NIP assumed a highly personalized and unbureaucratic approacb
to administering the program, guiding it along ever so di-
ligently to insure its eventual operation in qix NIP tar-
get neighborhood througnout the state.
In an attempt to be both comprehensive and politically
expedient, numerous compromises were made-in-the early start-
up stages of NIP that were to eventually to £4ffect the long-
term viability of the Neighborhood Improvement Program to
successfully surmount the numerous obstacles that it would
nevertheless confront throughout its implementation phases.
Numerous actors and program elements involving the commu-
nity, private sector, city and state had to "pieced together"
into a concerted and coherent strategy for "neighborhood im-
provement.' Commitments needed to be securedand coordinafled,
budt often the resource or desire to undertake such tasks would
be unavailable or reserved.
The purpose of this study is to serve the.needs d-f'the
State to aefine.its role for tHe-implbementation of NIP.
It will study the history of the Neighborhood Improvement
Program, review and anzmyze its current status among the va-
rious NIP demonstration projects throughout the state, re-
late these observations to the issue of implementation, and
suggest how these observations imply alterations in the
State's role as the central coordinating focii of NIP. The
author has decided to specifically focus the study to the
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perspective of the State (i.e. DCA) sire as the administra-
tive authority~ of NIP, its role is percieved as paramount
to all others. involved.
Methodology :
As a professional document this study proposes to de-
lineatec a course of action for the State in its administra-
tion of the NIP. To buildup- to such a recommendation a
thorough examiniation of the background and conceptual/ope-
rational structure of NIP must be foremost undertaken.
Chapter II provides a indepth history of NIP from the
period before its formation, when Chapter 705 and 707 were
independently pursuing their goals, to its planning appro-
val stages. Much of this infcrmation was derived from DCA
Annual Reports, and extensive interviews with the two ori-
ginal coordinators of NIP, Gary Jefferson and Joel Kirshner.
Chapter III is an extensive series cf casestudies con-
ducted on all- six operating NIP's in Massachusetts. Dis-
cussion and analysis is performed on each NIP such that neigh-
borhood issues, the community's or city's planning propo-
sal, and early stages of implementation are reviewed. The
author, conducted an;extensive questionnaire of all of the
NIP's (of which RAP of Roxbury did not respond). Both clos-
ed and open questions spanning the spectrum of issues were
included to provide basic data in three areas: 1) problem
perception, 2) solution strategy, and 3) implementation.
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These questionnaires were followed up by interviews conducted in
April of 1977 to gather up-to-date information on the sta-
tus of each NIP.
Chapter IV of the study grapples with the issue of im-
plementation as it applies to NIP in general and to thei so-
called "non-bureaucratic style" of public administration in-
dicative of the early initial stages of NIP. Observations
by the author are built upon the data of the two preceding
chapters. The theoretical basis for the discussion is large-
ly derived from the Pressman and Wildavsky book: "Imple-
mentation: How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed
in Oakland".
Included in the appendix of this' thesis document are
three major "pieces" of strategy which require State.input
for a more formidable comprehensive approach to neighbor-
hood revitalization in declining communities. These three
inputs, as deemed important facets of State involvement by
DCA, are: the Massachusetts Mortgage Finance Agency, Mecha-
nisms to Activate Private Lending Institution Participa-
tion, and State and Local Initiated Improvements for the
Tax Title Process. This serves'to further facilitate DCA
in delinatng specific paths for action in implementing
longterm strategies fdr'NB.
Alcknowledgements:
Various personnel in numerous state and city agencies
and departments throughout the state were key to the develop-
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ment of this study. Too numerous to mention individually
the author would nonetheless like to extend her grattitude
to those who submitted to timely interviews, contributed
pertinent documents .-for reference, and offered many leads
to other important sources of information. Th& coopera-
tion of all these people,- is deeply appreciated.
A special note of.appreciation goes to those within
the DCA Division of Urban Renewal, NIP and Relocation that
were forever accomidating and helpful during the author's
internship within the Department. Norman Dion, Coordinator
for the DCA NIP, deserves special mention for his assistance
and guidance throughout this study.
Langley Keyes, the thesis advisor for this study, was
indeed the highpoint of this learning experience. Provi-
ding unrelenting encouragement and support, the author can-
not express her heart-felt appreciation for making a seem-
ingly unsurmountable task an accomplishment that will long
be remembered by the author.
Last but not least I would like to thank my cadre of
loyal friends that assisted in the laborious task of typing,
and arranging this thesis, as well as for their loving friend-
ship through difficult times. Julia Chu often extended her
assistance to facilitate my needs even before her own', of
which no amount of words cai amply express by grattitude,
Cay Fong', my constant love and companion, has once again
lent his-full suppgrt ard'assistance, of which this accom-
plishment I would like to share with him.
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CHAPTER II
THE MASSACHUSETTS NEIGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
A. DCA Chapter 705 & 707 Programs Prior to NIP
The Massachusetts Department of Community Affairs was
established by Chapter 23B of the M.G.L.A. and given the
broad mandate to act in the areas of housing, community de-
velopment, urban renewal, local assidance, and social and
economic opportunity. Focusing on housing, Chapter 23B states:
"The Department shall be the principal agency of
the Government of the Commonwealth to mobilize
the human, physical and financial resources avail-
able . . . to . . . provide open housing oppor-
tunity, including, but not limited to opportunities
for residents of depressed and slum areas .
shall encourage and assist communities in the deve-
lopment, renewal and rehabilitation of their physi-
cal environment .
Over the years DCA has fulfilled its responsibilities
under this mandate through a variety of programs designed to
provide housing for low and moderate income citizens throuth-
out the State of Massachusetts. Among these State programs
are the Chapter 705 Scattered-Site Low-Income Family Housing
Program and the Chapter 707 Rental Assistance Program.
Both the Chapter 705 and 707 Housing Programs were con-
ceived in part as alternatives to the traditional public hous-
ing developments that were widely constructed throughout
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Massachusetts from 1940 to 1955. Originally slated as Veterans'
Housing, this form of concentrated, high density low-income oub-
lic housing has since disillusioned participating communities
and sponsoring governmental agencies alike. Most of these pub-
lic housing developments have deteriorated from abuse and poor
maintenance, suffered from inefficent manacrement, and become en-
claves for a myriad of social problems from random vandalism to
organized crime. 1 Not all public developments are known to be
"failures," but nonetheless many communities have come to view
"public housing" as blights within their neighborhoods, "prob-
lem areas" with unsightly visability and spillover effects that
threaten the stability of the local community.
Clustered in high density low-income developments and sim-
ilarly manipulated by a maze of bureaucratic systems, tenants
of "public housing" became identified by the surrounding com-
munity and administering agency (i.e. Boston Housing Authority)
with the stigma of "public housing". Acutely aware of the
plight of the tenants, the I popularity of the program in lo-
cal communities, and the administrative dilemmas that public
housing developments created, the State eventually focused its
attention on alternative methods of providing low-income hous-
ing..
B. Chapter 705 Program:
On December 8, 1966 the Commonwealth established the Chap-
ter 705 Scattered-Site Low-Income Family Housing Program in an
-7-
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effort to provide a variety of housing development options on
a "scattered-site" basis.* The 705 Program allows for sub-
stantial flexibility in providing family housing opportunities
through new construction, rehabilitation of previously sub-
standard units, and acquisition of existing standard housing
units.
From 1966 to 1971 the primary emphasis of the 705 Program,
as administered by DCA, focused on new construction. DCA re-
quired that potential sites for 705 housing be located conven-
ient to transportation and public facilities? Likewise it was
understood that the program must be desired and applied for by
the local communities.
Funding for 705 housing was initially provided by shift-
ing- $37.5 million in "left-over" barlir authority from the
Veterans' Housing Program. Though this amount eventually
grew to $82.5 million in bonding, the program was not actively
pursued either by the Department or the local communities dur-
ing that 5 year period. 3 Communities were relutctant to par-
ticipate due primarily to their inclination to avoid any form
of low-income housing. New construction in particular also
posed a responsibility on part of the local sector to provide
additional community services and facilities. The probability
that additional residents, specifically low-income families,
would require additional city expenditures to suppAment the
local schools, police force and the like was sufficient reason
* The HUD standard of "not more than 100 units within an
eighth of a mile" was the definitiaiof "scattered-site"
utilized by the Department.
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for community disinterest in the 705 Housing Program.
The Department of Community Affairs, in reaction to the
(political) unpopularity of the 705 Program, did not pursue
the matter. Administrative disinterest, lost of program mo-
mentum, and concern for departmental public relations allowed
the Chapter 705 Program to remain inactive until 1971.
In 1971 renewed interest on the part of DCA to make use
of these neglected funds prompted the staff to develop incen-
tives for local community involvement in 705 housing develop-
ment. From 1971 to 1973, DCA "attachMd" the development of 705
housing to the construction of elderly projects under Chapte
667 of the Acts of 1954. The two programs were linked togeth-
er such that if local communities desired Chapter 667 Elderly
Housing in their neighborhoods they would likewise be "encour-
aged" to include 705 housing.
The desire fcr elderly housing was indeed strong among
the communities and certainly much more popular than low-income
family housing. Through this DCA strategy the long-stalled 705
Housing Program was activated in 1971 with the signing of a
series of Contracts for Financial Assistance totalincg more than
$12 million. 396 units were scheduled to be built in eleven
communities at approximately $25,000 per unit (refer to Table
11-1) . 4 Most of these units were slated for acquisition and
new construction. Only two of the projects,, Attleboro
and Somerville (totaling 22 units) , were planned fcr rehabili-
tation.
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As these and other projects under this 1971-73 phase of
the Chapter 705 Program evolved, the estimated cost per unit
began to escalate in some communities beyond initial estimates.
In Newton, for instance, 20 units were contracted for construc-
tion for a total of $1.4 million or $70,000 per unit. The
feasibility of new constuction to efficiently provide low-
income housing grew dim. Cost over-runs, complicated bidding
proceedures, the time and energy required for overall project
coordination of new construction proved too much a burden for
the Department. Likewise, local communities persisted in
their reluctance to accomadate for additional households in
their neighborhoods. By 1974 it had become apparent to DCA
that the strategy to "attach" the 705 Program to 667 Elderly
Housing only succeeded in solicitating a similar "token" ef-
fort on the part of local communities to provide the neigh-
borhood infrastructure needed for these isolated, "scattered"
units of 705 Housing to work.
C. Chapter 707 Program
Chapter 707 of the General Laws was signed in 1966 pro-
viding for a Rental Assistance Program permitting families
eligible for public housing to be housed in selected private
housing of acceptable standards. Through the Chapter 707
Program the Local Housing Authority provides a rent subsidy
equal to the difference between the occupant's ability to
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pay (presently estimated as 25% of the occupant's income)
and the approved rent level of the designated unit. Commit-
ments may be made under this program either by providing as-
s.stance to tenants in existing standard units or by guaran-
teeing occupancy of low-income households after completion
of units that are either being constructed or rehabilitated
by the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA)* or the
owner of the structure. Commitments cannot be for periods
less than one nor more than five years.
Initially the Chapter 707 Program was created in res-
ponse to the immediate need for low-income housing that the
existing public housing developments could not accdiadate.
As Chapter 121b of the M.G.L.A. clearly states:
there does not now exist wihin the Commonwealth
an adequate supply of decent, safe and sanitary dwel-
ling units available at rents which families of low-
income . . . can afford without depriving themselves
of the other necessities of life, . . . that experi-
ence has demonstrated that the construction of the
new low-rent housing projects on the large scale re-
quired . . would be unduly expensive and would gen-
erate undesirable social consequences . . . there ex-
ists a supply of moderate rental dwelling units with-
in the Commonwealth presently under construction or
vacant which could be used to house such families of
low income . . . provided public funds are available
to supplement the portion of their income which they
can afford to spend on housing . .
* MHFA - state agency that promotes the development of
mixed-income housing by private developers. It pro-
vides construction loans at below market interest
rates to qualified developers.
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The Legislation further states that such a Rental Assis-
tance Program as administered by the Local Housing Authori-
ties would "help end the undesirable concentration and seg-
regation" of low-income families. Undoubtedly the Chapter
707 Program, like the Chapter 705 Progam, was a conscious ef-
fort to avoid concentrated public housing developments.
Appropriations for the 707 Program are made annually by
the State Legislature. The fiscal '71 appropriation for the
program was $1 million. After the first year of operation
the 707 Program revealed to be well received by the local
communities. 707 funds permitted previously vacant units to
be leased and likewise, orovided an incentive for owners of
substandard units to bring their buildings up to code.
The program was nopular at the State level as well. A
3-party contract involving the tenant, Local Housing Author-
ity and DCA permitted a sense of participation and responsi-
bility on the part of everyone involved. Once arrangements
were made with DCA's Comptroller on the nroceedures needed
to release funds on a timetable convenient to the land.ord,
DCA discovered administration of the program efficient and
relatively less complex than previous State housing programs.
Likewise 707 funds could be utilized to subsidize other
state projects such as those mixed-income developments pro-
posed by MFA.
As the Chapter 707 Rental Assistance Program oroved to
be both successful and viable the annual appropriation stead-
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ily grew. In 1974 $4 million was administered to 130 munici-
palities throughout MassachusettsP 105 of these communities
had Housing Authorities to administer the program. In the
remaining 25 communities DCA had contracted non-profit organ-
izations to carry out the Housing Authorities' duties. In
total 3,328 units were under lease during 1974 under the Ren-
tal Assistance Program.
D. Conception of NIP & Program Development
In 1973 Lou Crampton was apoointed Commissioner of the
Department of Community Affairs. As is common practice a-
midst administrative transitions the new Commissioner promptly
proceeded to reshuffle pertin~nt staff, and review the past
performance and existing policies of the various state pro-
grams operating out of DCA.
During this period of transition the Chapter 705 Program
experienced both a change in administration and in program
orientation. Foremost, Commissioner Crampton decided to ap-
point one of his Executive Assistants, Gary Jefferson, direc-
tor of the Chapter 705 Program.* It was anticipated that un-
der Jefferson's direction the program would be orovided with
a new thrust and sense of direction.
* Before becoming Executive Assistant to the Commissioner,
Gary Jefferson worked in the Division of Community Services
for DCA providing technical assistance to local communities
on a wide range of issues (e.g. zoning, capital improvement
programs, budgeting).
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A major concern of the new director was that the Chapter
705 Program, which continued to control a substantial amount
of unexpended funds, was at a virtual standstill. Previous
attempts by past administrations to activate the Scattered Site
Low-Income Family Housing Program suffered for the most part
from unyielding community resistance. Other attempts to "at-
tach" 705 housing to more attractive projects, such as 667
Elderly Housing, had proved too piecemeal a strategy to be
effective in providing low-income housing on a beneficial
scale.
After a re-evaluation of the long-stalled Chapter 705
Program the Commissioner, for a variety of reasons, decided
to deter from the program's emphasis on new construction.
Foremost was the basic issue of costs. New construction was
becoming increasingly expensive. Rising construction costs
and the added complexities created by the required public
bidding process made new construction under Chapter 705 ec-
onomically unfeasible and inefficient. Moreover, as men-
tioned earlier in this Chapter, new construction of family
housing in turn required increased community services and in
some cases, extended community facilities in the fom of rec-
reational, educational or fire protection accommadations.
This, unlike rehabilitating existing dwelling units already
accommodated by neighborhood services and facilities, created
new construction needs on the part of local communities to
provide for the growth of their neighborhoods. Commissioner
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Crampton also viewed the new construction policy as a sub-
stantial administrative burden for the Department requiring
extensive processing and supervision.
By 1973 it had become apparent to DCA, as well as among
those involved in formulating housing policy throughout the
country, that new construction was a costly, unpopular, and
socially problematic method of providing for low-income hous-
ing needs. The Department increasingly focused its attention
on the substantial amount of under-utilized housing stock
that existed throughout the State of Massachusetts. A large
number of dwellings, especially in. older communities, were
either vacant or deteriorating from disrepair or lack of main-
tenance. The sentiment of the Department was that these under-
utilized housing units should be rehabilitated to provide for
low-income housing needs. Rehabilitation seemed the wiser al-
ternative contrary to adding expensive new housing stock and
leaving the old stock to deteriorate beyond utility.
In addition to rehabilitation the administration believed
a new, more comprehensive approach to housing needs was re-
quired to deal with the broader dilemma of deteriorated hous-
ing, and general neighborhood disinvestment and instability.
It was felt that the 705 Program's previous emphasis on new
construction focused too narrowly on dwelling units alone and
not enough on the total neighborhood environment. It was felt
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that any serious attempt to attack the housing problem and
design a workable housing strategy would have to consider a
variety of elements entrenched in the inter-relationships of
neighborhood dynamics. No longer was the goal sdely to im-
prove the supply of low-income housing, but instead to im-
prove entire neighborhoods.
The Neighborhood Improvement Program (NIP) emerged in
reponse to the desire to design a strategy for neighborhood
stabilization. The program evolved, masterminded to a large
extent by Jefferson, until it became apparent that utiliza-
tion of Chapter 705 funds alone would not be sufficient to
mobilize a neighborhood-wide program. Chapter 707 funds
would be needed to suppliment the efforts. By insuring a
steady source of rental income to homeowners, Chapter 707
provides a tool by which indigenous homeowners can maintain
their units and secure their ownership.
As NIP began to incorporate the utilization of Chapter
707 funds Jefferson required the input and assistance of Joel
Kirshner, then the director of the Chapter 707 Program.
Kirshner had worked at DCA for about two years before being
appointed by Commissioner Crampton to administer the Chapter
707 Program. Both Jefferson and Kirshner shared the same en-
thusiasm for developing a more comprehensive, innovative
housing program with a balanced combination of 705 and 707
funds. In addition both were keen to make the most of the
Commissioner's receptivity toward program improvements. The
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administration wanted to "repackage" the 705 Low-Income
Housing funds in a neighborhood format in an effort to "sell"
the program to local communities. With the atmosphere with-
in DCA conducive to the initiation of NIP, Jefferson and
Kirshner were to provide the impetus for its eventual im-
plementation on a demonstration basis.
The need for initiative and the desire to maintain mo-
mentum was of primary concern to both Jefferson and Kirshner
in developing NIP. They firmly believed that if they failed
to act quickly the "mood of the administration" might change,
once again stalling the program. These concerns coupled
with a serious lack of additional manpower provided little
time or resource from which to carefully develop an elabor-
ate, detailed plan for NIP. This need for expediency was
nonetheless combined with a sincere, intense commitment on
the part of the two directors to make NIP work and succeed.
Their administrative style was highly personal and unbureau-
cratic. It was their belief that only through personal in-
teraction, commitment and perseverance could NIP be quickly
implemented and results produced.
Given the underlying need for rapid implementation, the
two directors nonetheless made a conscientious attempt (in
the limited time available) to solicits ideas and opinions
from a variety of persons involved in various aspects of
housing. The primary focus of these discussions centered on
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determining the critical elements that would be needed to .
develop an effective and viable program for neighborhood
stabilization. The discussions continued to raise such
questions as: Who are the Principal actors in a neighbor-
hood? What are their roles in providing for a stable neigh-
borhood? What is a "stable neighborhood"? What conditions
or incentives must exist for these actors to act either in-
dependently or collectively for neighborhood stability?
What is the State's role in this process? What types of
neighborhoods would provide the best forum for State inter-
vention?
A strategy began to take form as a result of the dis-
cussions initiated during this short period of conceptuali-
zation for NIP. Critical to this developmental period was
input from a noted author and practioner in the area of
neighborhood stabilization, Rolf Goetze. Rolf Goetze firmly
believed neighborhood stability to be the product of a var-
iety of inputs. Factors such as housing market dynamics,
sensitive code enforcement, strengthening indigenous home-
ownership patterns, building neighborhood confidence and
imagery were all a part of the inter-related myriad of ele-
ments essential to the longterm viability of a neighborhood.
Goetze's concept of a "stable neighborhood" went beyond the
singular concern for the dwelling unit. Neighborhood ameni-
ties such as recreational space, security systems, street
maintenance, public transportation and community facilities
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created the larger package of housing goods and services
critical in housing decisions and dynamics.
Similarly the homeowner was but one actor among many
that played a major, determining role in Goetze's broad con-
ceptualization of the "stable neicrhborhood' . Financial lend-
ing institutions, appraisers, housing inspectors, elected
city officials, real estate representatives, potential home-
buyers, and neighborhood associations likewise possess tre-
mendous influence over the dynamics of housing maintenance,
supply and demand. 7
Jefferson came to incorporate many of these ideas in his
strategy for NIP. He believed that to isolate one element or
one actor from another would only lead to an unsuccessful,
piecemeal approach towards neighborhood stabilization. The
question now was how to structure the program, with its all-
inclusive array of variables, so as to incorporate as many of
these factors as possible.
Guidelines briefly outlining the objectives and proce-
dures of NIP were drawn up by Jefferson and Kirshner in the
summer of '73. Unlike rules and regulations that have legal
implications, the guidelines were broadly written so as to
provide flexibility in its interpretation and eventual imple-
mentation. Intentionally written in such a manner the objec-
tives of NIP as originally conciived were:
1. Upgrade the physical condition of older neighbor-
hoods. It is expected that through the judicious
use of DCA housing resources, a significant por-
tion of a neighborhood's deteriorating housing
can be rehabilitated. These resources, matched
with other funds, can likewise be used to improve
essential neighborhood facilities. Further in-
fusion of public resources must in turn stem pri-
vate disinvestment and spur reinvestment in the
private housing stock.
2. Improve the availability and qualityof neighbor-
hood facilities and serviqes. The availability of
quality community facilities, recreation, open
space, street lighting and municipal services are
key ingredients for a successful neighborhood.
An important element of the Neiqhborhood Improve-
ment Program is the identification of needed neigh-
borhood facilities and services. While DCA funds
are available to finance a portion of the requir-
ed facilities, the development and maintenance of
improved neighborhood facilities and services de-
,pends substantially on resource commitments of the
municipality and its successful bid for additional
funds from state and federal agencies and the pri-
vate sector.
3. Secure funding commitments from other sources.
These sources include iocal government, Federal
agencies, other state agencies, banking institu-
tions and local businesses. Because of limited
NIP funds . . . the bulk of housing units in a
participating neighborhood will have to depend
on alternative resources for financing repairs.
Because many participating neighborhoods are red-
lined, securing a pool of mortgage money will
frequently require special initiatives. In ad-
ditionwhile DCA can finance substantial portions
of the cost of certain neighborhood facilities,
some generally operating costs for neighborhood
facilities must be covered in total from other
sources.
4. Strengthen indigenous ownership patterns. Many
deteriorating neighborhoods suffer from a decline
in homeownership and high rates of absentee land-
lordism which may imply neglect of the housing
stock. Rental assistance can be used to subsi-
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dize the tenants' rent and to provide a fair and
timely rental payment to the landlord, frequent-
ly in exchange for certain repairs on the proper-
ty. Other mechanisms such as low-cost mortgage
financincg and tax abatements can mitigate the
difficulties of the resident landlord in a low-
income neighborhood. In addition to reinforcing
resident landlord homeownership, mechanisms can
be developed to encourage homeownership among
capable low-income families. These devices in-
clude homeownership cooperatives using rental
assistance and lease-purchase agreements under
Ch. 705 (pending enabling legislation now in
process).
5. Strengthen neighborhood organization. A strong
neighborhood association is essential for the co-
operation between tenants, landlords, and the
housing authority required to carry out the plan-
ning and implementation of a Neighborhood Im-
provement Program. Furthermore, after the com-
pletion of this intensive effort known as the
Neighborhood Improvement Program, a strong neigh-
borhood association can be expected to continue
to secure housing resources and quality municipal
services for the neighborhood and require neigh-
borhood residents to properly maintain their
properties.
6. Increase user involvement. Tenants and owners
should be involved to the greatest extent pos-
sible in the rehabilitation, maintenance, man-
agement, and owner'hip of dwelling units pro-
duced under the NIP. The benefits of these
types of involvement are:
a. reduction of housing costs thru decrease in
maintenance costs.
b. expansion of real equity to resident (co-op,
ownership).
c. increased community support among residents
through increased knowledge of housing pro-
cesses and problems.
d. increase resident ability to adapt structure
to changing family needs.
e. increase in resident independence, self-con-
fidence, and sense of responsibility for units. 8
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E. Proposal Stage of NIP
The NIP guidelines offered a wide range of program
options, none of which at the time were ever fully devel-
oped in concept or by mode of ooeration. Alternative
home mortgage loan pools, the participation of local fi-
nancial lending institutions, cooperatives and tenant
management/maintenance systems were encouraged, but their
actual design and method of implementation was left large-
ly for the local communities to devise. The state's role
in promoting and developing these program elements along
with the local communities was undefined and for the most
part, never elaborated upon.
Vague as the NIP Directors were about the various pro-
gram elements and how they were to be implemented, Jefferson
and Kirshner did have specific communities in mind for NIP
funding. Both directors were quick to admit that there was
virtually no effort to solicits proposals from the local
communities on a statewide basis. Instead the process by
which proposals were solicitat-ed was very unbureaucratic
and personal; only a select number of communities were even
informed of NIP funds. As Gary Jefferson phrased it:
"It was intended to be a small demonstration proj-
ect. We had originally intended that there would
not be more than 4 or 5 (projects) . Having work-
ed in the housing field for many years, between
Joel and I we knew a great many of the better
people at the local level in housing and planning
with a special sensitivity to housing. We felt
it made more sense to go to these people than to
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design an elaborate selection process which ul-
timately would be a charade and put a great
deal of political pressure on the department." 9
As reasoned by Joel Kirshner,
"Momentum is very important for these programs
. . (we were) looking for cities, neighborhood
organizations and local housing authorities
that we thought would provide the spark for
this."10
What type of neighborhood did these two directors en-
vision would provide the desired forum for NIP? What
neighborhood features would have to exist for one to be
selected as a demonstration site? These questions, as
mentioned earlier in this chapter were discussed quite
thoroughly in the conceptual stage of NIP. For the most
part NIP was aimed at the "transitional" neighborhoods.
Those communities that had formerly been well maintained
and secure in the housing market, but now were experiencing
physical decay, and decline. Numerous neighborhood and
city elements were seen as significant in developing a
strategy to stabilize or "turn around" these communities:
the availability of Community Development Block Grants, a
cohesive neighborhood organization, the support and co-
operation of city officials. Among the numerous features
desired, one aspect stood out as most significant: the
need for "the single individual locally (with) 'the breath
of knowledge of local, state and federal funding sources
and the managerial skills, creativity, innovation, per-
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serverance and integrity to make NIP work." 11
In Soringfield, Jefferson and Kirshner vested their con-
fidence in the acting Planning Director. Likewise in Lowell
the Planning Director, Frank Keefe, was sinaled out and en-
couraqed to submit a proposal. Lowell also had the added ad-
vantage of Jefferson's personal acquaintance with the presi-
dent of the neiahborhood association from which the NIP site
was eventually to be located.
Kirshner specifically solicitated the interest of the
Riverside/Cambridgeport Community Corporation (RCCC).
Kirshner was impressed with the Cambridge-based oraanization
througt/previous interactions,and 'das confident that the Direc-
tor of the Cambridge Housing Autnority, Harry Spence, would
likewise be receptive to the concept of NIP.
Both NIP 1directors were interested in a Central Western
Mass-achusetts organization called Rural Housing Movement. Fa-
miliar with an interesting project they had been working on
in Greenfield, the _RHMi.was informed of NIP and the availabi-
lity of funds.
Another well known community based organization, the
Roxbury Action Program (RAP) , knew Lou Crampton and was also
informed of the new DCA program. DCA felt that George
Morrison, the Director of RAP, possessed many of the leader-
ship qualities they saw as central to the program's success.
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In addition to the afore mentioned communities Waltham,
Dorchester,, Mattapan, Brockton, Fitchbura, Pittsfield, and
Soringfield together comorised the list of cities that were
authorized to commence planning for a prospective Neighbor-
hood Improvement Program in the target area of their choice.
In the final analysis only six communities would be awarded a
Contract for Financial Assistance (CFA) to imi;lement tljeir
approved plans.
At this stage Jefferson and Kirshner presented each ao-
plicant community with a set of NIP guidelines which outlined
the data that would be required in the plans submitted by each
community. Background information coverina numerous aspects
of the designated NIP area within each community would be ac-
companied with a descriptive portion indicating neighborhood
participation processes, contemplated use of other housing
resources, proposed timetables and budgets among other things.
Workshops to review the guidelines and clarify the pro-
cedures were held with the aoplicant communities. Whereupon
further liaison with DCA was conducted on an individual con-
ference level with one or both of the NIP Directors. Personal
interaction and site visits were the methods imolemented by
Jefferson and Kirshner. Informal, personalized and unbureau-
cratic was the conscious style they conveyed.
Information not provided by the plans but nonetheless
required for evaluation purposes was sought through personal
interaction. As Jefferson and Kirshner explained:
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"We were satisfied with satisfying ourselves . not
on paper but through meetings . .. . - (we filled in the
gaps) through personal encounter." 1 2
"What was not written into- the plan was what we saw
there and in talking with the people."1 3
This informal approach in throughout the proposal stage
was later to Affect the actual implementation stages of NIP
as a whole. This will be discussed later fin the thesis.
F. The NIP Approach - Piecing Together The Program Inputs
The NIP guidelines and procedures provided no set of cri-
teria by which to evaluate the proposals. Apparently in the
interest of flexibility Jefferson did not chcse to delineate
a complicated, restrictive evaluation component. LikeWise, it
seemed Jefferson was skeptical about to what extent one could
scientifically analyze the numerous, varied factors involved
in the process of neighborhood improvement.* If tradeoffs had
to be made Jefferson would base his decision on "professional
judgement." In this case "professional judgement" was root-
ed in Jefferson's preliminary conception of how the various
NIP components were to come together and function as an over-
all strategy. NIP as a complex strategy for neighborhood
stabilization involved a wide range of independent inputs
that as a set of interacting program elements were designed
* Kirshner shared this sentiment:
"Who knows what is going to stabilize a neighborhood?
It's about as scientific as someone once said, 'the
man on the moon'. David Birch (of MIT) gave us a di-
agram with bunches of arrows relating all the vari-
ables . . . it looked like the electrical circuit of
a color TV." 14
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INPUTS
Chapter 705
Chapter 707
tQJ
Chapter 705 Ownership
Xnabling Legislation
MHIMFA
Prv't Lending Instit.
Revolving Loan Pools
NEI GH1BOI1l001) IMPROVEMENT PROURAN
PROGRAM ELEMENTS
PROCESS (Summary)
Establish site office
707 outreach for owner partic.
Select bldgs. for demo .rehab
or rental ass't.
Inspection, assessmenI, aquis.
of 705 bldgs.
Select architects, dev. plans
Select contractors - pulilic
bidding
Dev. t approve contracts for
705 rehab construc.c & 707
rent-up
705 rehab construction
Tenant Selection & occupancy
707 loan aquis. - perform re-
pairs & improvements
Dev. of tenant ownership struc-
ture (e.g. coop, limited part-
nership)
Secure financing
Dev. management system
Transfer of title
Inter-State agency cooperation
(MIM FA/DCA)
Public/private sector coopera-
tion (gov't/banks)
OUTPUTS
Dwelling units rehabbed
Dwelling units under
707 lease
Housing provided to low-
Income tenants
Participation of owners
Home repair &S/or improv.
l6ans secured by lever-
ing 707 lease agreem-ts.
Assistance to resident-
owners & responsible
absentee-owners
Public hsg, tenants-'home-
owners...ront-t equity
Low-income homeownership
Transfer of quality hsg.
from pub'id sector to
privi.te sector
Public & priv't originat-
ed funds provided to
NIP areas for repairs
& home improvements
Mortgage loans (conven-
tional and non-conven.)
NEI G11BORH1OOD IMPROVEIMENT PROGRAM
PROGRAM ELEHENTS (Continued)
PRO C ES S
CDBG & "Other" Funds-
Technical Ass' t
City Services
Neigh. Facilities
Needs & strategy development
Community Outreach Support systems to NIP
Provision of advisory, contractor area& homeowners
referrals, financial consoling, Improved neigh. environ.
etc. services Open space, community
Provide muni. improvements and in- centers & the like
creased muni. maintenance
Dev. community facilities
Local Gov't inter-Dept.
Coordination -
Property Tax Assess.
Code Enforcement
Tax Title
Rebates/Incentives
Alternative Management
& Maintenance Systems
Needs & strategy ddvelopment
Revisions in policy, processing
&/or governing statutes for exst'g
programs (e.g. tax title)
Creation and dev. of new programs
(e.g. kehab rebates)
Sensitive & flexible po-
licies for homeowners
"Up to code" & improved
hsg. stock
Diminish disinvestment
& abandonment
Increase city revenue &
K r n P r+ res a b
Tenant outroach Tenant pride & confidence
Tenant training Tenant cost savings
Tenant management &/or maintenance Tenant skill development
Maintenance of hsg. stock
Coops & Limited Partner-
ships
Neighborhood Association
Utilize Chapter 705 Ownership
Enabling Legislation
Outreach, training, financing, etc.
Outreach to neighborhood residents
Participation in planning, implemen-
tation, and monitoring stages of
NIP
Provision of technical Assistance
(refer to Chap. 705
ownership legis.)
Resident input & feedback
Pressure group to facili-
tate accountability
INPUTS, OUTPUTS
I
t1j
00
I
I
to deal with particular target problems as well as to cel-
lectively meet broad objectives. In the following para-
graphs these program inputs are delineated according to
their roles as pieces of a larqer NIP strategy. This sec-
tion describes those elements briefly mentioned earlier in
the NIP objectives in greater detail as conceived by those
responsible for NIP in its early stages.
Chapter 705 funds, by far the largest, most important
component of NIP, was especially aimed to acquire and re-
habilitate the most seriously deteriorated, largely absen-
tee-owned structures. To assist in the arrest of general
neighborhood housing deterioration Chapter 707 funds would
be utilized to subsidize the rental income of largely in-
digenous resident-owned structures which were in relatively
good condition but in need of perhaps minor home improve-
ments and/or rehabilitation. Moreover Chapter 707 sub-
sidies could be leveraged to secure needed private funds for
such repairs and rehabilitation. All together it was hoped
that the NIP areas would range in size of neighborhoods of
500 to 1500 units (figures recommended by Neighborhood
Housing Services*) and that NIP would not subsidize more than
25% of the housing stock in any one of the designated areas. 1 5
*NHS-nationwide program funded through the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board with two such Boston-based operations.
It provides technical assistance to neighborhoods in
revitalization and in halting disinvestment.
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DCA was acutely aware that Chapter 705 buildings, once
acquired, would be owned and operated by DCA for at least
40 years, the term of the mortgage. This was a long-term
commitment DCA preferred to avoid. The objective of NIP
was to increase indigenous homeownership, not develop state
agency owned housing that would be in essence under the su-
pervision of a large, bureaucratic absentee-landlord. As
part of the larger scheme of NIP, Jefferson proposed to de-
velop additional 705 homeownership legislation internally
by which Chapter 705 housing could be transferred over time
to tenants for homeownership.
The remainder of housing units not subsidized by either
705 or 707 funds but requiring home improvements or rehabil-
itation nonethelesS would require other public funds or pri-
vate financing. To fulfill this need it was expected that
the city would either utilize Commuiity Development Block
Grant (CDBG) funds to provide a revolving loan for homeowners,
or encourage local lending institutions into responsive lend-
ing activity in the depressed NIP areas. One method of re-
vitalizing lender activity would be for local housing author-
ities and neighborhood organizations to deposit their funds
(e.g. Chapter 705,667 or CDBG) only in those local banks
that would cooperate with the efforts of neighborhood im-
provement (i.e. "greenlining") Other methods of combating
disinvestment and encouraging active lending in the target
areas would be designed and utilized.
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NJefferson was aware that such -leveraging of public funds
miqht fail in providing the incentives required to motivate
the banking community to act responsibly. Thus, another key
input was required to insure monies would be available to main-
tain or improve those dwellings in the NIP area not maintained
by either Chapter 705 or 707 funds. It was anticipated that
the Massachusetts Housincr Mortgage Finance Agency (MHMFA)
which was still in its conceptual stage but nonetheless at-
tracting a great deal of support and interest, would designate
NIP areas for home improvement and rehabilitation loans. By
providing "Loans to Lenders" Jefferson hoped to not only pro-
vide funds to indigenous homeowners of NIP areas, but to in-
volve the local banks in the administration and Processing of
the loans as well. The asset of MUMFA would not be so much
that the interest rate for the loans would he lower, but that
the funds provided through these loans would be available in
areas oreviously relined from such funds. Both Kirshner and
Jefferson admitted that MHMFA was perceived as a critical in-
gredient to the overall strategy of NIP.*
DCA encouraged further city commitment of CDBG, other
oublic and/or private funds in the provision of neighborhood
services and facilities. Additional funds provided by city,
* Interview with Gary Jefferson (12/10/76):
"It's not the sort of program to fool around with .
there are certain things in the margin. We needed
M4HMFA for this thing (NIP) to work."
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state or federal sources might be utilized towards providing
technical assistance to homeowners in NIP areas. Loan proces-
sing, instruction in minor repair and maintenance, advice on
the design and subcontracting aspects of rehabilitation might
be provided by NIP support staff at the local level.
Moreover, city funds were expected to subsidize state
efforts by improving or extending community services, such as:
security (i.e. police) garbage collection, street improve-
ments and added recreational activities. The city was also
designated to develop plans for the acquisition, rehabilita-
tion, or new construction of those neighborhood facilities
that could be allocated with no more than 10% of the Chapter
705 funds. The remainder of the facility development costs,
at least 50%, would have to be from other funding sources,
public or private.
Further local governmental support would involve inter-
departmental coordination toward policies conducive to neigh-
borhood improvement. DCA recommendations for a supportive
role in NIP were in the form of: revisions in property tax
assesment practices, efficient processing of tax title pro-
cedures, sensitive code enforcement, and possible implemen-
tation of direct cash rebates for rehabilitation work. Is-
sues such as abandonment, the acquisition of additional land
for municipal uses, housing deterioration, and the need for
rehabilitation incentives would require many changes in govern-
ment programs and methods of processing.
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To control costs and increase tenant oarticipation with-
in NIP,DCA was receptive to alternatives in management/main-
tenance systems. Owners of Chapter 707 units could emoloy
self-help techniques in performinq a portion of the rehabil-
tation work in order to reduce the amount of the rehabilita-
tion loan. Tenants of Chapter 705 housing could also be em-
ployed to perform some rehabilitation tasks for either finan-
cial reimbursement, or rent reductions. In the case of coops
or limited partnerships work equity methods (i.e. "sweat
equity") might be employed. Such initiation of alternative
management/maintenance systems miqht ultimately depend on the
initiative of the local administrating party or neighborhood
residents of the NIP area. Nonetheless support systems for
such- e.fforts by the state would be required.
No doubt a crucial element underlying any effort -for
neighborhood improvement would lie with a commitment of the
neighborhood's residents. As outlined previously in the ob-
jectives of NIP the exist&nce of a "stroncr neighborhood as-
sociation is essential . (it) can be expected to continue
to secure housing resources and quality municipal services
for the neighborhood and require neighborhood residents to
properly maintain their property." 1 7 As Jefferson and Kirshner
put it:
"We don't know how you can insure there will always
be a city commitment. That is one of the reasons
why it was important that there be a neighborhood
organization to apply pressure."1 8
-33-
". . . if you have people organized in concert and
speaking in concert that is a force for the mayor
or city council to contend with for better services
or community development funds."' 9
G. Evaluation Stage of NIP
As the various NIP applicants proceded to develop their
plans the two NIP directors began to reassess their guide-
lines, concepts and expectations. No'rules or regulations
were ever formulated for NIP on which an evaluation of the
submitted plans could be based. Jefferson and Kirshner brief-
ly attempted to secure funds for an elaborate evaluation com-
ponent for NIP (to be based partially on Goetze's theory of
neighborhood stabilization) but the proposal was not funded.
Evaluation, as with the other stages of NIP, was restricted
to the. limited manpower and resources available.
In addition to the practical constraints of developing
extensive regulations and implementing a detailed evaluation
system, were the real desires of both NIP directors to proceed
as quickly as possible through the "start up" stages of NIP,
and to maintain a level of "flexibility" in the program.
Their immediate goal was to get NIP (and the Chapter 705
Program in particular) launched. In their minds any action
was better than no action.* The funds were available, and the
money had to be moved.
* Interview with Joel Kirshner (12/2/76):
If you wait for everything to come together to start,
you never start . . . Without NIP what you had was a
705 Program that wasn't working or having any impact
at all . . . the choice was between a program with no
plans, and (one with) random effect."
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Rules and regulations were avoided because it was felt
that they would be legally constraining and thus, minimize
administrative lattitude. Neighborhoods obviously. were not
all alike. The NIP directors felt program flexibility (rath-
er than bureaucratic adherence to a set of rigid regulations)
would have to be permitted if a variety of neighborhood
types were to be granted funds. Some program inputs such as
organized neighborhood associations virtually did not exist
in some of the prospective NIP areas. Other inputs such as
local bank participation or revised tax title procedures were
in essence "good faith" commitments having little binding
power. When the time for actual implementation came Jefferson
figured "it would purely depend on the department's insistence".2 0
Evaluation of the various NIP applicants was more a ran-
dom-bal'ncing act than a scientific analysis of costs and ben-
efi.ts. Values were arbitrarily set on many program inputs,
and were mentally shifted either to offset weaknesses in the
plans or count as "pluses" toward approval. Criteria such as
local political support, code enforcement, local technical as-
sistance and organized neighborhood associations were desir-
ables but would be overlooked in lieu of other positive inputs.
Kirshner put it:
"It's really whatever works, whdever you can get through
the politicians, bureaucrats and the community . . .
the most you can hope for is something like this . .
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. . . a 'shared concept' of neighborhood improvement
that hopefully will be enough to keep the program
going. "21
The over-riding criteria that was imperative for approval
was the presence of a strong, commitled and caoable personality
in the NIP area who would support and guide the program through
its implementation stages. Other criteria could be overlooked
or replaced, but this need for a figurehead was to remain a.
-must for any program that was to be approved.
This "balancing" approach utilized in the early NIP eval-
uations is perhaps best demonstrated in the approval process
applied to the Highland Park area. Though this target neigh-
borhood suffered the worst deterioration observed amongst all
the proposed NIP sites and was beyond the stage of decline
commonly associated with "transitional" neighborhoods, its
strengths and overall potential for success nonetheless at-
tracted a positive interest on the part of DCA. As deterior-
ated as the neighborhood was, Highland Park was slated for
future development efforts. Plans had been developed to lo-
cate a community college in the area, and the neighborhood
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was firmly in the path of the new development of the South-
west Transportational Corridor. Substantial amounts of pub-
lic funds from the City of Boston and H.U.D. were committed
to the area, much to the credit of the Roxbury Action Pro-
gram, the pioneering community organization based in High-
land Park. Though DCA felt portions of the RAP NIP proposal
were weak in some areas, it was nonetheless greatly impressed
with the sponsoring organization itself and confident in the
leadership of it Executive Director, George Morrison.
In addition to RAP, Jefferson and Kirshner eventually
were to approve Lowell and Waltham for NIP funding. Dorchester,
on the other hand, was granted a small planning grant. Some
confusion as to the precise approval dates is comolicated by
the' fact that in the midst of the NIP evaluation stage another
administrative change befell DCA in the Spring of 1975.
Jefferson and Kirshner left DCA, and were replaced with a suc-
cession of different appointees designated by a new commis-
sioner. The new administration eventually proceded to add
Cambridge, Fitchburg and Brockton to the list of approved NIP
areas making a total of six NIP target neighborhoods.
To summarize the NIP selection process Jefferson quite
candidly put it:
"We were aware that this was not only a demonstration pro-
ject but also an experimental one, experimenting upon
which circumstances would work. If we took only the
'creampuffs' that would be fine but we wanted to test the
limits which meant we had to take some chances, big chan-
ces. We figured if we had a 50% success rate it would
show us what we can do and what we can't do . . . or else,
what's the use for an experimental preram?" 2 3
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CHAPTER III
EVALUATION OF NIP TARGET NEIGHBORHOODS
A. Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the six NIP target
neighborhoods that are presently oDerating in Massachusetts.
The six target neighborhoods are considered in the following
order: Brockton - Walnut-Turner Area, Carbridae - Riverside/
Cambridgeport Community, Fitchburq - College District, Lowell -
Lower Highlands Area, Roxbury - Highland Park Area, and
Waltham - Charles-Felton Area. The Neighborhood Improvement
Program has allocated funds for all six neighborhoods to the
amount of $6.06 million in Chapter 705 and $895,000 in Chapter
707 funds (Exhibit III-1). The sponsor cities of each NIP
have likewise committed their share of local funds to the NIP
effort (Exhibit 111-2).
Each NIP neighborhood will be briefly described to high-
light the more significant features that characterize it as a
tarqet area warranting NIP funding, as well as Dresent dis-
tinctions that may separate it from the other designated neigh-
borhoods. The major issues and concerns of these NIP areas
will be reviewed such that both the problemns and assets of the
community are revealed. Likewise, e::ch NIP will be reviewed
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for their prooosed strategy as delineated in their original
NIP plans and to the extent possible, as thus carried out in
their respective early stages of imolementation (Exhibit III-
3) . Since it is yet premature to perform any evaluation of
the actual results of each NIP, the analysis in this chapter
will be based on an evaluation of the perceived weaknesses
and strengths of the various NIP proposals, the degree to
which these proposed strategies are reflected in their early
operational stages, and the potential fcr such strategies to
meet their objectives for "neighborhood improvement".
The analysis conducted in this chapter is predicated on
a variety of sources. Extensive, detailed data on neighbor-
hood characteristics are for the most part derived from the
original funding proposals submitted by the various target
areas. Other sources of information are pieced together
from Working Paper: Evaluation of the Neighborhood Im-
provement Program submitted to DCA (May 5, 1976) by Harvard
University's Pl. 311b Community Development Policy Workshop,
NIP Monthly Reports (by DCA staff) , and data collected from
the memorandum files of DCA. In addition to these existing
sources of data, a series of questionaires (Exhibit 111-4
to 7 ) and interviews were conducted in Spring of 1977 by
the author to facilitate the correlation and updating of in-
formation on the six neighborhoods.
Maps of each NIP target area, and various supportive
data inserted in the appendix of this thesis are provided
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to reflect the diversity of the neighborhoods - selected for
NIP funding. These materials area not meant to be all inclu-
sive. Because the information is derived from the original
NIP plans of each respedtive community, data will at times
differ in format or not be consistently avail'able at all (e.g.
demographic cata on Lowell's NIP area is literally non-exis-
tent in the Lowell plan). Nonetheless an attempt has been
made to build a basic foundation of data on each neighborhood
from which one can develop an image of the communities.
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B. Brockton - Walnut-Turner Area
The Neighborhood - Issues and Concerns:
The Walnut-Turner Street neighborhood consists of a ten
block area surrounded on three sides by stable, middle class
communities with a fourth side bordering the downtown business
district of Brockton. Unlike its surrounding residential com-
munities, the Walnut-Turner area is largely occupied by low-
income residents. The neighborhood's population not only has
a greater percentage of low-income families than the City of
Brockton, but also a greater percentage of minoritiez(i.e.
Blacks, Spanish-speaking),families on public assistance, and
blue collar workers (Exhibit III-8). The other NIP target
neighborhoods reflect a similarly disadvantaged oopulation
relative to their respective cities. As in many of the other
NIP areas, the Walnut-Turner area also suffers from higher
than city average crime rates. 1
After years of decline, the Walnut-Turner neighborhood is
one of the most deteriorated neighborhoods in Brockton. An-
proximately one third of the neighborhood's 258 structures
containing over 700 dwelling units are in varying degrees of
deterioration with "sagging porches, rotten gutters, peeling
paint, and littered yards of beaten dirt".2 Over half of
these dilapidated buildings are owned by absentee landlords
(Exhibit III- 9 ) .3 Many of the resident homeowners who have
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lived in the neighborhood for many years are advancing in age
and will soon be in the position where they may wish to sell
their homes. There is concern that the number of absentee
landlords could grow in years to come.
Though the Walnut-Turner neighborhood is oresently de-
scribed as one that is "far beyond the stage of 'just begin-
ing to go bad'" 5 , there are nonetheless many oositive features
of the neighborhood that argue for its revitalization poten-
tial. Though the neighborhood is abundant in its share of de-
teriorated buildings and negligent absentee landlords, most
of the buildings in the area are still structurally sound
triple-deckers with over half of them occupied by resident
lar4Lords of the neighborhood and single-family homeowners. 6
The neighborhood in general is attractive even in its current
state of neglect. The streets are tree-lined and the build-
ings offer a diversity of attractive architectural styles.
The housing market within the area is alive if not well. Buy-
ers can be attracted to the area though the local banks are
often reluctant in encouraging investment in the neighborhood.7
In 1973 a non-profit community organization called the
Brockton Housing Trust (BHT) was founded by- Josh Posner in an
effort to build on the strengths of the neighborhood in pro-
viding for housing in the City of Brockton. Using conventional
funding, the BHT was able to rehabilitate four large buildings
on Turner and Haverhill Streets. The BHT was later instrumen-
tal in establishing the Turner-Haverhill Community Council as
-44-
a mechanism for resident participation in the neighborhood.8
Though the Brockton Housing Authority (BHA) had in its
possession approximately $71.6 million of Chapter 705 funds,
they had done nothing but "sit on the money" since 1968.9
The BHT decided to assume the initiative, and requested a
grant from the 705 money to develop a feasibility study for
a Walnut-Turner NIP. The feasibility study was funded by the
BHA for $29,500, completed in fall of 1975, and well-received
by the staff at DCA. Sufficiently impressed with not only
the submitted NIP plan but also BHT's experience in housing
rehabilitation, the organized participation of the residents,
and the presence of Josh Posner to maintain the impetus in
the the community, Jefferson and Kirshner decided to provide
Brockton with funding.
Brockton's Proposed Strategy for NIP:
The Brockton strategy under NIP reflects the approach of
the other NIP's in the state in that the Chapter 705 funds
are geared towards acquiring and rehabilitating the most ser-
iously deteriorated, absentee-owned, and generally most vis-
ible buildings in the neighborhood. Brockton's Chapter 705
and 707 funded dwelling units are nonetheless more dispersed
within its designated target area than many of the other NIP's
providing a trIAly "scattered' effect. The objective is not
only to improve the housing stock and provide more low-income
housing, but also to impact upon the rest of the neighborhood
by possibly serving as a visible incentive to other residents,
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homeowners and observers (e.g. lendio institutions) in
the area.
To suppliment the state funded aspects of NIP the City
of Brockton is commlted to improving municipal services and
facilities in the Walnut-Turner area. The Mayor has agreed
to undertake a concerted effort in the neighborhood to up-
grade the streets, sidewalks, curbs, and municipal services
(i.e. tree pruning, garbage collection). In the same spirit,
a full time housing inspector will be assigned to the neigh-
borhood to intensify the code enforcement program. 1 0
Most of the C.-ity's contribution to NIP will be invested
in funding a Homeowners Program to provide loans and grants
up to $1250 to homeowners in the area for repairs or home im-
provements. The banks are expected to participate and con-
tribute in this program as well. Free financial counseling
and technical construction assistance will also be provided
to the community under this program.
While Brockton's NIP strategy strives to be comprehen-
sive, extending itself beyond just another housing rehabil-
itation program, it is yet tailored to consider the limita-
tion of its funding. Brockton's NIP plan summarizes that
city's approach by stating:
NIP is not conceived as a 'product' or a set
of fixed objectives. It is meant to be the begin-
ing of a process of neighborhood renewal that will
continue for many years and will have an impact far
beyond the last dollar spent on salaries. . . the
transformation of this neighborhood will take much
longer than that; but a od fondation can be built
in this initial period. "
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The Brockton NIP is presently funded for $1.6 million in
Chanter 705 funds, and $110,000 in Chapter 707 funds. Since
the Brockton Housing Trust was actively involved in the target
community and had been the driving force behind the NIP it had
hoped the BHA would allow the BHT to administer the program in
the Walnut-Turner neighborhood.* Instead the Brockton Housing
Authority Board voted to administer the approximately $1.7
million in NIP funds itself. DCA nonetheless required the BHA
to appoint a Liaison (i.e. program coordinator) for NIP who
would possess the needed intimate knowledge of the neighbor-
hood and the program. Josh Posner, who "coincident1y" ful-
filled both Liaison qualifications, was ultimately appointed.
This 'DCAatactic" was a conscious effort by Jefferson and
Kirshner to incorporate both the firm desires of.the BHA to
administer the program's funds, and the need for a "personal-
ity" to provide the innovative impetus for NIP. Such a ar-
rangement would hopefully set the stage for cooperation be-
tweeen the local housing authority and the community.
Early Implementation of Brockton NIP:
This effort to develop a "partnership" between the BHA
and the BHT has thus far failed miserably. Since NIP's opera-
*NIP Contracts for Financial Assistance (CFA's) must be
made by DCA with the Local Housing Authority (LHA), but
the LHA has the option to subcontract the services of a
non-profit community organization to administer the pro-
gram. An example of such an arrangement can be found in
the Highland Park NIP administered by RAP through the
Boston Housing Authority.
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tional phase was initiated to begin in late 1975, the Brockton
program has been plagued with bureaucratic "foot dragging" and
local political controversy. Most of this controversy stems
more from the intricate personality and political disputes
within the City of Brockton than from the conceptual issues
directly concerning NIP.* Obstacles and delays totaling thus
far 12 months, are continually being encountered where BHA
Board approval or cooperation is involved. 1 2
Throughout the political "mud slincring" that has taken
place in Brockton around NIP, the City (i.e. Mayor, City
Council, and other city agencies) the City has remained as
neutral as possible. Given the limited state and federal
funds available to Brockton, the City has decided to concen-
trate its efforts in revitalizing its downtown area first.1
City commitments for increased municipal services and improve-
ments.in the Walnut-Turner area have been slow in occuring.
An "Off Street Park" has been developed in the neighborhood,
but much to the contributions of 705 facility funds and the
volunteer labor of the local residents than to the efforts of
the city.
The Homeowners Program, already allocated $89,500 by the
City for grants and administration funds, has been scheduled
*For more insight into the political/personality strug-
fles in Brockton refer to Sept. 1976 and May 1977 is-
sues of Brockton Daily Enterprise. It should be noted
that the Brockton Daily Enterprise has been accused of
bias reporting and may have pblitical/personal connec-
tions of its own with certain BHA personnel.
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to start for some time but delays have been encountered in
the BHA Boards's approval of the hiring of a Rehabilitation
Officer. Until the NIP Homeowners Program gets underway lit-
tle can be observed on the part of the local lending institu-
tions in their roles in promoting neighborhood investment.
Nonetheless, thus far the local banks have been cooperating
with the planning phases of the program and a secure commitr
ment has been made to the Walnut-Turner area to make funds
available to the community.
Considering all the delays of the program, that in their
political nature sets Brockton apart from the other NIP pro-
jects the Brockton NIP is proceeding however slowly with the
acquisition of four buildings in the area for rehabilitation.
Six to ten additional buildings, all absentee-owned and ser-
iously deteriorated, are scheduled to be acquired and rehab-
ed in the future for the provision of a. total of approximate-
ly 40 dwelling units. These units, in addition to the 35
units slated for Chapter 707 subsidies, hopefully will pro-
vide a positive impact on the remainder of the Walnut-Turner
area.15
Analysis of Brockton NIP - Strengths and Weaknesses:
The commitment of Josh Posner and the active participa-
tion of the community's residents are by far the strongest
elements at work in the Brockton NIP. The construction of
the Off Street Park demonstrated the involvement of the com-
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munity and provides a visible symbol of the residents' strug-
gle to "turn-around" the neighborhood. This coupled with the
activation of a Neighborhood Advisory Council (NAC) to NIP
and a Walnut-Turner Neighborhood Council provide and maintain
resident vitality in the area as well as input in NIP.
It is questionable whether the acquisition and rehab of
10 to 15 buildings (though they be the most deteriorated, ab-
sentee-owned buildings) in a target neighborhood of over 250
structures would provide enough of an impetus from which to
"turn-around" the Walnut-Turner area. Much depends on the
local lending institutions to provide funds for upgrading the
remainder of the housing stock not acquired or subsidized by
NIP funds. Nevertheless, as expressed in Brockton's NIP plan,
the City is aware of this dtlimma and only anticipates build-
ing a "foundation" for neighborhood revitalization.
"This is the first step in trying to upgrade the
neighborhood of the NIP. This money alone, even
if it wera$10 million cannot do the job of reha-
bilitation. It will take a 100 per cent effort
of all landlords, tenants, code enforcement of-
ficers, BHA employees and this Board (BHA's)...
If we all work together, it can mean a rebirth
of the. neighborhood but it has to be a team ef-
fort."-* 16
It seems evident that unless a "team effort" can be se-
cured in the Brockton NIP, little hope can be attached to its
* This statement coincidentally was made by Manthala
George Jr., the Chairman of the BHA Board and one
of the primary 'characters involved in the politi-
cal in-fighting responsible for the delays in the
Brockton NIP.
-50-
"success". The City needs to be more responsive in meeting
its commitments to the area. The internal Dolitical con-
flict between Brockton's "personalities" must be resolved.
Related to all of this, DCA should re-evaluate its role in
administering NIP's, deciding either to remain in its pres-
ent role as observer and occasional mediator with the pow-
er to null out NIP funds altogether if the program fails to
work, or to be more assertive on the local level to lever-
age what it can to. make the program work.
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C. Cambridge - Riverside/Camnbridgeoort Community
The Neiahborhood - Issues and Concerns:
The NIP target area for Cambridge differs from the other
NIP's in that it is mostly comprised of one block. This tar-
get area is strategi.cally located in two neighborhoods, River-
side and Cambridaeoort, and largely occupied by a city park
called Hoyt Field situated in the center of the block. The
Riverside/Cambridgeport area is bordered on two sides by busy
one-way arterial roads that isolate it from the two communi-
ties, thus its sense of "identity" is more self-contained
within that one block than it is related to its encompassinc
neighborhoods.
The predominant housing type is a 2 - 4 family dwelling
situated in triple-decker fashion. The Riverside/Cambridge-
port area as a whole contains approximately 205 dwelling
units.1 7 Despite the fact that the area is conveniently lo-
cated to the downtown district of Cambridge and oublic trans-
portation, and that there is a great demand for housing in
Cambridae, much of the housina in this area has been allowed
to fall into a deteriorated state. In recent years there has
been an exodus of owner-occupants in the area to the suburbs
and other parts of the city. 1 8 Absentee lan&ords now own much
of the property in the neighborhood. The introduction of
rent control and lender reluctance to invest in the neighbor-
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hood have discouraged absentee landlords from investing in
their structures beyond cosmetic renyovation.1 9 To enforce
this attitude of disinvestment in the area, Citv funds for
maintenance, improvements and expansion of public facili-
ties have not been made available to the ar6a' '(Exhibit III-10)-
Out of a total of 30 census tracts in the City of
Cambridge, tract #3534 (encomoassing the Riverside/Cam-
bridgeport area) ranks 26th in median income, and second
in unemployment (Exhibit III-ll). This gensus tract also
has the highest proportion of both black and Spanish-sneak-
ina oersons in the City. 2 0
Though plagued with its share of housing and socio-
economic problems, the Riverside/Carnbridgeoort community
has its appeal as a neighborhood in which to live. The
neighborhood, as mentioned earlier, is conveniently loca-
ted to both public and private services. There is a heal-
thy mix of residents from a wide spectrum of ethnic, income
and social groups. Many of the residents of the neighbor-
hood are active members of the Riverside/Cambridqeport Com-
imunity Corporation (RCCC) , the organization that has dem-
onstrated innovative approaches to community revitalization
and that initially caught the attention of Joel Kirshner,
then Director of the Chapter 707 component of NIP.
Further encouragement for NIP funding of the Riverside/
Cambridgeport area was secured in the fact that land was abun-
dantly available for open space recreation, and that the neigh-
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borhood is in a "transitional" state in which NIP funds could
effectively be used to provide a Positive imoact on the neigh-
borhood. There existed signs that with the investment and in-
terest of the state, the city and financial institutions in
the area would respond in kind.
Cambridge's Proposed Strategy for NIP:
Cambridge's NIP target neighborhood is for the most part
smaller and in better condition than the other NIP target
areas throughout the State. The RCCC, a non-profit corpora-
tion, is gradually rehabilitating 20 buildings in the area
with conventional bank loans it has secured on its own, and
selling them to owner occupants upon completion of the work.
This, in essence, provides the same benefits that Chapter 705
funds would and perhaps even to a greater extent because RCCC
is also able to transfer title to the property after rehabil-
itation.*
Given such a situation, Cambridge's NIP assumes a differ-
ent approach than the other NIP's in that it is authorized to
use only Chapter 707 funds in its program. By dispersing sub-
sidized 707 units in the "needy" structures throughout the
neighborhood, hopefully the owners of these buildings can lev-
*Chapter 705 enabling legislation for homeownership
has yet to pass the legislature.
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erage home improvement loans from the local banks to make re-
pairs and rennovations. It is the intent of the Riverside/
Cambridgeoort NIP to not only improve the designated target
area but to ultimately impact upon the rest of the Riverside
and Cambridgeport neighborhoods.. A large part of the reas-
oning behind the area's selection as a NIP neighborhood was
based on its central location and visibility to the two ad-
jacent communities.
The City has tentatively committed a total of $75,000
for homeownership "grants" related to the NIP, providing a
form of -reserve cushion for new owners. The City has also
pledged $33,000 to be applied towards NIP relocation and
administration costs. 2 1 Improvements to Hoyt Field, neigh-
borhood streets and sidewalks are likewise anticipated to
be funded by the City (through CDBG funds).
The on-going RCCC Housing Improvement Program (HIP) is
presently operating in the area funded by $100,000 in City
CDBG funds. The HIP will be coordinated with NIP, with NIP
primarily aimed at imoroving absentee-owned prooerties while
the NIP is directed towards assisting existing homeowners in
fixing up their homes. 2 2
Early Implementation of Cambridge NIP:
The Cambridge NIP was formally approved on April 4, 1977.23
The Riverside/Cambridgeoort NIP is presently allocated $65,000
in Chapter 707 funds for the subsidizing of 40 dwelling units.
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The program will be administered with both the cooperation of
the Cambridge Housing Authority and the RCCC. So far, both
groups have worked well with each other and- no complications
are expected. Likewise the City seems firm in meeting its
commitments to upgrade municipal services and improve Hoyt
Field, both aspects which are desperately needed in the area.
Participating homeowners for the Chabter' 707' have been
recruited from the area. Twelve units are presently being
rehabbed by the current owners, and six units by the RCCC.
Encouraged by all this activity in the neighborhood initiated
by NIP and HIP, the local banks have been very supportive of
these programs by increasing the number of construction and
home improvement loans in the area.
Analysi's of Cambridge NIP - Strengths -and Weaknesses:
The Riverside/Cambridgeport Community as a NIP target
neighborhood benefits from its manatable size and thus, man-
acable scope of objectives for neighborhood improvement. The
neighborhood is truely a "transitional" neighborhood requir-
ing only a spark to ignite a host of good-will efforts from
the city and local private sector. The area, for all these
reasons, may not necessarily need the "personality" to pull
the program along. In Cambridge the impetus is not embodied
in one person alone as much as it is facilitated by the co-
ordinated and commited efforts of two bodies, the Cambridge
Housing Authority and the RCCC.
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All factors considered the potential for the Riverside/
Cambridgeport community to qradually make a change 'for the
better is very good. Whether these improvements to the tar-
get area will impact any of the bordering housing stock be-
yond its designated one block area remains to be seen. The
bordering one-way arterial roads provide a formidable bar-
rier for whatever positive spillover effects can be accrued
from the Riverside/Cambridgeport NIP unless something is
done to alter this situation these obstacles will remain.
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D. Fitchburg - College District
The Neighborhood - Issues and Concerns:
The College District of Fitchburg is an older, densely
developed residential area of anproximately 70 acres situated
between a state college on the north and a commercial-business
district on the south. Bordered by these two forces that en-
croach upon the neighborhood, the College District has suffer-
ed from the negative effects oroduced by their evergrowing
needs fox facilities and. room for growth. Transient college
students and minorities have gradually replaced the resident
homeowners that once abundantly nopulated the area but have
since left in search of single family homes in more suburban
areas-. Absentee landlords have taken over more and more of
the property in the area, often looking to maximize the re-
turn on their investment by converting their buildings into
multiple apartment units, only adding to the congestion, park-
ing and maintenance problems of the area. In a resident sur-
vey conducted in the College District, 43% of those surveyed
said oarking was the number one problem in the area. This was
followed by problems related to vacant buildings, emoloyment
opportunities, traffic, recreational facilities, and security. 2 4
Presently over 64% of the 800 dwelling units in the Col-
lege District are still owner-occunied, and much of the hous-
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ing stock is basically in sound condition though deficient in
one asoect or another (Exhibit 111-13) There does exist a
number of randomly located deteriorated buildings (some of
which are abandoned and/or tax delinquent) that create a de-
finite blighting influence on the rest of the neighborhood.
Some of the more critically deteriorated buildings in the
neighborhood have been demolished, leaving vacant lots to
dot the area. The City cannot utilize this property until
it is awarded to the City by the Land Court and carried
through the lengthy tax title process which usually takes
from 3 to 5 years to run its course. 2 5 In the meantime,
these vacant lots have become overgrown with vegatation,
and littered with- refuse from the neighborhood, once again
bli.ghting the surrounding community.
Investigation of the properties demolished by the City
have revealed a pattern of tax delinquency averaging approx-
imiately $9,000 in 'unpaid property taxes ber barcel of'l'and.2&
By the time: the Land Court awards title to these properties
to the City, the debt will have grown even larger. The prob-
ability of the City regaining these foregone property taxes
is very unlikely.
In response to the neighborhood's needs, desire to hold
its ground as a viable residential community, and struggle to
combat blight and absentee-ownership, the City has endeavored
to secure funds for the rehabilitation of the area. On two
previous occasions federal funding has failed to materialize;
NIP represents the City's third attempt to secure funding to
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improve the neighborhood. 2 7
Herbert Groop, the Executive Director of the Fitchburg
Housing Authority, was personally commited to do something to
aid the Colleae District. He presented the needs of the neigh-
borhood to DCA, and developed a plan by which NIP could be uti-
lized in the area. DCA believed the neighborhood was location-
ally attractive being located near the commercial-business dis-
trict of Fitchburg, and that many of the major deterioration
problems of the housing stock could be confronted by NIP. The
neighborhood posed a collection of interesting characteristics
and pxoblems as a "College District. Herbert Groop, who had
been working in Fitchburg since 1948, would provide the stable,
commited "personality" required. Likewise, the local staff ap-
peared competent to implement NIP, and City officials were so-
JLidly- behind the plan.
Fitchburg's Proposed Strategy for NIP:
Meetings to solicit "input into the planning of the Fitch-
burg NIP were held in the College District with residents, pro-
perty owners, Ward Councilors, the Police Department, the Tax
Assessors, local financial and lending institutions, social
service agencies, and Fitchburg State College. 2 8 Each meeting
was attended by approximately 40 to 60 people. In general,
people were supportive of NIP with residents particularly ea-
ger for it to be directed towards aiding the low-income fami-
lies in the area.
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Like the other NIP strategies Chapter 705 funds would be
used to acquire the most deteriorated and visible structures
in the neighborhood. Chapter 707 though, was specifically to
include absentee-owned buildings in its distribution of ren-
tal subsidies. It was felt that unless absentee-owned build-
ings were facilitated by the program the absentee-owned struc-
tures would continue to decline, thus remaining a blighting
influence in the community.
A Rehab Grant Program funded by City CDBG funds would be
provided to provide funds for interested homeowners. The lo-
cal lending institutions present at the meetings stated that
they would likewise make loans in the neighborhood if they
held the mortgage and the person applying had the "ability to
repay the loan". This ability could be facilitated by the
Rehab Grant and/or a 707 Rental Agreement.
Vacant lots in the College District could be used to pro-
vide recreational space or off-street parking in the neighbor-
hood. Traffic routes would be investigated for re-routing
possibilities, and the Police Department would try to assist
in any possible way to control the traffic in the area.
Early Implementation of Fitchburg NIP_:
Fitchburg's College District is presently slated for 36
Chapter 705 units and 50 Chapter 707 units. Five buildings
(one of which is proposed for demolition) have so far been
purchased under NIP, an additional four buildings are yet to
be acquired. The architect has completed "as built" and sche-
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matic drawings, and is now working on the construction docu-
ments.*
The NIP has recently been fortunate enough to acquire an
additional two buildings from the Fitchburg State College un-
der special arrangements. The City has acquired two structur-
ally sound buildings (for the token purchase price of $1) that
the State College had proposed to demolish to make room for
new dormitories. The City hopes to move these buildings to
three vacant lots in the neighborhood (one lot will be used to
provide parking) to not only provide additional housing but
also to "fill-in" the gaps in the residential pattern. In ex-
cha e , the City is providing the College with land (formerly a
playgroud) for parking. Since the buildings must be moved to
their prospective sites by early June, the State College's
deadline to begin site preparation for new construction, the
City has no choice but to acquire title to the vacant lots
through eminent domain.
The City has hired a rehab specialist for the area, in-
creased code enforcement, and initiated their 20% Rehab Incen-
tive Grant Program. Operations to relieve the parking, traf-
fic and facility problems in the area have, as of yet, not begun
in any substantial way.
Analysis of Fitchburg NIP - Strengths and Weaknesses:
Once again NIP has limited funding potential to impact on
*Each NTP selects its own architects, subject to DCA
approval, from open competion.
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a neighborhood comprising of over 300 structures through its
proposed acquisition of 10 to 11 Chapter 705 buildings.
Though the City has commited $100,000 to its Rehab Incentive
Grant Program, and resident interest has been good, more must
be seen on the part of securing additional funds from the lo-
cal lending institutions if a substantial number of the home-
owners in the area are to be facilitated in their efforts to
repair or improve their buildings. It is still unclear as to
what the commitment of the local banks to loan to "qualified"
applicants really means in providing funds previously unavail-
able to the community.
The City has succeeded in acquiring two additional build-
ings from the Fitchburg State College. This was more a fortu-
nate stroke of good timing than anythng else. The City none-
theless was forced to acquire the needed vacant lots for re-
locating the buildings through eminent domain. Though the
lots had to be acquired in less than twgfnonths in this instance,
the fact remains that these lots had been tax delinquent for
years and could have very well been ahenady under the posses-
sion of the City. What ability the tax title process has to
acquire property for municipal reuse, threaten owners into re-
ponsive payment, and discourage owner "milking" of. profits on
"city time and at the city's expense" has been critically-crip-
pled by its drawn out processing time. Long-term institution-
al improvements are in order for the tax title process to be a
tool for neighborhood improvement in this and other neighborhoods.
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The residents of the neighborhood have experienced two
Drevious disappointments in efforts to revitalize the neigh-
borhood. So far resident participation in the 707 and Rehab
Incentive Grant Programs have been positive. Some skepteism
remains nonetheless as to what NIP as a whole can really ac-
complish for the community. 3 0  This skeptism may be dispell-
ed when rehab under Chapter 705 is completed and the City
carries forth. on its other commitments to the College Dis-
trict. All this yet remains to be seen.
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E. Lowell - Lower Highlands Area
The Neighborhood - Issues and Concerns:
The Lower Highlands area of Lowell is a small target
neighborhood of about 12.6 acres, largely occupied by 68 res-
idential structures built 50 to 70 years ago. 31 Most of
these structures are multi-family tenements or two-family du-
plex dwellings containing a total of 148 dwelling units. Of
the 68 structures in the area over one third are in a dilaoi-
dated condition or in need of major repairs (Exhibit III-15) 32
The Lower Highlands area is for the most part surrounded
by densely developed residential neighborhoods, except for the
Hale-Howard Industrial Park (that has yet to be constructed)
which lies directly east of the target area across Chelmford
Street3 3 many of the residents of the vicinity were displaced
after the .1 70 census by the~ clearing of this urban renewal
site. Aporoximately 390 residents of the lower Highlands area
have remained, momentarily unkffected by the industrial park
project. It is hoped that the industrial park, when it is fin-
ally constructed, will not produce negative spill-over effects
(e.g. traffic congestion, pollution, noise) unon the area.
The Lower Highlands area is not the "ideal" NIP target
neighborhood that Jefferson had in mind. It did not fullfill
his original basic criteria of being a "transitional" neighbor-
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hood of -about 500 to 1500 dwelling units which if nrovided
with funding, the NIP units would not encompass more than 25%
of the housing stock. 3 4 Instead the target area seemed es-
pecially small, and even by the admidnce of local planning
Dersonnel, beyond the stage of "transition" and more into a
stage of "bottoming-out" .*35
Despite these factors Jefferson was nonetheless acutely
aware of the neighborhood's need for assistance and the plight
of the residents in the neighborhood, about 18% of which were
"subsisting below poverty levels .** 36 - Friank Keefe,- then
Planning Director of Lowell's Community Develooment Agency,
firmly convinced Jefferson that Lowell was philosphically and
financially committed to neighborhood revitalization through-
out the City. The City, with no state assistance, had al-
ready demonstrated this commitment by fiancing the improve-
-ment of an even larger neighborhood in Lowell, Lower Belvidere.
The NIP plan for the Lower Hiahlands area in Lowell had the
widespread support of the City Council, City agencies, and the
neighborhood. 37 Though somewhat apprehensive about the select-
ed target area, Jefferson felt such suoport, such city demon-
stration towards the concept of comorehensive neighborhood re-
vitalization, and the commitment of local city officials could
successfully motivate "neighborhood improvement" of the Lower
Highlands area. 38
* "bottomed-outeis defined as at a stage of beig seriously
deteriorated'.
** "Mentioned earlier in the thesis was Jefferson's person-
al acquaintance with the President of the local neigh-
borhood association.
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Lowell 's Proposed Strategy for NIP:
The Lowell plan strongly emphasized the need for "coon-
eration from all those participatina" for the successful im-
olementation of their NIP plan. It soecifically mentions:
State -DCA Officials
Local Planners
The Lowell Housing Authority
Neighborhood Residents
The City Manager and City Council
Neighborhood Property Owners
The Banking Community
How this cooperative energy is to be channeled into particu-
lar program elements is described in the plan with a review
of Lowell's proposed strategy.
Most of the discussion on strategy is spent on the des-
ignation of particular target parcels for either 705 acquis-
tion or 707 subsidization. Through the canvasing of the
neighborhood's residents it appears that a good portion of
the landlords have exoressed interest in the Chapter 707 pro-
gram. As the plan states:
"The program encourages residential rehabilitation
. . . the landlords, however, also benefit in terms
of increased rents . . . Some landlords may not be
willing to part with their property, but with some
repairs, they could stand to increase their profits
and, at the same time, improve living conditions
for tenants." 39
The Lowell Housing Authority goes on to mention DCA's
expressed concern about the oossible concentration of Chapter
705 housing such that it produces a "Housing Project" type
image. In answer to this concern the LHA proposes to dis-
perse the LHA-owned properties "as much as oossible". At-
tached to this section is a map designatina the proposed 705
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acquisitions which clearly illustrates eight of the eleven
structures on a particular stretch of Grand street as des-
ignated for acquisition by the LHA (refer to attached man) 40
The LHA anticipates some problems in the acquisition of
705 property. It proposes to meet these problems in a var-
iety of ways: suggest to the landlord he/she participate in
the Chapter 707 program, and if the landlord still refuses to
participate in NIP or do any improvements on his/her property,
launch strict code enforcement proceedinqs against the land-
lord (the "harassment" strategy as the author prefers to en-
title it) .41
On the issue of "neighborhood needs" the resident survey
foremost stressed the desire for more recreational facilities,
a community center, and street improvements. It is proposed
that the City undertake resurfacing of the streets, replace-
ment of the sidewalks, transformation of a neighborhood vacant
lot into a site for recreational facilities, rehab of an old
armory building for a community center, revisions in the traf-
fic pattern, and tree planting throughout the area. 42
Little is said about the financial aspect of NIP in pro-
viding for repair or home improvement loans in the Lower High-
lands area. The plan does state that "the financial community
must get into the act" if Chapter 707 property owners and other
owners in the area are to make imorovements on their proper-
ties. 4 3 Aside from mentioning "a"local bank" that had expres-
sed initial interest in lending in the area, at terms, interest
rates and amounts unknown, nothing else is delineated in the
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LHA proposal. Likewise no mention is made of a city funded
rehab grant or rebate program.
Early Implementation of Lowell NIP:
Lowell's Lower Highlands area actually contains fewer
dwelling units in its target area than that contained in the
Riverside/Cambridgeport community.* Nonetheless funding for
the Lowell NIP is twenty times more than that of Cambridge's
NIP which was allocated only $65,000 in Chanter 707 funds.
Because Lowell does not benefit from a community organization
such as the RCCC (which as mentioned before provides a sim-
ilar service of heavy rehab comparable to the Chapter 705
component) and many of the buildings in the Lower Highlands
area require more aid than rent subsidies can provider Lo-
well has been allocated $1.2 million in Chapter 705 funds in
addition to $120,000 in Chapter 707 funds. As of May 1977,
a portion of these funds have been used to acquire seven
buildings in the area for purposes of rehab or demolition to
eliminate blight and possibly provide space for passive rec-
reation or parking.
Some problems were encountered in Lowell's efforts to ne-
gotiate a purchase price for NIP sites. An example of this
can be found in the LHA's efforts to purchase four buildings
owned by Louis Saab who for a period of time first refused to
* Whereas Cambridge's target neighborhood has @200
dwelling units, Lowell's Lower Highland's area
has @150 dwelling units.
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sell the properties, then later insisted on sale prices based
on appraisals that averaged from thee to four times the assess-
ed valuation of the properties. 4 4 Such sale prices were well
over NIP offers for the Parcels. The City was aware that Saab
was not only the City's biggest landlord but also the City's
biggest tax delinquent. Though Saab's tax delinquency on the
Lower Highlands sites amounted on the average less than $1,000,
Saab nonetheless owns many more tax delinquent properties
throughout Lowell. Some discussion was made by local officials
to "threaten" Saab with code enforcement or tax title procedings,
but for the most part it was felt Saab would recognize such
threats as minor and continue to "play his cards" in the nego-
tiations. As a well-seasoned landlord in the city, Saab was fa-
miliar with the code enforcement tactics and likewise, he was
aware of the processing complexities of the tax title proced-
ure which could allow him years of profit before eventual pay-
ment of back taxes or the actual "takincr" of title. Saab even-
tually negotiated the parcel prices back and forth with the LHA
until he received the best price he caLd expect under the cir-
cumstances.45
Frank Keefe is no longer working in Lowell having moved
on to head the State Office of Planning.* Armand Mercier, Ex-
ecutive Director of the Lowell Housing Authority, who likewise
*Gary Jefferson, after leavina DCA and NIP, also moved
on to work for the State Office of Planning under
Frank Keefe.
-73-
played a crucial part in implementing the Lower Highlands'
NIP, continues to propel and guide the program through its
operational stages. Lowell is moving slowly through the
process of appraisals, inspections, purchases, and prelim-
inary architectural designs. Improved municipal servicing
and repairs have begun. The City has already initiated and
is presently operating a city-wide revolving rehabilitation
loan pool for homeowners by utilizing CDBG funds ard Section
312 grants from H.U.D. 4 6 The program to increase code en-
forcement on an area-wide basis has not yet been initiated
The City- on the whole .provides little active participation
in the Lower Highlands NIP. Lack of both City input and
feedback reflect a "lay-back" attitude to the program in
general. 47
An additional $44,000 in loan commitments from the lo-
cal private banks was expected, but thus far little process-
ing has been activated. 4 P The NIP Questionaire for Lowell
indicates participation and commitment by the local banking
and savings and loan institutes as not included in the pres-
ent implementation phase of NIP (Exhibit 111-6)-
Local citizen participation continues in the form of
the Lower Highlands Neighborhood Council. This Council ap-
parently represents a much larger area than the target area
itself, thus a subcommitte within this organization is the
group that actually deals with NIP. William Flanagan, the
Director of the Lower Highlands NIP, has expressed concern
-74-
over this subcommitte's ability to maintain momentum and
identity in such an arrangement. He believes the subcommittee
sometimes feels lost or factioned off from the rest of the
Council.4 9
Analysis of the Lowell NIP - Strengths and Weaknesses:
Given the thrust of NIP funding in a small target neigh-
gorhood such as that in Lowell, the program' s impact on the
neighborhood will be dramatic. The City hooes that such an
impact will act as a visible sign of encouragement to the
residents in the area and as an incentive for neighborhood
improvement to surrounding neighborhoods adjacent to the Lo-
wer Highlands target area. To insure that this occurs, the
City should take a more active role in the LHA's efforts to
improve the neighborhood. Technical assistance can be pro-
vided to the citizen participation arm of the neighborhood
to strengthen and encourage their input. City mechanisms
(e.g. code enforcement, tax title procedures) can be improved
upon to maximize their utility. The search for additional
funds or innovative methods for lowering the cost of owning
and maintaining housing should be a continual activity on
part of the City, not just the LHA. Likewise, the City
should apply some efforts to encourage local banks to active-
ly participate in neighborhood revitalization efforts. This
comprehensive approach is needed not only in the.-NIP target
-75-
area, but also beyond into the adjacent neighborhoods if
neighborhood improvement is to be realized in any one area
on a long-term basis.
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F. Roxbury - Hichland Park Area
The Neighborhood - Issues and Concerns:
The Highland Park area of Roxbury, spanning 183 acres
and containing over 1700 dwelling units, is the largest NIP
target neighborhood. The problems that plague the neighbor-
hood are likewise great in comparision with the other NIP
communities (Exhibit III-16,17),Take into consideration these
revealing figures:
38% of the buildings are substandard or in need.
of repairs.
--One tenth of the buildings are abandoned.
- One third of the parcels of land are vacant.
- Half of the dwelling units are absentee-owned.
70% of the residents are renters. 5 0
Likewise property tax delinquency and general disin-
vestment is a prevalent problem in the Highland Park area.
The author conducted a stratefied saipling of the Highland
park area to determine the approximate extent of tax delin-
quency in the area (Exhibit 111-18). The stratefied sam-
pling, organized by geographical sectors and street patterns
(i.e. arterial or "side" streets) , revealed the level of tax
delinquency in the First Half of Fiscal Year 1977 to be ap-
proximately 36% of all parcels in the Highland Park'.area.
-18'-
This percentage is lower than the desianated Ward averages
for Roxbury as a whole but higher than the 28.4% figure f6r
the City of Boston. 5 1
Roxbury, and Highland Park being a part of Roxbury, also
suffers from the plight of "redlining". Redlining in this
area of Boston is largely created by the reluctance of lend-
ing institutions to grant conventional loans.
The Highland Park area has been experiencing decline
in one form or another since the early 1900's when many of its
residents began to migrate out of the city and into the sub-
urbs. Absentee landlords began to buy uo much of the property
in the area. The number of homeowners began to decline as the
number of renters progressively grew to its present astonish-
ing percentage of 70%. Because of the out-migration of non-
minorities and the accomoanying in-migration of an ever in-
creasing number of minorities, Roxbury is now one of two,-areas
of predominant Black settlement in the City of Boston, the
second being Dorchester. Highland Park is composed of a poD-
ulation that is 64% black, higher than the -16% figure for the
City of Boston but honetheless smaller than Roxbury's 84%.
In comparison with Roxbury the Higland Park area still has a
substantial non-Black population,.(Exhibit 11-16) .52
The Highland Park area's aspirations to stabilize its
neighborhood are focused on its ability to attract potential
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homebuyers from a diversity of racial, income, social and oc-
cupational backgrounds. It is felt that the foundation for
this exists within the community, as the P.oxbury NIP Plan
states:
. . demographic characteristics indicate . . . (that)
while there exists within the community families and
individuals who occupy disadvantageous positions -with
respect to education, employment and income, data in-
dicate the nucleus of a heterogeneous socio-economic
structure which lends itself fcr reinforcement and
which portends the potential for a viable community."5 3
-Only 19% of the residents are on public assistance
compared to the 30% for Roxbury as a whole.
-The percentage of persons with a college education
or more is higher than that in Roxbury.
-The percentage of families with both husband and
wife is higher than that of Roxbury. 5 4
Beyond a doubt the major asset in Highland Park by far
is the Roxbury Action Program (RAP). Under the strong lead-
ership of George Morrison, Executive Director of RAP, RAP
has evolved into a widely respected community organization
that has successfully engaged in activities involving hous-
ing rehabilitation, planned commercial development, social
services, training programs, and the search for additional
private and public funds for the community. Over $25 mil-
lion have been invested in and directly adjacent to the
Highland Park area with Urban Renewal funds and the develop-
ment of the new Camous High School. Over S1.5 million was
soent in 1974 alone in the area under the Model Cities Pro-
gram.5 5
-80-
Future development continues to be planned for the area.
The Southwest Corridor transportation system is slated to pass
along the border of the Highland Park area, and there remains
the possibility that a Community College will someday be con-
structed in the neighborhood.* Though the area is excessively
marked with vacant lots, such lots can be viewed as both det-
rimental in their present vacant state or, potential utility
for future recreational, housing or commercial development.
Roxbury-' s Proposed Strategay for NIP:
Roxbury's NIP proposal was Predicated on the assumption
that the Roxbury NIP would be allocated enough funds to Pro-
vide for 100 units of 705 housing. The proposal expressed
the firm belief that these 705 units would only succeed to
stabilize the area in the long run if ownershin possibilities
Csupposely p-rovided by 705 enabling legislation) could inev-
itably be secured. Working on this assumption RAP decided to
concentrate on the abandoned buildings in the area as poten-
tial sites for acquisition under Chapter 705. A section of
the Highland Park area of particular concern to RAP called
Kittredge Square, was singled out to receive a large portion
of the Chapter 705 units.
Additional recreational and community facilities are of
major concern to the community. 705 and city funds area ex-
*Preliminary architectural feasibility studies have
been conducted for the Community College.
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pected to develop and improve the provision of such parks,
plazas, playgrounds, and service centers in the Highland
Park area. A community-wide path system is proposed to link
the different facilities in an "open space network" to de-
velop continuity and facilitate active resident utilization.
Many supportive homeowner programs are likewise pro-
posed to assist the resident of the community. A Highland
Park Homeowners Acquisition Fund is planned to provide lim-
ited no or low interest loans to low-income persons. Wishing
to purchase homes in the area. Revcving loans, free con-
struction assistance to the community are among the other
proposals to improve the neighborhood in general.
Early Implementation of Roxbury NIP:
One hundred units of 705 housing are not to be allocat-
ed to the Roxbury NIP. Such an enormous amount of 705 fund-
ing is just not available to one NIP target area alone. In-
stead twenty-eight units of Chapter 705 housing are proposed
for the area with the bulk of the thrust in the Roxbury NIP
vested in the utilization of Chapter 707 funds to subsidize
approximately 100 units in the neighborhood. DCA, with its
limited funds, cannot hope to alleviate the entire absentee
landlord or deteriorated housing problem in Highland Park.
Nevertheless it sees itself as only one of the important ac-
tors in the area attempting to alleviae the plight of the
neighborhood. Hopefully by utilizing 707 leases a portion
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of the homeowners in the area can leverage for additional
private funds to maintain or make improvements on their
buildings. Additional public funds fran the federal -govern-
ment are likewise expected to contribute to the overall
neighborhood improvement efforts in the community.
The Highland Park NIP will be administered through the
Boston Housing Authority by the Roxbury Action Program.
Final agreement on the Contract for Financial Assistance
for Roxbury's NIP has yet to be finalized by all parties
concerned (i.e. DCA, RAP, and BHA). Many delays have occur-
ed, caused in some cases by DCA's lengthy preparation of the
CFA and in others, BHA bickering on the terms of the Con-
tract. Much valuable time has been consumed by such burea-
cratic redtape and haggling. Until some level of implemen-
tation is undertaken in the Highland Park NIP, little can be
speculated about the Neiqghborhood Improvement Program's ini-
tial operations in that community.
Analysis of the Roxbury NIP - Strengths and Weaknesses:
RAP under the leadership of George Morrison, is most de-
finitely the major asset and driving force within Highland
Park's NIP. Much of NIP's success depends on the experience
RAP has to offer in neighborhood revitalization, and RAP's
ability to attract and secure additional funding. Funding
sources at the city, state, and federal level seemingly all
rest on each other's vested interest and commitment to the
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area, as well as their mutual respect for the capabilities
of RAP, and its ExecutidIe Director to support their invest-
ment decisions in the revitalization efforts of the High-
land Park area.
NIP, more so in this target neighborhood than in any
other, because of the scope of problems it must confront,
needs to encompass a very comprehensive approach to the d*-
limmas of the Highland Park area. Pri3ate financing, code
enforcement, useful development of vacant or abandoned prop-
erties, homeowner cost-saving techniques, and the like are
all essential so that the "pieces of the strategy" can come
together to support each other in collectively stabilizing
the neighborhood. By maximizing the utilization of the tax
title process and developing mechanisms to facilitate low-
income homeownership, something can possibly be done about
the critical absentee landlord problem. No one element (NIP
included) can be or is expected to solve all the problems
that plague the Highland Park area. RAP and George Morrison
can not hope to "turn-around" the neighborhood without the
assistance of the government. Likewise the government, with-
out the involvement of community residents and organizations
like RAP, cannot hope to revitalize the area and build neigh-
borhood confidence alone.
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G. Waltham - Charles -Felton Area
The Neighborhood - Issues and Concerns:
The Charles-Felton NIP area is a neighborhood located
near the center of the City of Waltham. The neighborhood,
which spans over a ten block area, is very accessible to ma-
jor city functions such as shooping, offices, government and
the like since it is within walking distance to the civic/
business center of Waltham. The Charles-Felton tar et area
is distinct from the other NIP target areas with its charac-
teristic high residential density and prevalence of mixed
land use. Commercial uses are intersoersed in no particu-
lar pattern among the residential units throughout the neigh-
borhood. Many of the industrial uses are, concentrated at the
eastern and western ends of Charles and Felton Streets but
nevertheless, "bleed" into the predominantly residential sec-
tors.5 6
The target area contains 251 residential, wood-frame
structures, most of which were built before 1900, providing
a total of 598 housing units. 5 7 The area's housing stock is
primarily composed of single or multi-unit structures compact-
ed in relatively small residential lots lined along narrow
streets. Such high density develoomeit has created parking
problems, and little usable onen space exists in the neighbor-
hood. All these problems are accentuded by the high density
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zoning in the area that provide homeowners with the ability
to convert single and two-family homes into aDartments.5 8
The Charles-Felton area is viewed as a "transitional"
neighborhood rather than as an "irreparably deteriorated
slum". Most of the housing stock is structurally sound and
suitable for rehabilitation. Over half of the homes are
resident-owned. Though 75% of the residents are renters, ap-
proximately three quarters of the neighborhood's residents
have lived in the area for at least four years. The commun-
ity is rich in its ethnic diversity with a large number of
Italian, French and Hispanic families. Though cultural and
language barriers exist among the community, for the most
part they all share a common income and class situation.
There exists a sense of community and cohesA'veness among
many of the long-time residents of the neighborhood. 5 9
There i.s concern that .many of the long-time residents
of the Charles-Felton area are elderly. A high 43% of the
residents area 60 years old or older. 6 0 Many of the -elder-
ly owners are unable to make home repairs or are unable to
secure financing for such repairs and improvements therefore
allowing much of their housing to fall into a state of deter-
ioration. When their homes are evertually vacated they will
be placed on the market in substandard condition. 6 1
For the most part the plight of this neighborhood has
continued to run its course with little financial assistance
with which to confront its problems. There is little en-
couragement on the part of local banking and lending insti-
tutions to invest in the neighborhood.6 2 Steven Cole, then
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Executive Director of The Waltham Housing Authority, pre-
sented to DCA a convincing picture of a neighborhood in
need of assistance. The Mayor, City Council and the Hous-
ing Authority of Waltham were strong in their endorsements
for a NIP in the area.6 3 The Charles Street West Neighbor-
hood Association, the Sacred Heart Church Parish Council,
and Programa Roberto Clemente, community organizations
within the neighborhood, likewise were anxious to receive
the much needed NIP funds. All three community organiza-
tions had become actively involved in the NIP planning
phase by conducting the social surveys throughout the
neighborhood themselves. Impressed with such community
and city support DCA decided to fund Waltham for a NIP.
Waltham's NIP Plan was one of the strongest ever written,
and the neighborhood associations were no doubt the most
racially diverse group of residents actively involved in
any of theNIP's.
Waltham's Proposed Strategy for NIP:
The objectives outlined in Waltham's NIP Plan in-
cluded the stimulation of private rehab through the dem-
onstrated state regyr vation of the most deteriorated and
visible buildings in the Charles-Felton area. Further
stabilization of the neighborhood would require tIse build-
ings to be redesigned for possible owner occupancy (if the
705 buildings ever should be transferable out of state
hands by enabling homeownership legislation), thus hope-
-88-
fully encouraging resident ownership versus absentee-owner-
ship.
The City, at the time the Charles-Felton Plan was writ-
ten in January of 1976, had allocated $8,500 of its CDBG
funds to support a NIP Homeowner Rehabilitation Loan Program
(conditional on DCA's approval of the Waltham NIP Plan) .
Future CDBG funds, in larger amounts up to $80,000, would be
eventually contributed to enlarge the loan program. Since
many of the elderly homeowners in the area subsisted on fix-
ed and limited incomes possible outright grants might be
able to accodbdate such "hard luck" cases. It was felt that
before any form of intensive code enforcement could take
place in the neighborhood, alternative sources of funding
home improvements and repairs must be available to the com-
munity.65
Local banking institutions were solicited for their ac-
tive participation in the program. The banks responded in
the form of "good will"letters expressing their "enthusiasm
and support" of a NIP effort in the Chales-Felton area. For
the most part their "support" was termed in the provision of
FHA - Title I loans that would be made available to the area,
and in the assumption that "they (the applicants) are credit
worthy.* 6 6
*The Middlesex Family Co-operative Bank in Waltham in its
Dec. 17, 1975 letter to Ronald Vokey of the City of Boston
concerning -its role in the Charles-Felton area.
. . all loans will be made to oronerty owners under the
Title I section of the Federal Housing Administration."
This state-ment should be considered in light of Carol Green-
wald's (Mass. Banking Commisioner) statement in the Boston
Phoenix (.5/10/77:
"I can consider it redlining if only FHA loans are avail-
able in a neighborhood."
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The City prooosed to investicrate the oossibility of rea-
ulating the parkinq situation in the Charles-Feltoi area, al-
tering traffic patterns to reduce congestion and Pollution,
and down-zoning of particular areas of the neighborhood. The
City has already allocated funds to imorove certain roads and
sidewalks in the area, and is prepared to orovide their share
of the facility improvement funds required under NIP.
No doubt City inter-agency coordination and commitment
is needed for NIP to succeed. Likewise the continual input
of the community organizations and the creation of a Citizens
Advisory Board are all essential elements of the Waltham NIP.
Early Implementation of the Waltham NIP:
Twenty-four units of Chapter 705 housing and twenty-four
units of Chapter 707 housing are presently scheduled for the
Waltham NIP. Steven Coile had moved on to another position e-
ven before the Waltham NIP Plan was completed and submitted
in January of 1976. John Walker, Executive Director of the
Waltham Housing Authority, and Ronald Vokey, Senior Planner
for the City of Waltham and a princioal author of the Waltham
NIP Plan., have since moved very slowly in imolementating the
Taltham program. Much of the delay has been caused by a ser-
ies of events, for instance: the contract necessary to start-
uD the Waltham NIP went through three draftings before it was
finally approved by the City, DCA, ard WHA, and a dispute con-
cerning the designation of the Chesterbrook Community Center
as the site for 705 facility improvement funds was firmly oD-
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posed by DCA which did not feel the center directly related
to the Charles-Felton area.6 7 At present much of the actual
implementation of the Waltham NIP is awaiting the hiring of
a program director. The apoointment of a nrogram director
is expected very soon and when this does occur the program
will hopefully begin rolling.
Community inout continues to be a part of the Waltham
NIP though there has been some conflict between the Hispanic
and Italian ethnic groups over aspects of the program. The
Citizens Advisory Board has likewise taken a turn in that it
has evolved into a board dominated by local public officials
instead of actual participants from the community.6 8
Analysis of the Waltham NIP - Strengths and Weaknesses:
The Waltham NIP, despite its delays and moments of com-
munity conflict (which are minor in comoarison to Brocton's) ,
has maintained the interest of the community organizations
that had actively participated in the planning phase of the
program and who still see themselves as having a vested "stake"
in the outcome of the program. None of the other NIP's di-
rectly involved community organizations or residents in the
data collection process of the proposal like the WHA did.
This aspect of the program, and the continual political sup-
port of the Mayor, lend a positive fare to NIP.
Bank participation on the other hand seems dubious as
perceived in the Waltham NIP Drooosal. Harvard University
-91-
conducted an evaluation of the Waltham NIP and mentioned that
the local banks have since committed $100,000 worth of home
improvement loans at an interest rate of 6%.69 The terms and
types of these loans are not certain but regardless, the funds
as actually activated once NIP gets fdly underway is what will
reflect the true commitment of the local lending institutions
to the "spirit" of NIP. Unless additional financing is pro-
vided the elderly cannot improve upon their housing conditions
or keep up with code enforcement. Likewise, low-income fami-
lies have little hope of purchasing those homes that will even-
tually be vacated by the elderly. The NIP structures could be
surrounded by exclusively absentee-owned buildings within 10
to 20 years.
Mixed and conflicting land use, and the area's heavy con-
centration- of high density residential dwellings present the
most formidable problem in the Charles-Felton target neighbor-
hood. Downzoning efforts in the area have been met with pol-
itical opposition. The open space, parking and traffic prob-
lems within the area still persist since NIP has yet to really
start-up its operation in the area
The City must pursue its efforts to search for additional
funds, and coordinate the various city agency mechanisms (i.e.
code enforcement, zoning, traffic control, maintenance) so as
to benefit the neighborhood in the long run. Likewise, the
City should continue to support and encourage the participa-
tion of the community organizations or lose their input. Not
-92-
only should such community participation be encouraged, but
it should also be facilitated with technical assistance and
expertise so as to increase these organization's capacity
to contribute to the neighborhood improvement process.
-93-
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CHAPTER IV
OBSERVATIONS IN IMPLEMENTATION
A. Missing Pieces
The Neighborhood Improvement Program, as envisioned by
Jefferson and Kirshner, indeed became an ambitious and complex
scheme to manage at both the state and local level. NIP, with
its strategy to not only provide more low-income housing but to
also stabilize entire neighborhoods, attempted to pursue a
variety of far-reaching objectives that would encompass almost
every facet of community life. Deteriorated housing, negligent
landlords, inadequate community facilities, lack of municipal
services, and area-wide disinvestment by local lending institu-
tions were just a few of the issues NIP attempted to confront.
Many actore7 and program elements involving the community, pri-
vate sector, local and state governments had to be "pieced to-
gether" into a singular strategy for collective action within
that neighborhood. Unless a level of cooperation, coordination
and commitment could be secured from all these parties, the
viabilitity of NIP to accomplish its numerous objectives would
no doubt be compromised to those "missing pieces" of the over-
all strategy.
In an effort to "piece together" a workable strategy for
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each particular NIP neighborhood, Jefferson and Kirshner were
careful not only to examine each neighborhood individually but
to deal with each personally as well. They believed one of
the shortcomings of previous adminstrations was that they basic-
ally failed to "assign people to the program that had any
imagination, or cared about the program".1 Caught in the
bureaucratic routine of state government it was believed that
previous administrators of both the Chapter 705 and Chapter
707 programs had proceeded year after year to push the prog-
rams along their familiar new construction and pure rent
subsiday lines. Jefferson and Kirshner, both young and eager
to "get things rolling" and to do it differently, instead
innovatively combined the two programs together. They added
a few more features, and then proceeded to assume a highly
personalized and unbureaucratic approach to directing the NIP
program. They were intent on not playing the role of "big
government" administrators, sitting aloof in their Saltonstall
offices forever engaged in the practice of memorandum planning.
Instead, as stated earlier in the thesis:
"It was their belief that only through personal
inter-action, commitment and preseverance could
NIP be quickly implemented and results produced
. . . their immediate goal was to get NIP launch-
ed." 2
Thus, launch the program they did. With little prior
planning of how the "pieces" of the strategy were to come
together, or what criteria would be utilized to evaluate the
various neighborhoods that would apply, Jefferson and Kirshner
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began to personally contact the "better people at the local
level in housing and planning with a special sensitivity to
housing." 3
This strategy to focus on the "better people" at the
local level became central to the entire early planning phase
of NIP. It would seem like an awesome task indeed to find an
individual in each neighborhood with the "breath of knowledge
of local, state and federal funding sources . . . and the
managerial skills, creativity, innovation, perseverance and
integrity" that they were searching for, but in one form or
another (with maybe minus an attribute or more) they came to
find such a personality (or personalities as the case may be)
at the local level. 4
No doubt dynamic, commited personalities are often cri-
tical in maintaining the momentum of a program. But there is
often little assurance that such personalities will or can
remain fixed in any one situation or area for a particular
length of time. In Lowell, Frank Keefe, who became involved in
the Lower Highlands NIP, left his position as Planning Director
for the city to become State Planning Director instead. In
Springfield (which was funded for a planning grant but never
funded for the operational phase) Jefferson and Kirshner vest-
ed their confidence in the acting planning director, who soon
left to become director of the Local Transit Authority. Steven
Coile, the Executive Director of the Waltham Housing Authority,
eventually went to Washington, D.C. where he is presently work-
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Ling under Secretary Harris of H.U.D. In Roxbury George
Morrison and another RAP staff member had been the initial
contacts for the Neighborhood Improvement Program. The other
5
staff member was later to be indicted for income tax evasion.
On the other hand, personalities may remain to experience
the actual implementation of their plans but their relation-
ship to the program may have altered in the interim. In
Brockton Josh Posner, who for all intents and purposes, was
the original driving force behind the Walnut-Turner area NIP,
slowly saw his capacity to be "innovative and creative" re-
stricted by local redtape and infighting. Though he has re-
mained to propel NIP through its operational phases much of
his original clout connected to the program has been weakened
by the political turmoil and bad newspaper publicity that has
occured in Brockton since the planning phase. The resources
which such personalities had once thought they could apply to
a particular situation and generate a positive outcome can
sometimes be greatly dimished by uncalculated circumstances.
All this is not to say that "personalities" can not often
prove to be determining factors in certain situations. "Great
men" often play critical roles in the success or failure of a
program. Nonetheless "great men" theories are of little value
if these "great men" should choose to move on to greater and
better things, or their moments of "greatness" should fall
prey to unforeseen misfortunes.
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With much of the focus of NIP concentrated on the "better"
people, the weaknessesi*in~strateqy in the plans were allowed to
be overlooked. The plans were often seriously deficient in many
aspects. Problems were often ill-defined or stated in terms
of statistics that didn't necessarily relate to why the neigh-
borhood wasn't working. Strategy would be loosely described
more as "things to be done" rather than "things to be done and
how they were to be done". How does one get the local lending
institutions to cooperate? How are the cities to improve upon
their code enforcement or tax title procedures? How and what
forms of state assistance were needed at the local level to
drive NIP along?
"Pieces" of the neighborhood's strategy would be strewn
out from the plans but little sense could be made of how they
were to be fitted all ioNgether through implementation.
Jefferson and Kirshner were aware of these shortcomings but
decided to deal with them inf mally and with great flexibility.
As a result little concrete planning, detail, consistency and
firm written commitment appeared in the NIP plans or occurred
in the initial planning phase of NIP.
It is interesting to note that in interviewing the two-
original directors of the NIP program, much emphasis was placed
on how the "special" personality at the local level was to be
the key to the concept and method for implementation of NIP.
Whereas the importance of personalities would be raised again
-103-
and again, at the same time it was clear that the two directors
envisioned the programs as supremely comprehensive where all ac-
tors were viewed as important pieces of the strategy. The com-
munity, the private sector (i.e. private lenders), the city and
the state were all critical components of NIP. As Jefferson
clearly acknowledged:
"I suppose one of the criticisms of the program is that it
is very delicately designed . . . if all the pieces aren't
available then the chances of risk are extraordinary. "6
What- did eventually happen to the other four components of
NIP? What do the case studies reveal about the actual roles of
the community, private sector, city and state in the early stages
of NIP? Did all the cooperation, coordination and commitment
originally hoped for materialize into reality?
The Community:
,. In the original NIP Guidelines and Procedures a strong neigh-
borhood association at the local level was deemed "essential" for
NIP. This was often unrealized in many of the NIPs because the
neighborhood would frequently be at such a stage of decline or low
moral that an organized community association would be either non-
existent, defunct, or weak in substance or numbers. Fitchburg, as
an example, had experienced two previous disappointments in the
College District alone in securing public funds to alleviate the
neiahborhood's plight. All the planning and community participa-
tion that had been generated had apparently led the community down
a fruitless path. By the .time NIP had arrived on the scene in
Fitohburq, -the residents were wary of gettincr invoLved in
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another public project that "promised to do great things"
for the neighborhood. Thus, Jefferson and Kirshner had to
"satisfy themselves" (as the phrase they used goes) initially
with community skeptism, with hopes that neighborhood confid-
ence in NIP would gradually improve.
In Lowell, on the other hand, Jefferson personally knew
the president of the neighborhood association in the general
area of the target neighborhood. The target neighborhood was
so small that it was unlikely that a community organization
could deal with the area's many problems. Only after definite
plans had gotten underway for a NIP in the Lower Highlands
area did a subcommittee suddenly appear within this community
organization to specifically deal with the matters concerning
the targeted area. Such a method of initiating a community
component in this particular NIP has, to this day, caused
some "identity" problems for those within the Lower Highlands
subcommittee.
Waltham is perhaps the most actively involved at the
community level with a diversity of ethnic groups representing
different sectors of the residential population providing input
and assistance to the NIP in the Charles-Felton area. Though
community input has been very good in this neighborhood it has
not been without its problems. Conflict and tension between
the ethnic groups have erupted at times where little coopera-
tion and much commitment to their own perspectives prevented
them from coordinating their activities.
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In most instances the community components of NIP were
either not existent prior to NIP (Lowell), existent but not
strongly supportive of NIP (Fitchburg), supportive of NIP but
not united (Waltham), or united but not equipped with enough
clout (Brockton). Cambridge, equipped with the RCCC, and
Roxbury, supported by the efforts of RAP, were perhaps the
only exceptions. In Cambridgeport/Riverside and Highland Park,
the community "pieces" have operated pretty much as Jefferson
and Kirshner had hoped they would have operated. Deeply in-
volved and continually keeping a "watchdog" eye on the commit-
ments of the other actors involved in NIP, both community
organizations have fulfilled their roles in the NIP strategy.
The Private Sector:
Jefferson and Kirshner had expected the neighborhood
associations to assist in pressuring the local lending insti-
tutions into a more responsive role in revitalizing declining
neighborhoods. Since many of the community organizations for
the most part failed to live up to their preconceived roles,
little [formal commitment] has been demanded on the part of
the private sector. This lack of active private sector part-
icipation could change in the years to come as NIP and the
community organizations continue to develop through the opera-
tional stages of their respective programs. As of yet, most
private sector participation and "commitment" has been reserved
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to "good will" type gestures. Letters of encouragement and
"support" (more spiritual than monetary) vaguely commiting
"cooperation" and providing little concrete assurance that
large sums of previously unavailable funds at previously un-
available, "reasonable" tersJ6 would be supplied to the target
neighborhoods. Those that did mention specific amounts or
loans types (often FHA) rarely failed to add on the "usual
conditions" of loaning to "qualified" or "credit-worthy"
applicants. No doubt the banks are trying to maintain a level
of appearance such that their public images will not be tarn-
ished by any sign of uncooperation. The over-riding attitude
is one of "we'll be watching what you'll be doing," rather
than one in which involves making a firm and affirmative con-
tribution to the NIP process on the part of the local lending
institutions themselves. No one has been firm in demanding
any more from the private sector than what they have given.
(which has been little or no firm commitiments); unless the
community, city or state should take any action to the contrary
NIP should anticipate little else from the private sector.
The City:
Though the various NIP cities had promised "great cooper-
ation" in their respective NIP proposals, may items would at
times be slowly or passively implemented. The upgrading of
municipal services (an example is Brockton) would take long
months to be initiated, revolving loans funded through city
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CDB9 funds would be tied up in staff hiring delays, and ac-
tive city pressure to spur the loci banks into action has
been thus far very reserved.
Tn addition, question has arisen-tb the issue of whether
those items listed under city commitments (Exhibit 111-2)
would not have been allocated to the designated target areas
whether NIP was in the neighborhood or not. To what extent
are city commitments an "extra" effort on the part of the lo-
cal sector to aid in the state's revitalization efforts in the
neighborhood, or rather a processing of "business as usual"-
The State:
The State, for the most part, represented by the two di-
rectors, had proposed many program elements that never did
materialize beyond the conceptual stage. Perhaps the major
shortcoming of the State's role in NIP was its inability to
meet up to its initial funding commitments to many of the ci-
ties with NIP's. Because of unexpected budget alterations in
the Chapter 705 funds, the Fitchburg, Roxbury, and Waltham
NIP's experienced major reductions in their 705 allocations
(Exhibits IV-1 and 2). The NIP demonstration project was
eventually reduced to a total allocation of approximately $6
million. These limited funds were distributed to the six
target areas in approximately equal amounts to prevent
from completely destroying the smaller NIP's which explains
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why the funding appears to be the same though the sie and scale
of the problems among the NIPs obviously vary. Chapter 707
funds were increased in some of the most critically reduced
programs but nevertheless it was clear that the viability of
NIP to turn-around some of the largest, most troubled target
neighborhoods was greatly diminished. More than ever, there
existed a greater need for the other "pieces" of the NIP stra-
tegy, especially those aimed at supplying additional funds to
homeowmers in the area not directly subsidized by NIP funds,
to come together as strong and longterm commitments.
Regretfully, the Massachusetts Housing Finance Mortgage
Agency stalled in its attempts to get off the ground. This
program input that would have been critical in providing the
additional back-up funds in the NIP areas, and that Jefferson
had once referred to as "needed . . . for this thing (NIP) to
work.," has yet to be implemented.
Likewise, the state has provided little guidance in as-
sisting the local sector in pursuing their tasks under the '
NIP comprehensive plan. Faster processing of city procedures
Csuch as tax title) were often restricted by cumbersome state
statu tes; disinvestment would be alJlowed to run rampant in
NIP neighborhoods with little public pressure to do otherwise.
Often times the State had the resources or clout to intervene
* For an update of the status of MHMFA, a description
of its program elements, and a review of its impli-
cations for NIP, refer to Exhibit IV-9.
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and apply pressure to the problem sources, or to change the
contextual elements (i.e., existing legislation or lack of
it) that allowed or disallowed for major systematic changes
in government or private business practices (i.e tax title,
redlining.1**
No doubt much of the difficulties involved in meeting
the administrative demands of coordinating NIP activities,
keeping abreast of current legislation, maintaining a grasp
of alternative state resources (e.g. MHMFA), and fulfilling
original funding commitments to the NIP projects is invaria-
bly related to the internal workings of the Department of
Community Affairs. Since NIP began in 1974 the administra-
tion has always had its cluster of skeptics, some of which
were key DCA personnel, that questioned the viability of such
a comprehensive approach to neighborhood revitalization on
such limited funds. Thus, in a sense, NIP was caught in a
"Catch-22" funding dilemma, until it "proved" itself as a
viable program to DCA it would receive no additional funding,
likewise, until NIP could muster more Chapter 705 funds for
these often huge target neighborhoods the odds of "proving"
itself were dim.
DCA's definition of what was "viable" was dependent on
the mood of the present administration, which was often in
turn dependent on the politically motivated self-interest
needs of the administration as well. As much as any public
** For a review of possible tax title or anti-disinvest-
ment strategies refer to Exhibit IV-4 & jg respectfully.
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agency or department exists to serve tie needs of the public,
it is no recent revelation that in reality they also exist to
serve the needs of those (i.e. governing political party) who
administer it. DCA is interested in innovative, socially ben-
eficial and enlightening programs. Nonetheless political ex-
pediency often called for less innovation and more visible
"results" that can demonstrate to the public (i.e. voters)
that the present administration is "making things happen."
NIP, with its complex. comprehensive approach, was viewed by
many within DCA as a long, drawn-out process that would reap
results only after many years of operation. There was ser-
ious discussion within factions of DCA whether such funds
could be better spent in something less complex, and more im-
mediate in nurturing results. The results of an alternative
program (e.g. revolving loan ) may not be as socially bene-
ficial in the long run, but on the other hand there was no
assurance that NIP either would result in long-range benefits.
Thus, viewed somewhat skeptically by some within DCA,
support for NIP administratively has been limited and reserv-
ed. The entire state NIP is presently coordinated by one
DCA staff member, who is responsible for the day-to-day ad-
ministration and coordination of the six areas, as well as
for the planning and development of NIP in the long range.
The supervisor overseeing the coordinator must not only di-
rect NIP, but the State Urban Renewal Program and Relocation
Program is also under his responsibility.
Limited in staff, internal support and fundingNIP is
indeed in a precarious- position. Nonetheless the program
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continues to operate within DCA, on the verge of embarking on
its critical first steps into implementation, namely actual
building acquisition and rehab construction. As leary as the
administration is about its potential for success, they are
content to let NIP proceed and observe whatever may result.
No doubt how DCA conducts business, allocates is own internal
resources (i.e. funding, manpower) , and views the program
from a self-interest mode #ffects the outcome of NIP. None-
theless attention must be given to how the program will be
administered differently given the lessons from past experi-
ence that have been reviewed in this thesis.
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B. The Good Intentions and Empty Hopes of
A Non-Bureaucracy
bu-reauc-ra-cy (byoo-ro'kro-si,, byoo-rB 'kro-si) . n. (pl.
BUREAUCRACIES (-siz)), (Fr. bureaucratie bureau + Gr.
dratia dratein, to be strong), 1. The administration
of government through departments and sub-divisions
managed by sets of officials following an inflexible
routine. 2. the officials collectively. 3. govern-
mental officialism of inflexible routine: see also
red tape. 8
Just as quickly as Jefferson and Kirshner had come onto
the scene at DCA to create their little non-bureaucracy amidst
a bureaucracy, they were quickly once again out-on-the-streets
within a year and a half of creating the Neighborhood Improve-
ment Program. The state bureaucracy had decided to shed its
old skin. William Flynn became the new Secretary of DCA in
January of 1975, and Gary Jefferson was soon fired afterwards
in February. NIP was basically taken out of Kirshner's hands
to be administered by someone else, eventually provoking
Kirshner to leave as well. In all their efforts to build an
independent, unbureaucratic enclave within DCA, the two"great
men"at the state level had themselves been removed from the
operations of NIP, once again demonstrating the vulnerability
of the "great man" theory to sudden changes in its "great
plans".
Given the unbureaucratic and personalized fashion in
which the two original directors had successfully used to
"launch" NIP, NIP nonetheless, as revealed in the case studies,
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soon found itself in "rocky waters". As the book called
"Implementation: How Great E xpectation in Washington are
_Dished in Oakland" by Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky
put it:
"The concerted efforts of non-bureaucratic men may be
able to get a program launched; but . . . launching is
not enough . . . The idea of creating a non-bureaucra-
cy within a bureaucracy is strictly a one-time short-
run theory. Designed to get something done in a hurry,
after which it would presumably be all right for events
to take their usual course. Get in fast, get the job
done, move out, turn it over to the bureaucrats -
suggests an orientation to time that is unlikely to
coincide with the requirements of a program designed
to make a permanent, significant change." 9<
No doubt the directors were sincere in their efforts to
improve declining neighborhoods, nonetheless it was not un-
usual for them to permit verbal commitments where written ones
and
would have been wiser,A\more over-simplifications to be expres-
sed in the plans where concrete strategies for implementation
would have sprouted more results. Instead of planning ap-
propriately for implementation, emphasis was placed on "spark
ing'some'NIP activity" in each neighborhood. In an effort to
move the money they believed the issue at hand was not " a
choice between good or bad decisions or better and worse
actions, but between some action and none." 10
Jefferson and Kirshner did strive to develop in each
neighborhood a foundation of congensus over a "shared concept"
of neighborhood improvement by which the program could con-
tinue to build upon. Nonetheless in their firm conviction
to be as unbureaucratic about the planning phase of NIP as
possible, they failed to benefit from:the positive aspects
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of bureaucracy that are often overlooked.
speaks to this point:
"Many of its (bureaucracy's) most criticized features
.... the requirement for multiole and advance clear-
ances and standard operational procedures, serve to
increase the ability of each participant to predict
what the others will do and to smooth over the dif-
ferences. . .Instead of assuming a unity of inter-
ests, we shall become aware of difference of opinion,
emphasis, and timing between federal donor (in this
case, the 'state donor') , host city, and then numer-
ous organizations through which they do business. One
side has limited resources to allocate; the other,
limited ability to spend. They could take into
account each other's limitations by designing pro-
grams geared to . implement. . . instead, both succumb
to the temptation to juxtapose grand schemes for.
which their resources, both in terms of money and
administrative capacity are inadequate." 11
All this analysis and criticism is not to detract from
the basic attributes of such a comprehensive aporoach to
neighborhood revitalization as NIP. The original far-reaching
objectives, and attempts to coordinate a singular strategy
among the community, private sector, city and state still
thrive within the present administration at DCA. How these
objectives and commitments are to be secured and implemented
are problems that still remain to be confronted by the state
and local level. By observing the early stages of implement-
ation, the "missing pieces" of the NIP strateqy for the most
part have become apparent. If NIP is to succeed in demon-
strating the viability of its concept, much must be done to
reinsert or recoup these missing inputs once again into the
overall s.trategy involved.
The State, as the central administrative heart of NIP,
should no doubt "get its act together" before it demands the
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same of others. The State has already developed a more effec-
tive, structured and organized set of guidelines by which fu-
ture neighborhood applicants to NIP will provide accurate, con-
sistent and direct data. Strategy are required to be clearly
delineated by these new guidelines, thus setting a foundation
for accountability in future stages of implementation.
One of the greatest fallacies of the previous administra-
tion was their desire to depend on verbal commitment versus
documented strategy. Such a style of program administration
can be appropriately labeled as the "old boy network," a sys-
tem by which personal interaction is the only means of secur-
ing "commitment." Such leniency and flexibility proved to be
largely ineffective in that many of the commitments left when
the "boys" (i.e. personalities at the local level) left. Ac-
countability is likewise hard to secure when such intangibles
as intent, one's word or an informal mutual "understanding"
subsitute for documented, worked-out strategies.
This is not to advocate for a hard ultra-bureaucratic
line for NIP administration. Certain flexibility, especially
when dealing with so many diverse neighborhoods, is necessary,
but not necessarily sacrificed at the cost of accountability,
which is the point to be stressed here. Somewhere between the
"old boy network" and the "pure bureaucracy" system lies a
balanced norm that borrows from the best of both perspectives;
a manner of administration that permits for both a personalized,
informed but yet firm form of State intervention. The city,
private sector and community can not be expected to meet de-
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mands that are not clearly delineated or strongly stated. The
State must make clear: ad~'and firm its demands for what it ex-
pects and requires on the part of all involved sectors to con-
tribute and participate to the NIP efforts. Though actual dol-
lar amounts cannot always be secured, strategies to confront
such unknowns and make them into precise quantities should none-
theless be worked-out as definite strategies for implementation.
Then, when commitments are clearly evident to have not been met
the State should assume a personal investigation of the matter,
and if need be, use whatever pressure or power it can leverage
to help alleviate the problem or to encourage othes to cooper-
ate. Both the sensitivity but yet firmness to deal with obsta-
cles are required if NIP is not to die a slow and painful death
due to "wishy-washy" administration. The State can "walk soft-
ly" among the various NIP's, but it should likewise "carry a
big stick."
An analogy that may reflect the NIP situation is that of
the pieces of the NIP strategy being similar to tie pieces of an
elaborate stain glass window. Each piece is brillant in its
own way, but yet until it is brought tapther by a strong lat-
tice that bonds it together to create a complete image it re-
mains but pieces of glass with little utility or purpose. In a
similar sense, the State must be the lattice that brings all
the pieces of strategy together to form a coherent and function-
ing program. Until the State takes the initiative to fulfill
its role it cannot hope to propel NIP through its implementation
stages on empty hopes and good intentions alone.
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TABLE II - 1
CHAPTER 705 PROJECTS GRANTED
CONTRACTS FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
(1971)
CONTRACT NUMBER TOTAL 2STI MATED
AUTHORITY PROJECT NO. DATE (71) OF UNITS AMOUNT COST/UNIT
Attleboro 1 12/28 10 $250,000 $25,000
Barnstable 1 9/30 10 $250,000 $25,000
Beverly 1 6/16 12 $300,000 $25,000
Gardner 1 6/25 26 $650,000 $25,000
Haverhill 1 3/22 10 $323,000 $25,000
New Bedford 1 6/24 100 $2.5 M $25,000
New Bedford 2 9/30 30 $750,000 $25,000
Pittsfield 1 3/24 46 $1.15 1 $25,000
Plymouth 1 6/23 16 $400,000 $25,000
Salem 1 6/23 100 $2.5 M $25,000
Somerville * 1 6/30 12 $300,000 $25,000
Waltham 1 6/25 24 $600,000 $25,000
* rehabilitation
Source: Programs of the Mass. Dept. of Community Affairs (1971)
EXHIBIT III - 1
FUNDING ALLOCATIONS FOR NIP IMPACT AREAS
NIP
705 Dwelling Units
707 Dwelling Units
TOTAL Dwelling Units
705 CFA* (Millions)
707
TOTAL NIP Funds
(Millions)
Annualized. Rental
Subsidy
Local Committment
705 Facilities
Improvements
(10% or less of
CFA)
Management Budget
(8% of CFA)
Relocation (No. of
families/indiv.)
Relocation Costs
. BROCKTON
V40
35
$1.6 M
$110,000
$87,500
@$129,000
$135,000
CAMBRIDGE
40
$65,000
$65,000
$293,000
$128,000
FITCHBURG
36
50
$1.26 M
$157,500
$80,050
$208,400
$114, 000
$100,800
39
$36,300
45
$40, 115
LOWELL
26
35
$1.2 M
$120,000
ROXBURY
28
100
$1.0 M
$300,000
$120,000 $160,000
$264,200
$114,600
$30,200
$100,ooo
or
$350,000
$96,000 $80,000
34
$25,410
* CFA - Contract For Financial Assistance
WALTHAM
24
24
$1.0 M
$142,500
$44,700
$181,500
$77,000
$80,000
27
$28,500
TOTAL
154
284
438
$6.06 m
$895,000
$6.955 M
$557,250
$31.3 M
$54o,6oo
or
$890,600
$484,800
145
$130,325
EXHIBIT III - 2
NIP LOCAL COMMITMENTS
(4/77)
AMNT COMMITTED
BROCKTON
Loan Subidy Program
Administrative of Above Prog.
Street Improvement (Approximation)
CAMBRIDGE
Housing Improvement Program
Special Housing Rehab.
Housing Rehab Coordinator
Relocation
Street, Sidewalk, Trees
Hoyt Field Improvements
Other Open Space
Studies
Health Clinic (5 Callendar St.)
$50,000
$39,500
$40,000
$129,000
$100,000
$25,000
$13,000
$20,000
$110,000
$20,000
$10,000
$50,000
$65,000
$293,000
$100,000
$14,000
$12,000
$2,4oo
$47,000
$19,000
$14,000
$208,400
$107,000
$18,000
$38,300
$65,000
$15,000
$10,900
$10,000
$264,200
$1,000,000
$1,200,000
$3,000,000
$25,000,000
$30,200,000
$78,500
$10,000
$181,500
FIT CHBURG
Rehab. Grants
Rehab. Specialist
Code Enforcement
Day Care
Neighborhood Improvements
Demolition
After-school Tutoring
LOTELL
Acquisition
Demolition
Relocation
Loan Subsidies
Parking Facilities
Resurfacing
Tree Planting
ROXBURY
General Improvements, John Eliot Sq.
Campus High Urban Renewal Plan (BRA)
Kittredge Sq. Urban Renewal
Federal & City $ - Campus High School
WALTHAM
Loan Subsidy
Neighborhood Improvements
EXHIBIT III - 3
PRELIMINARY PLANS
*705:
Brockton
Cambridge
Fitchburg
Lowell
RAP
Waltham
Negotiate,
NIP Site Cost Purchase Relocate Rehab/
Staff, Selec t dcr Resid Demro
707--
Brockton
Cambridge
Fitchburg
Lowell
RAP
Waltham
Solicite
NIP Partic.
Staffm _ Llda.
Bldg. Negot.
Insnec. Packare
Enter
into
Agreem. Occuo v
Leverage:
Home Improv./
Rehab.
Funds
NOTE: This information was derived from the NIP Questionnaires
that were conducted in Spring of 1977. No questionnaire
was ever recieved from RAP in Roxbury. Some attempt has.
been made to fill in portions of the data in the Problem
perception portion of the questionnairenonetheless.
Oggupy~'
options s ed
n Phase acouis.
V-- -- - -- -
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MICHAEL S DUKAKIS
GOVERNOR
WILLIAM G FLYNN January 5, 1977
SECRETARY
Armand Mercier, Executive Director
Lowell Housing Authority
350 Moody Street
Lowell, MA
Dear Mr. Mercier:
In recent months the Department of Community Affairs
has held a series of meetings to discuss the Neighborhood
Improvement Program. Discussion has primarily been focused
on three aspects of NIP: the major forces which contribute
to neighborhood deterioration, critical program elements
necessary to counter these forces, administrative and program
alternatives.
It has become apparent that though these meetings
brought forth useful feedback and recommendations, much was
nonetheless left undiscussed. Thus, it is the desire of
DCA to solicit more concise and complete feedback on part of
the existing NIP's on their particular programs. We have
developed a questionnaire that hopefully will not only
summarize the existing NIP's but also reflect certain specific
approaches and perspectives peculiar to each individual NIP.
The data collected in this questionnaire is not intended
to be all inclusive. We hope it will provide a basis for
feedback that is not only important but essential to the re-
design of NIP. We are presently engaged in making NIP con-
ceptially stronger, operationally more workable and efficient.
This effort to improve the program requires the feedback of
those city agencies and community organizations presently
developing and administering the program at the local level,
so that comron problems can be identified for resolution.
Thus, this questionnaire is specifically designed to be com-
pleted by the administering body of the local NIP and should
ultimately reflect that perspective.
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EXh1BIT 111-4
DCA greatly values your response and encourages as
frank and detailed information as you can provide. Question-
naire should be completed and sent back to DCA by January 28,
1977. If there are any questions feel free to call 727-7180
or 7181 and ask to speak to Norman Dion or Jennie Lew. Thank
you for your time and cooperation.
Sincerely,
JOHN P. SAWYER, JR.
Director, Bureau of
Neighborhood Improvement
JPS:ct
-125-
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EX~~lY111-4
Massachusetts Department of Community Affairs
- NEIGHBOIOO1) IMPROVENENT PROGIRAM QUESTIONNAIRE -
Administrating NIP City Agencl or Community Organization:
Located in City of:
Director or Chief Administrator of City NIP:
Stages of Program Implementation (If completed block out box,
if partially oompleted or in progress checki( box):
705
NIP Select
Staff"g Plausible
sites
Prelim.
Plans,
Cost Est.
Negotiate,
Furchase
Bldgs.
707
I a o I- e il
NIP Solicite
Staff g Partici.
Landlords
Bldg. Negotiate Enter
Inspect. Package into
Agreemefnt
Seek
Occupy Home Improv.
& Rehab.
Funds
This questionnaire is designed to ascertain basic information on
three fundamental aspects of the Neighborhood Improvement Program:
problem perception, solution strategy and implementation. The
questionnaire has basically been structured in two ways:-in."closed"
form to solicite specific measurements and in 'bpen" form to allow
for more discussion and elaboration.
Please answer all questions. If a question is not applicable to
your NIP program write "not applicable". If more space is required
for your response use the back of the page. At the end of the
questionnaire there is a page provided for additional comments you
may wish to make.
Re-
locate
Resid.
Rehab.
or
Demo.
Occupy
A. PROBLEM P'ERCEPTION
DIRECTIONS: The first section of this questionnaire lists
a series of statements that describe either
specific characteristics, or perceptions of
problems associated with a variety of elements
found in most neighborhoods. Check those re-
sponses that reflect those characteristics or
perceptions that existed within the NIP impact
area prior to the investment of NIP funding
into that neighborhood. Those responses ex-
pressing different intensities of "concern"
are to reflect how the neighborhood elements
mentioned ere regarded in relation to the pro-
blem of neighborhood deterioration.
Those phrases or words that may require addi-
tional definition or description are under-
lined in the question and elaborated upon in
the appropriate spaces on the right. If your
administrating body has a different conception
or definition feel free to write in your own
description.
- I2~T~'
!,E-1UI,"1.IT III-4
EX1I BI T I 11-4
A ~PROIU.I.~t'I pi~:pi~P~r~ ON ELABORATION or PERSONAL COMMENT:
1 Size of designated NIP area:
5 blocks or less
6 - 10 blocks
11 blocks or more
2. Population within NIP area:
0 - 500 persons
501 - 1000
1001 - 1500
1501 or more
3. Number of housing units in NIP area:
0 - 500 units
501 - 1000
1001 or more
4. Visibility of NIP area to general City residents, visitors,
population: passerbys traveling by foot
or auto.
Good
Fair
Poor
5. General physical deterioration level
of NIP area as ranked in comparision
with other neighborhoods in the city:
1 - Worst
2 - Bad
3 - Average
4 - Good
5 - Best
6. Appearance of external physical hsg. Signs of neglect, desrepair,
deterioration within NIP area: poor maintenance, wear & tear,
etc.
Prevalent (widely existing)
Moderate
Little or None
7. Existence of documented external As reported by City Building
and internal code violations in NIP Inspector(s) or approved
area: Prevalent examiners.
Moderate
Little or None
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8. Problem of competing housing markets
from other parts of city:
Critical Concern
Modera te"
Little or No
9. Problem of encroachment upon NIP area
by bordering element(s):
Critical Concern
Moderate "
Little or No
I
10. Existence of mixed uses within NIP Combined uses of residential
area: Critical Concern with industrial, commercial
or institutional uses.
Moderate "
Little or No
11. Existence of vacant lots:
Critical Concern
Moderate "
Little or No "
12. Existence of abandoned buildings:
Critical Concern
Moderate
Little or No "
13. Level of accessibility to transpor- Major automobile arteries,
tation systems and facilities: public transportation.
Critical Concern
Moderate "
Little or No "
14. Availability of open/green spaces for
recreation or aesthetic enjoyment:
Critical Concern
Moderate "
Little or No "
15. Availability of neighborhood facili- Recreational, cultural, health,
tiesr educational, service-oriented.
Critical Concern
Moderate "
Little or No "
ELABORATION or PERSONAL COMMENT:
Eil.,'lBIT III-4
A. PROBLEM PERCEPTION (continued ... )
Xi1IBIT 111-4
A. PROB]LEM PEIRCEPTION (continued. . .) ELABORATION or PERSONAL COMMENT:
16. Availability and quality of city Street maintenance, garbage
services: collection, fire, police.
Critical Concern
Moderate
Little or No "
17. Condition of sidewalks, streets and
curbs:- Critical Concern
Moderate "
Little or No "
18. Presence of crime in NIP area:
Critical Concern
Moderate "
Little or No "
19. Lack of racial mixture among house-
hold composition:
Critical Concern
Moderate "
Little or No
20. Lack of income mix among household
composition:
Critical Concern
Moderate "
Little or No "
21. Existence of absentee landlords:
Critical Concern
Moderate
Little or No "
22. Lack of homeowners:
Critical Concern
Moderate "
Little or No
23. Apparent quick turnover of residents:
Critical Concern
Moderate
Little or No "
-W130-
XAl}JIYI 11I-4
A. PROBLEM PERCEPTION (continued...) ELABORATION or PERSONAL COMMENT:
24. Lack or. level of community identity Sense of identification to a
among residents: larger residential grouping or
Critical Concern a collective-perception of in-
terests stemming from a neigh-
Moderate " borhood context.
Little or No
25. Lack or weakness of neighborhood or-
ganization(s) or association(s):
Critical Concern
Moderate "
Little or No "
26. Lack or level of formal informatidn Newsletter, local cable tele-
systems or mehanisms: vision, brochures, bullentin
Critical Concern boards and the like.
Moderate
Little or No
27. Availibility of city funds for home
improvement loans or compensation
(rebates):
Prevalent
Moderate
Little or None
28. Level of financial commitment of cit CDBG, other state or federally
funds other than NIP in NIP area: allocated funds for investment
Preval ent into neighborhood facilities or
services.
Moderate
Little or None
29. Availability of home improvement
funds provided by local banking or
loan institutions:
Prevalent
Moderate
Little or None
30. Availability of home mortgage funds
provided by local banking or loan
institutions:
Prevalent
Moderate
Little or None
-1 it-
EXH1IBIT 111-4
A. PROBLEM PERCEPTION (continued...)
GENERAL DISCUSSION
1. Considering the many problems related to neighborhood stabili-
zation, list three or four of the most important problems that
contribute to the deterioration of the NIP impact area in your
city. Discuss briefly how these problems effect your NIP area
specifically.
2. List three or four of the least important problems commonly-
associated with neighborhood stabilization that fail or have
little effect in the NIP impact area of your city. Discuss
briefly why this is so.
-132-
EXHIBIT 111-4
A. PROBLEM PERCEPTION (continued...)
3. In developing and administering your city's NIP, what is the
conceptual and working definition and image of "scattered -
site" housing? What composes an appropiate and effective mix-
ture of "scattered - site low income housing" with standard
housing (e.g. distance, percentage of mixture)?
4. When selecting a NIP impact area what were considered in the
decision-making process besides level of physical deteriora-
tion? If there were none write "none".
5. Does the administrating party believe maximum effectiveness is to
be achieved by investing NIP funds into a "bottomed-out" (ex-
tremely deteriorated) neighborhood or a "transitional" neigh-
borhood (at a pivotal stage, going from "good" to "bad")?
Briefly explain your response.
IJXHIIBT 111-4
B. SOLUTION STRATiEGY
1. What is the key element of your NIP as it exists now?
705 707 Both
a. Explain as briefly as possible why.
2. Does your plan dictate future expansion to be emphasized more
on one component (either 705 or 707) than the other? Syecify.
705 707 Both
a. If there is a different response in question no. 2 than in
question no. 1 please explain the reason for this shift in
program emphasis.
3. Are your 705 and/or 707 structures, as presently planned,
scattered throughout your NIP impact area or are they clustered
within the impact area? If they are clustered please explain
the reasoning for this.
a. If future development is anticipated in what form ahall
this development of either 705 or 707 structures take,
scattered or clustered?
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L HIIBIT 111-4
B. SOLUTION oTRATEGY (continued...)
DIRECTIONS: Describe briefly to what extent and in what form. are
the following program elements a part of you NIP. If
technical assistance or financial comnitments are in-
volved please specify the type or monetary amount,
and whether these commitments are "real" or "paper"
at this point in time.
Please designate in the spaces provided on the right
whether these elements are in the planning ("P"),
operational ("0"), or not presently included ('N.I.")
stage of your NIP.
P 0 N.I.
NIP:
a. 705
b. 707
CITY COMMITNENT:
c. Repair of streets, curbs and sidewalks
d. Improvement of neighborhood facilities
e. Improvement of neighborhood services
f. Provision of technical assistance to neigh.
-135-
B. SOLUTION STRATEGY (continued...)
g. City funds for home improvement loans or
rebates.
h. Improve transportational services and faci-
lities.
i. Increase building inspection and code
inforcement
Property tax or tax title revisions
k. City inter-agency/departmenial cooperation
1. Search for additional funds other than NIP
for neighborhood improvement
m Promote greater racial and/or income mixture
in resident composition
n. Other, specify.
P 0 N.I.
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B. SOLUTION STRATEGY (continued...)
PRIVATE 6ECTOR PAITICIPATION/COMMITMENT: P 0 N.I.
o. Business community
p. Local banking and savings & loan institutions
q. Local real estate brokers
r. Other, specify.
NEIGHBORHOOD PARTICIPATIONt
s. Neighborhood participation in planning stage
t. Neighborhood participation in implementation
stage
u. Neighborhood participation in program moni-
toring/evaluation stage.
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',XIBIIT III-4
EXHIBIT 111-4
B. SOLUTION STRATEGY (continued...)
NEIGHBORHOO) PARTICIPATION (continued ... ) P 0 N.I.
v. Formal neighborhood infornation network
development
w. Neighborhood organization or association
development or training
x. Other, specify
DIRECTIONS: Now please go back to item "a" and in the left column
rank each program element for its importance in imple-
mentation. In other words, if you were to specify
which elements of your NIP were critical to its over-
all strategy in what order would they be ranked with
"1" being of top priority.
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C. IMPLEMENTATION
1. The original NIP plan was concieved and initiated by:
Local Planning Agency
Local Housing Authority
Community. Organization
Other (specify)
program is being administered by:
Local Planning Agency
Local Housing Authority
Community Organization
Other (specify)
3. The NIP program is locally being
Local Planning Agency
Local Housing Authority
Community Organizqiion
Other (specify)
Undetermined
monitored by:
4. Briefly describe the paid staff administering the NIP program
(i.e. titles, number, responsibilities and expertise).
5. To what extent is further technical expertise needed by the
administrating body?
-139-
2. The NIP
EXHIBI'' 111-4
C IMPLEMENTATION (continued...)
6. Briefly describe in general your design and construction process/
system (selection of architects, construction bidding and super-
vision, etc.).
7. Can you suggest improvements to the process/system described
above?
8. What efforts or method of approach are being taken to solicitate
the participation of landlords in the 707 program?
-140-
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C. IMPLENE]INTATION (continued...)
9. If delays are occuring in the NIP program what is causing them?
Be as objective but frank as possible.
10. Describe the proposed Management/Maintenance system for NIP
that will be used once units are occupied.
11. What can DCA do or improve upon to assist or speed up the planning
or implementation stage of NIP for the administering body? Please
be frank, providing as many details and suggestions of improvement
as possible.
End of questionnaire. Thank you very much.
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A. PROBLEM PERCEPTI ON:
1nB-2800 Structures1 .Size of designated NIP area: 150 Owner Occup.
5 blocks or less X x 80 Absen. Owned
6 - 10 blocks I 20 Neigh. Llds.
11 blocks or more x C-One very lrg. block
2. Population within NiP' area: C-485 in block
0 - 500 persons X(1766 in census
X I tract)
501 - 1000
1001 - 1500
1501 or more x x x x
3. Number of housing units in NIP area: C-205 in block
0 - 500 units 704 in tractI-x x x
501 - 1000 x X
1001 or more
4. Visibility of NIP area to general B-much traffic along
population: border . . . less
Good visi. of center
X X X X X
Fair x
Poor
5. General physical de-teri oration leve
of NIP area as ranked in comparision B-some areas comparable
with other neighborhoods in the city: none worse.
1 - Worst 
x
2 - Bad X x x x
3 - Average
4 - Good
5 -Best
6- -Appearance of external physical hs9. C-HSG. Deter. Partially
deterioration within NIP area: covered w/cosmetics
Prevalent (widely existing) X X X X X
Moderate
Little or Nne
7. Existence of documented external
and internal code vi olations in NIP
area: Prevalent Ix
Moderate
Little or None
. R-Roxbury
W-Waltham142--
B-Brockton
C-Cambridge
Coments by: F-Fitchburg
'L-Lowell
Exhibt 111-5
:3
A. PROBLEM PERCEPTION (continued...)
8. Problem of competing housing miarkets B-while hsg. mk't is
from other parts of city: tight, bad reputatio
of NIP area scares
Critical Concern off many potential
Moderate " tenants & owners
X X X XIX X
Little or No"
9. Problem of encroachment upon NiP area
by bordering element(s):
Critical Concern X X
Moderate X XX
Little or No x
10. Existence of mixed uses within NIP F-mixed uses exist
area: Critical Concern but not a problem
Moderate --- B-lrg. dept. store w/X X X parking lot is an
Little or No " X eyesore
11. Existence of vacant lots: F-w/i last 5 yrs. from
Critical Concern city's demo. prog.
Moderate -C-exstg. lrg. vacantlot, hsg. lacked
Little or No X rehab ... led to demo
12. Existence of abandoned buildings: jF-recently reduced due
to demo. prog.Critical Concern X X X B-there are vacant
Moderate X X X boarded up bldg.
Little or No hav'g infectious ef-
fect on rest of area
13. Level of accessibility to transporf
tation systems and facilities:
Critical Concern
Moderate X
Little or No X X X
0l~l~rEf B-recently completed14. Availability of open/green spaces or park/plygrd lst open
recreation or aesthetic enjoyment: p
space in area. More
Critical Concern is needed
Moderat plygrd.& 2 tot lots
Li e r N I XF construc. by redev.
Little or No " _X auth. during neigh.
15. Availability of neighborhood facili- dev. prog.
ties: 
- - -B-park helps; day care
Critical Concern & other social prog's
Noderate x X X X needed.
Little or No "
Exhibit 111-5
(continued)
A. PROBLE1M PERCEPTION (continued. . .)
16. Availability and quality of city
services:
Critical Concern
Moderate " -
Little or No "
dli
x x
Exhibit 111-5
(continued)
B-needs much improve-
ment. resid's feel
neigh. is on bottom
of the city's list.
B-need repairs. overal~l17. Condition of sidewalks, streets and -
curbs: .r.t-c-- not that bad.
Critical Concern X X C-plans are updated
Moderate X X X since NIP
Little or No X
18. Presence of crime in NIP area: B-myth is greaterthan
reality; but real
Critical Concern x prob's include mug
---- ging,vandalism,drugs
X X X etc. don't exist in
Little or No " other areas.
19. Lack of racial mixture among house- B-neigh. well-integrat.
hold composition:
Critical Concern x x x
Moderate " Xx
Little or No " X
20. Lack of income mix among household B-incomes relative to
composition: rest of city low &
-- getting lower. Need
Critical Concern X Xj to recruit higher inc.
Moderate X X ~ young families.
Little or No "
F-will be eliminated21. Existence of absentee landlords: -wia be comine
via 705 component
Critical Concern X X X X X B-prob. relates to
Moderate " absentee landlords.
Little or No "
22. Lack of homeowners:
Critical Concern X X X X
Moderate I X X
Little or No "I
F-due to deteriorating23. Apparent quick turnover of residents: multi-fam. dwellings.
Critical Concern X X X X B-esp. in absen-owned
Moderate " bldgs.,both owners &
- - tenants often chg.
Little or No "
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A. PROBLEM PERCEPTION (continued...)
iI~iI4 Exhibit III-5(continued)
24. Lack or level of community identit 
-neighborhood ident.
among residents: is strong
Critical Concern X X X
Moderate X X X
Little or No"'
25. Lack or weakness of neighborhood or- C-RCCC fills this role
ganization(s) or association(s):
Critical Concern X
Moderate " x
Little or No " XX
26. Lack or level of formal information B-need newsletter
systems or mehanisms:
Critical Concern C-RCCC working on thisX X
Moderate "
Little or No "
27. Availibility of city funds for home B-none prior to N
improvement loans or compensation $100,000 now from
(rebates): --- CDBG
Prevalent 
X,
Moderate
Little or None X x
28. Level of financial commitment of city B-$100,000, contingent
funds other than NIP in NIP area: on NIP, alloted di-
Prevalent rectly from city
X X budget.
Moderate X X X
Little or None C-improving
29. Availability of home improvement B-loans are being
runds provided by local banking or made. banks are dis-
loan institutions: couraging, people
must be persistent.
Prevalent X
Moderate - ---- C-atmosphere is
improving
Little or None X XIX X
30. Availability of home mortgage
provided by local banking
institutions:
f u nd s
or loan
Prevalent
Moderate
Little or None
2Xll [ I
X X I X X-
EXHIBIT .III - 5
SUMMARY OF NIP QU3TIONNAIRE
A. PROBLEM PERCZPION
Question 1: Considering the many problems related to neighborhood stabili-
zation, list three or four of the most important problems that
contribute to the deterioration of the NIP impact area in your
city. Discuss briefly how these problems effect your NIP area
specifically.
NIP City
Brockton
Cambridge
Fitchburg
Lowell
Waltham
Most Important Problems
Absentee landlords
Disinvestment
Low-Income Population
Absentee landlords
Disinvestment
Rent Control
Disinvestment
Low-Income Population
Blighting effect of de-
teriorated buildings
Declining population
Density of dwelling units
& accompanying problems
Absentee landlords
Disinvestment
Vacant land (In-
dustrial Park Bite)
Security (for personal
property)
Absentee landlords
Mixes Uses
Ethnic mix
EXHIBIT III - 5 (continued)
A. PROBLEM PERCEPTION (continued)
Question 2: List three or four of the least important problems commonly
associated with neighborhood stabilization that fail or have
little effect in the NIP impact area of your study. Discuss
briefly why this is so.
NIP City Least Important Problems
Brockton Attractiveness of building
type
Encroachment
Ethnic diversity
Housing market
Cambridge Housing market
Abandonment
Vacant parcels
Fitchburg City services
Mixed land use
Lowell Upgrading of homes in pri-
vate sector as NIP develops
Neighborhood cooperation
Waltham (not applicable)
Question 3: In developing and administering your city's NIP, what is the
conceptual and working definition and image of "scattered-
site" housing? What composes an appropriate and effective
mixture of "scattered-site low income housing" with standard
housing (e.g. distance, percentage of mixture)?
NIP City Summary of Comments
Brockton Not more than 705 of total units
in neighborhood as a whole.
Restriction on allocated units
assure this. Some clustering
of 3 or 4 buildings permissable.
Cambridge Scattered-site housing, as usually
defined, is not and probably
will not be viable in our NIP.
EXHIBIT III - 5 (Continued)
A. PROBLEM PERC1; PiTION (continued)
Question 3 (continued):
NIP City
Fitchburg
Lowell
Summary of Comments
(no comment)
We plan to acquire buildings and
land that will comprise about
30 % of total area.
In the concept of "scattered-
site" housing, the NIP area
should not be overly satur-
ated with low income housing.
Waltham
When selecting a NIP impact area what were considered in the
decision-making process besides level of physical deteriora-
It ntion? If there were none write none
NIP City
Brockton
Cambridge
Summary of Comments
Existence of Brockton Housing
Trust (& prior rehab. projects).
Area designated by city as ideal
for scattered rehab.
Revitalization of Presbyterian
Church and construction of
"Off Street Park".
General appeal of area.
ix of population ... ethnic,
economic, family size, etc.
Availability of open space for
recreation.
Proximity of service (private &
public).
Proximity to college.
Proximity to downtown.
Excellence of adjacent areas.
High % of owner occupants in area.
Blight is scattered and somewhat
limited
Formerly disignated as an Urban
Renewal area.
Fitchburg
-1,48-
Question 4:
EXHIBIT III - 5 (Continued) -
A. PROBLEMl PEPRCPI'ION (continued)
Question 4 (continued):
NIP City Summary of Comments
Lowell % of non-resident ownership.
Economic & social structure of
NIP area residents.
Waltham Predominance of absentee land-
lords.
Ethnic composition.
Question 5: Does the administrating party believe maximum effectiveness is
to be achieved by investing NIP funds into a "bottomed-out" (ex-
tremely deteriorated) neighborhood or a "transitional" neigh-
borhood (at a pivotal stage, going from "good" to "bad")?
Briefly explain your response.
"Transitional" Neighborhood "Bottomed-Out" Neighborhood
Cambridge Brockton
Lowell Fitchburg
Waltham
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EXHIBIT III - 6
SUM'AR1Y OF NIP QUESTPIONINAIRE
B. SOLUTION STRATEGY
Question 1: What is the key element of your NIP as it exists now?
Chapter 705
Lowell
Waltham
Chapter 707
Cambridge
Both
Brockton
Fitchburg
Question 2: Does your plan dictate future expansion to be emphasized more
on one component (either 705 or 707) than the other? Specify.
Chapter 705 Chapter 707
Waltham
Fitchburg
Lowell
Question 3: Are your 705 and/or 707 structures, as presently planned, scat-
tered throughout your NIP impact area or are they clustered
within the impact area? If they are clustered please explain
the reasoning for this.
Scattered
Brockton
Cambridge
Clustered
Waltham
(w/i i block)
Both
Fitchburg
Lowell
Question 2a: If future development is anticipated in what form shall this
development of either 705 or 707 structures take, scattered
or clustered?
Scattered
Cambridge
Fitchburg
Waltham
Clustered
7150-
Both
Cambridge
Both
Lowell
XHIBIT III - 7
SUMMARY OF NIP QUESTIOIAIRE
C. IMPLEENTATIOT
Question 1:
NIP City
Brockton
Cambridge
Fitchburg
Lowell
Waltham
Question 2:
IP City
The original NIP plan was conceived and initiated
Local Local Community
Planning Agency Housing Auth. Organization
x
x
x
xx
x
x
The NIP program is being administered by:
Local Local Community
Planning Agency Housing Auth. Organization
by:
Other
(specify)
x
Other
(specify)
Brockton
Cambridge
Fitchburg
Lowell
Waltham
x
x
x
x
x
x
Question 3: The NIP program is locally being monitored by:
Local Local Community
NTIP City Planning Agency Housing Auth. Organization
Brockton
Cambridge
Fitchburg
Lowell
IWaltham
Question 4:
NIP City
Brockton
Cambridge
Fitchburg
Lowell
Waltham
x
x
xx
x
x
x - -
-X - -
Briefly describe the paid staff administering the NIP program
(i.e. titles, number, responsibilities and expertise).
Director/
Coordinator
x
x
x
Housing
Manager
x
Outreach
Worker
x
Rehab.
Specialist
V
Ax
X
Maintenance
x (2)
Clerk/
Typist
x
x
-151-
Other
(specify)
EXHIBIT III - 7 (Continued)
C. ItMPLEIENTATION (continued)
Question 5 To what extent is further technical .exnertise needed by the
administrating body?
NIP City Summary of Comments
Brockton
Cambridge
Fitchburg
Lowell
Waltham
Spanish-speaking liaison.
Relocation expert.
Rehab. & Procedural consultant.
Rehab. expert.
(unspecified)
To be determined.
Question 6: Briefly describe in general your
system (selection of architects,
vision, etc.)
design and construction process/
construction bidding and super-
NIP City
Brockton
Cambridge
Summary of Comments
Architects screened by Comm. of
neigh. residents, BHA Board &
NIP staff.
Design review by Neigh. Advisory
Council, BHA Board & DCA.
Supervision by Clerk of Works,
to be approved by BHA Board.
Gen. design done by consultant,
Housing Economics.
Supervision by NIP Rehab Directors.
Architects selected by Housing
Authority.
Design in accordance with DCA's
Chief Architect's recommendations.
Supervision by Architect & Clerk
of Works
According to DCA requirements.
To be determined by NIP staff.
Fitchburg
Lowell
Waltham
-4-5~-2 -
EXIHIBIT III - 7 (Continued)
C. IMPLEMENTATION (continued)
Question 7: Can you suggest improvements to the process/system described
above?
NIP City Summary of Comments
Local Housing Authority should
confirm or reject one arch.
selected by NIP staff & resid.
Construction should be handled
in-house ... use force account.
Cambridge
Fitchburg
None
Use forced-account process
Lowell
Waltham
Too early to comment.
Too early to comment.
Question 8: What efforts or method of approach are being taken to solicitv
the participation of landlords in the 707 program?
NIP City Summary of Comments
Brockton
Cambridge
Fitchburg
This aspect of NIP under review.
Most likely be used sparingly
on a case by case basis for
absentee landlords. Resident
landlords will be recruited
thru publicity of NIP Home-
owners Prog.
(Delays, by Brockton Redev.
Auth. & Mayor, have taken 6 imos.)
Direct mailing, phone conver-
sation, personal contact.
contact landlords individually
for appointments to explain
program.
Pamphlets are provided on program.
Mail solicitations have been con-
ducted twice. Response to date-
"wait & see" attitude.
Solicitated by phone.
Lowell
Waltham
-15-3-
Brockton
EXHIBIT III - 7 (Continued)
C. IMPLEETTATIONT (continued)
-estion 9: If delays are occuring in the NIP program what is causing them?
3e as objective but frank as possible.
Summary of CommentsNIP City
Brockton
Cambridge
Fitchburg
Lowell
Waltham
Comments available on informal
basis.
Many loose ends at this time,
one of delays caused by absence
of final written commitment of
707 subsidies from DCA.
DCA delays in reviews & approvals.
DCA delay in preparing an approved
model lease for 707 program.
Delays in getting work write-ups
& cost estimates from Rehab
Specialist.
Initial delay caused by adjusting
cost estimates from '74 budget
figures to '77 implemettation
prices..
DCA approval of budgeted items
for purchase.
Forced Labor issue.
Program approval in Dec. 1976.
'.ust hire NIP staff.
Question 10: Describe the proposed lanagement/
that will be used once units are
aintenance system for NIP
occupied.
Summary of CommentsNIP City
Brockton
Cambridge
Fitchburg
Uill consider tenant participation.
To be handled by inhouse staff.
Site office & maintenance work-
shop will manage & maintain.
Local agencies will be utilized.Lowell
Waltham Not applicable.
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EXHIBIT III - 7 (Continued)
C. IMPLEi ENTATION (continued)
Question 11: What can DCA do or improve upon to assist or speed up the planning
or implementation stage of NIP for the administering body? Please
be frank, providing as many details and suggestions of improvement
as possible.
NI? City Summary of Comments
Brockton
Cambridge
Fitchburg
DCA has been responsible for I or
2 months of the cumulative 14
month delay process. DCA has
been excellent so far in rela-
tion to this program.
DCA cooperation thus far has been
exemplory ... only suggest they
continue the timely transmittal
of 707 subsidy funds.
Request DCA support for requested
alterations in truck routes of
city.
Improve communications, speed up
decisions.
Improve over-all coordination.
Need for periodical joint meetings
between DCA, NIP staff & directors
of local agency NIP's.
Local NIP staff should be given
more immediate implementation
power for budgeted items ini-
tially approved by DCA (e.g. pur-
chase of equipment, Architect's
contract).
Lead time from initial planning to
implementation should be reduced.
Lowell
Not applicable.WJaltham
EXHIBIT IIT-8 BROCKTON NIP
D1MOGRAPHjIC CHARACTERISTICS
Population Walnut-Turner Area Brockton
Total Population 2,046 89,040
Racial Composition
Black % 5.9% 2.4%
Spanish-speaking % 1.0%
No. of Families 509 21,952
Persons/Family 3.6 3.7
w/Female Head % 21.00 13.4%
No. of Households 710 27,688
Persons/Household 2.5 3.13
W/Female Head %
Elderly Population% (65 yrs or older) 10.4% 11.0%
Education
Median School Yrs. Comoleted 10.8 12.1
Income
Median Family Income $8,921 $10,377
Families w/Income Below Poverty Level
Percent of all Familes 9.865%
Receiving Public Assistance 41.1% 32.
AFDC % 44.0%
General Relief % 5.0%
fmoloymtent
Unemployed (over 16)% 6-3 4.1
Occupational Catagories %
White Collar 35.3% 47.4
Blue Collar 51.6% 41.0%
Service 12.8% 12.1%
*1970 U.S. Census
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EXRIBIT III- 9
BROCKTON NIP/WALNUT-TURNER AREA
RESIDENTIAL BUILDING CHARACTERISTICS
BUILDING OWNERSHIP
Resident-Owned
Absentee-Owned
TOTAL
BUILDING CONDITIONS
NO. OF STRUCTURES
161
2
258
Gutted
Very Poor
2
15
Deteriorated 66
Good 115
Excellent 60
TOTAL 258
HOUSING TYPE
1 Family 65
2 - 3 Family 128
4 - 5 Family 25
6 -10 Family 29
11 or TMore 11
TOTAL 258
Source: Brockton NIP Plan (Fall 1975)
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PERCENT
62%
38
100%
1%
6%
26%
40%
23%
10051
25%
50%
10%
11%
41,
100%
EXHIBIT III-10 CAMBRIDGE NIP
*
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
Census Tract
Population 3534 Cambridge
Total Population 1,766 100,361
Racial Comoosition
Bl ack % 35.0% 6.8%
Spanish-speaking % 10.9 1.9%
No. of Families 376 20,850
Persons/Family 3.4 3.2
w/Female Head % ?17.95
No. of Households 658 36,411
Persons/Household - 2.43
W/Female Head % 16.0 7.9
Elderly Population% (65 yrs or older) 79 11.6%
Education
Median School Yrs. Completed 11.6 12.5
Income
Median Family Income $7,958 $9 815
Families w/Income Below Poverty Level
Percent of all Familes 17.0%
Receiving Public Assistance
AFDC % 15.1% 7.5
General Relief % 5.8% 2.7%
Emoloyment
Unemployed (over 16% 7. 1 4.0%
Occupational Catagories %
White Collar 47.2% 66.6%
Blue Collar 29.5% 20.5%
Service 19.8% 12.8
*1970 U.S. Census
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EXHIBIT III-ll
CAMBRIDGE NIP RIVERSIDE/CAMBRIDGE PORT AREA
RESIDENTIAL BUILDING CHARACTERISTICS
BUILDING OWNERSHIP NO. OF STRUCTURES
Resident-Owned
Absentee-Owned
TOTAL *
35
97
92
BUILDING CONDITIONS
Poor
Fair
Good
TOTAL *
45
42
92
HOUSING TYPE
1 Family
2 - 4 Family
5 or More
TOTAL **
26
134
26
186
* Total of Buildings in RCCC Conducted Survey for NIP
** Total of Structures in Hoyt Block Area, 1970 U.S. Census
Source: Cambridge NIP Plan (April 1975)
PERCENT
38%
62%
100%
46%
5Co
100%
14%
72%
14%
1000'/
EXHIBIT 111-12 FITCHBURG NIP
*
DEMOGRAPHIC CHAiACTE3ISTICS
Population College District Fitchburg
Total Population 2,480 43,343
Racial Comoosition
Black % 4.6,t.0
Spanish-speaking % 0.2q
No. of Families 11,035
Persons/Family 3.5
w/Female Head % 9.6% 10.05
No. of Households 269 2,917
Persons/Household -
W/Female Head %
Elderly Population% 13.5 15.0%(65 yrs or older)
Education
Median School Yrs. Completed 11.5
Income Tract 710 Tract 7110 Fitchburg
Median Family Income $7258 $9093 $9692
Families w/Income Below Poverty Level
Percent of all Familes 10.7% 8.9 7.77
Receiving Public Assistance - 6.1%
AFDC %
General Relief % -
Emoloynent
Unemployed (over 16)%
Occupational Catagories %
White Collar
Blue Collar
Service
*1970 U.S. Census
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EXHIBIT 111-13
FITCHBURG NIP/COLLEGE DISTRICT
RESIDENTIAL BUILDING CHARACTERISTICS
BUILDING OWNERSHIP
Resident-Owned
Absentee-Owned
TOTAL
BUILDING CONDITIONS
Dilapidated
Deteriorated
Deficient/Deteriorated
Deficient
Good
TOTAL
HOUSING TYPE
1 Family
2 -3 Family
4 -8 Family
9 or More
TOTAL
NO. OF STRUCTURES
193
309
23
23
134
115
302
59
192
45'
6
302.
* Dilapidated - Recommend Demolition, Structure Is Unsound And/Or Obsolete
Deteriorated- Building Has Many Major Code Violations
Def./Det.
Deficient
Good
- Minor Code Violations W/ Few Major Code Violations
- Minor Code Violations
- No Code Violations Or Minor Incipent Code Violations
Source: Fitchburg NIP Plan (November 1975)
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PERCENT
8%
81
38%
100/o
20%
64%
15%
1%
100%
EXHIBIT III-14 LOWELL NIP
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
Pooulation Lowell
Total Population 94,239
Racial Composition
Black % 0.8
Spanish-speaking % 1.1%
No. of Families 22,690
Persons/Family
w/Female Head % 16. 5%
No. of Households -
Persons/Household 3.04
W/Female Head %
Elderly Population% (65 yrs or older) 12.0;-
Education
Median School Yrs. Completed 11.3
Income
Median Family Income
Failies w/Income Below Poverty Level 8.55
Percent of all Familes
Receiving Public Assistance
AFDC %
General Relief %
FjnolovNient
Unemployed (over 16)% 4. 3
Occupational Catagories %
White Collar 20.0o
Blue Collar 63.0%
Service 7.0%
*1970 U.S. Census
NOTE: Information on Lowell target neighborhood not provided in NIP plan.
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EXHIBIT III- , 15
LOWELL NIP/WALNUT-TURNER AREA
RESIDENTIAL BUILDING CHARACERISTICS
BUILDING W.ENERSHIP
Resident-Owned
Absentee-Owned
TOTAL
BUILDING CONDITIONS
NO. OF STRUCTURES
39
29
68
Poor
Fair to Poor
Fair
Fair to Good
Good
Good to Excellent
Excellent
TOTAL
HOUSING TYPE *
* Not Specified
Source: Lowell NIP Plan (1975)
2
12
14
14
15
8
68
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PERCENT
57%
4M
100%
3%
17%
20%
20%
22%
12%
6%
100%
EXHIBIT 111 16. ROXBURY NIP
DEOGOiRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
City of
Pooulation Highland Park Roxbury Boston
Total Population 4,335 38,490 641,o71
Racial Composition
Black % 644 84% 16%
Spanish-speaking % 12% 6; 3%
No. of Families 873 8,838 142,019
Persons/Family 4.2 3.9 2.9
w/Female Head % 33 38 221.
No. of Households 1,461 12,544 217,622
Persons/Household 3.3 3.1 2.8
W/Female Head % -
Elderly Population% (62 yrs or older) 16- 135 16%
Education
Median School Yrs. Completed 11.5 10.9 12.1
Income
Median Family Income $6,639 $9,133
Farilies w/Income Below Poverty Level
Percent of all Familes - 11.7
Receiving Public Assistance 19/ 30% 14%
AFDC %
General Relief %
Emoloyment
Unemployed (over 16)% 6% 4%
Occupational Cataqories %
hite Collar 41%
Blue Collar 38- 27%
Service 21% 17
*1970 U.S. Census
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EXHIBIT IIIl7
ROXBURY NIP/HIGHLAND PARK AREA
RESIDENTIAL BUILDING CHARACTERISTCS
BUILDING OWNERSHIP *
Resident-Owned
Absentee-Owned
City Owned
TOTAL
Percent
100%
11%
27%
39%
*100%
BUILDING CONDITIONS
Substandard
Needing Major Repairs
Needing inor Repairs
Sound Buildings
TOTAL
BUILDING SIZE
1 Family
2 Family
3 Family
4 Family
5 or More
33%
21%
35%
6%
100%
* Figures for All Buildings in Highland Park Area, Not Just Residential
Source: Roxbury NIP Plan (October 1974)
Mi6V
EXHIBIT 111-18
TAX DELINQUENCY LEVEL/ROXBURY-RI GHLAND PAPK AREA
Existing data accumulated by the Collecting Divsion of
the City of Boston does not readily orovide tax delinquency
figures for the Highland Park Area. The Highland Park Area
is comprised of two precincts of Ward 11 of the City of Bos-
ton and most of one precinct of Ward 9. Unfortunately de-
linquency data by precinct is not available, only data by
ward or parcel-by-parcel is provided. A review of the data
of Wards 9 and 11 can provide an overview of the level of
tax delinquency in and around the Highland Park Area.
In Tables 1 and 2 all taxable parcels for Wards 9 and
11 are organized by land use and the number of all First
Half delinquencies (as of November 1976). In percentage
terms (refer to Table 3) Wards 9 and 11 have considerably
higher delinquency rates than those reflecting citywide fig-
ures. Futher breakdown of delinquent residential parcels
by payment levels (i.e. no First Half payments, partial or
Full First Half Payments . . . refer to Tables 4-6) further
reveal Wards 9 and 11 to have higher percentages of "no pay-
iments" and lower percentages of "partial and full payments"
than the citywide statistics.
Data by Ward is valuable in providing a general over-
view of the area, it nonetheless may not provide an accurate
picture of the smaller neighborhood in question, Highland
-1k 6 -
EXHIBIT 111-18 (continued)
Park. To acquire more precise data a stratified sampling of
the Highland Park Area was conducted. Organized by geograoh-
ical sectors and designated either as arterial or "side"
streets, a sampling of streets was randomly selected within
each category and analyzed parcel by parcel for tax delin-
quency (refer to Table 7). This stratified sampling reveal-
ed the level of tax delinquency in the First Half of Fiscal
Year 1977 to be approximately 36% of all parcels in the High-
land Park Area. This percentage is still higher than the
28.4% for the rest of the city but lower than the designated
Ward averages (58.1% for Ward 9, 39.6% for Ward 11) . Thus
figures for property tax delinquency by Ward are- inaccurate
indicators for Highland Park as a neighborhood. A more de-
tailed investigation of the area shows the Highland Park
Area to be not as tax delinquent as the rest of the larger
community that immediately surrounds it.
-167-
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Exhibit III- 1977 Prop. Tax Deling.-lst Half Payment Only/Wards Encompassing Highland Park
1-Family
2-Family
-- 3-Family
MULTI-FAMILY
RC Resid/Comne'cia. kstoreiront;
I Industrial
C Commercial
L Vacant
X Exempt
Table 1 All taxables parcels for wards 9 and 11
Parcels:Distributed by land use and ward
Ward
. 9 RI1
122
R2
92
11 602 564
R3
178
949
R4 RC
416 182
I
5
C L
110 142
X
159
233 67 26 205 415
ALL
1352
68 3129
Table 2 All first half delinquencies
Parcels:- Distributed by land use
4-b
Ward
9 Ri
65
1 11 213
R2
55
179
R3 R4 RC
118 174 68
325
I
0
134 40
C L
54 96
X
156
5 79 191
ALL
786
67 1238
Table 3 All first half delinquenc
Parcels: this parcel. as a% of all taxable parcels
Ward Ri
9 53.5
11 36.2
Citywide23.2
R2 R3 R4 RC
59.8 66.3 41.8 53.1
31.7 34.2 57.5 59.7
23.9 31.2 34.6 32.5
I C
0.0 49.1
19.2. 38.5
21,7 28.8
L X ALL
67.6 98.1 58.1
46.0 98.5 39.6
36'.0 94.6. 28.4
Table 4 All residential parcels with no first half payment
parcels: this parcel
Ward RI R2 R3 R4 RC
9 47.5 50.2 59.6 34.1 40.0
11 26.7 20.7 23.0 48.9 49.3
citywidel2.6 12.6 20.4 24.7 21.7
as a% of all taxable parcel
(Source: Collecting Division, .City of Boston)
R1
R2
R3
R4
and ward
H0
H
8
Ht
Table 5 All residency parcels with partial first half payment
parcels; this parcel as a% of all taxable parcels
Ward RI R2 R3 R4 RC
9 6.6 9.8 6.7 7.7 13.1
11 10.0 11.2 11.3 8.6 10.4
cityw. 11.0 11.4 10.9 10.7 10.9
Table 6 All residential parcels with full first half pa-ryments
parcels: this parcel as a% of all taxable parcels
Ward RI R2 R3 R4 RC
9 44.3 37.0. 32.0 56.7 55.3
11 61.6 67.2 65.1 42.1 21.2
cityw. 75.4 75.2 68.1 63.7 66.6
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H0
H
0
Ht
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EXHIBIT 11-18 (continued)
First half of 1977 f ircal oustanding strat ifJed unpling
(Source: collectiing division,C-ity of B5oston)
M1ain arterial roads:
14a rd
9-
11
9
11
Northeast Sector:
Ward
9
9
9
9
Northwest Sector:
Ward
9
9
9
Cedar Street
Centre Street
"I I
Street or Avenue
Kenilworth St.
Bartlett St.
Guild St.
Rockledge St.
Street or Avenue
Norfolk St.
Lambert St.
Highland Avenue'
Parcels Deling.
7
4 13
9419
10
Parcels Delinq.
12
14
6
3
Parcels Deling.
6,
9
12
Total No. of Parcels
92
78
Total No. of Parcels
22
30
10
13
Total No.of Parcels
20
18
Southwestern Sector
Street or Avenue
Highland Park Ave.
Fort Ave.
Marcella St.
Parcels Deling.
23
25
38
Total No. of- Parcels
33
52
89
Southeast Sector:
Street or Avenue
Valentine St.
Vale St.
Flilda St.
Parcels Deling.
.3
10
6
Total Parcels
Delinquent
199
199/550 =36% of all parcels in statified sampling of Hlighland Park Area are
delinquent
Total No. of Parcels
27
19
29
Total No. of Parcels
on streets sampled
550
Ward
11
11
11
Ward
311
11
11
EXHIBIT, 111-19. WALTHAM NIP
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
Population Charles-Felton Area Waltham
Total Population 1,448 56,590
Racial Composition
Black 0** -0
Spanish-speaking ** @25 0.8%
No. of Families** 355 14,144
Persons/Family
w/ Female Head 5 12.9% 11%
No. of Households 536
Persons/Household** 3.6 3.04
w/ Female Head ** 20% 6.7%
Elderly Population (65 yrs or older) 10.8 19
Education
Median School Yrs. Completed 12.1
Income
Mean Family Income $7r140 $11,523
Families w/Income Below Poverty Level
Percent of all Families** 4,f
Receiving Public Assistance**
AFDC 11
General Relief 2
Employment
Unemployed (over 16)
Occupational Categories
White Collar 52. 0%
Blue Collar 34.4%
Service 13.4%
*1975 U.S. Census
**1970 U.S. Census
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EXHIBIT 111-20
WALTHAM NIP/CHARLES-FELTON ARA
RE3IDENTIAL BUILDING CHARACTERISTICS
BUILDING OWNERSHIP
Resident-Owned
Absentee-Owned
TOTAL
. NO. OF STRUCTURES
138
113
251
BUILDING CONDITIONS *
HOUSING TYPE
1 Family
2 Family
3 Family
4 or More
T OTAL
65
111
35
40
251
* Condition of Buildings Were Not Specified in NIP Plan
Source: Waltham NIP Plan (January 1976)
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PERCENT
55%
45%
100%
26%
44%
14%
16%
100%
XHIBIT _IV-1 AD _) '1T-T IN 75 IUNDIN
705
City (NIP Neiighborhood)
Original
705
Requlie st 1
(m i 1 i on)
Original
# of
R.ehab Units
Total 705
Fund'g to
Date (CFA)
(nillion)
Facilities
Improvement
Allotment
(thousands)
Bro c k t c n
Cainbrid to
Fitchburg
( 1 nut-Tu ri r 3; 1 .6
(Canbridge 'Riverside)
(College District)
Lowel iower highlns )
I Roxbury (HiiighIl and Park)
Sal tham (lCharl es-Pe I ton)
64 ' * 1.6 s 135,000 (1I U
(not applicallc )
1.2
3 .0
3,* 0
310.55 14
50
100
1.26
1.0
1 . 026
266 w 6.o6 mA
114,000
114,600
1 00,000
or
350,000
77,.000
or
(S 890,600)
36
28
214
1l54 TOTAL.
Cu r r en t
Figure
Gn // of
Rte hab
U n its
NOT SY EXHIBI11 TIV-1:
1. Original 705 Request h s represents the origil *1 -
funding request of the c ti es in their NIP) proposals.
Original No. of Units o be eabed as given in the
cities' NIP proposals.
3. Total Funding to Dite (CFA) his is the funding amount
arrived at afrer negotia ions with DCA. Contracts for
Financial Assistance (CFA) that have gone out to the re-
spective cities use these figures. The source of this
705 funding is not necessarily from 705 bonding. Fitch-
burg received a transfer of 3600,000 in 667 funds to be
used for its NIP.
4. 705 Facilities Improvenent Allotment - the amount given
in the town's plans to be spent on neighborhood facili-
ties and not on housing.
5. Current Figure on # of Rehab Units - the final figure
on the number of units to be rehahed. Arrived At after
the cities negotiated with DCA.
NOT ES, EXII Bli T IV-2
1. Oriqi nal Funding Request - as' I1en in NIP proposal.
2. Ori inal of Units Pro ct - as ien in the NIP
proposal.
3'. Current Estinate of the Annual I ent Sibsidy the a-
rount estimated by the tois n consultation with DCA
as 1)e i1n- necessary for rental assistance.
4. of Cnits Approved to D!ate the curreint number ap-
proved by DCA.
XIBIT IV-2 ADJ U'TNT IN 707 -FUjND ING
Original
City (NIP Neighborhood)
Original #
Current
Est. of
7C7 of Units Annual 1 t
Request, Pro; ecoted Su bsidy(i sands) (1 housands)
B ro c k t oi1
C am bbri dge
Fitchburg
'3 110 000 35
(C ari b r i d g e port/'
ftivorside')
(C o I go District)
Lowell (Lower Highlands)
Roxbury (li i and Park
Wal tham (Charles-Fe lton )
1 20,000
1 1 ),000
300 000
1 42500
8 782,500o
10
,357
1 00
50
260 (
$ 110,000
65,000
157,500
1 20,000
300,000
142,5 0 0
895 ,000 284
# of
Uni ts
Appr ove
To Date
35
40
50
35
100
24
TOTAL
EXHIBIT IV-2
Massachusetts Home Mortgage' Finance-Agency
Problem:
A prevalent problem in many declining and deteriorating
neighborhoods is the lack of mortgage, home improvement and
rehabilitation funds. This problem is often attributed to
private sector disinvestment or "redlining" as it is often
called. Named after the presumed practice of drawing a red
line on a map around an area designated by lending institu-
tions for which real estate loans are not to be made, or
else made at terms substantially less favorable than avail-
able in other areas. Redlining is not always the single most
critical cause of limited funds for housing. Under certain
economic circumstances the ability to finance housing is ham-
pered in some neighborhoods not so much by redlining as.by an
apparent lack of funds available to private mortgage lending
institutions. Likewise a major factor of such a housing cris-
is is the lack of funds at interest rates which are at a lev-
el at which low and moderate income persons and families can
afford to own and maintain housing. In such instances the
problem becomes twofold: tight money and expensive money.
When credit money is generally scarce and available only
at high interest rates, the lending institutions become even
more conservative in assessina the risks and return on invest-
ment related to each lo in application. No doubt the chief
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victims of conservative lending practices are families of low
or modest incomes residing in older neighborhoods. As a re-
sult this older housing stock, that need the funds the most,
are most likely to be overlooked in favor of better maintain-
ed, and newer dwellings in higher income bracket neighborhoods.
This lack of funds contributes and perpetuates to the de-
cline of an alrealy deteriorating neighborhood. A commnQ scen-
ario, often used to describe the cycle of disinvestment. and
decline, begins to take form. Potential homebuyers are not a-
ble, or find it difficult to secure mortgage loans for purchas-
es. Homeowners also cAnnot secure home improvement or rehabil-
itation funds. Thus housing in the area-falls into disrepair
and deterioration goes unchecked. The housing market slides
downward as the number of buyers decrease. At the same time
the appearance of the neighborhood declines causeiq property
values in the area to fall. Municipal services in turn begin
to diminish as the city becomes disinterested and wary of
"over-investing"in a "bottomed-out" neighborhood. The cycle
comes full circle until lenders are reinforced in their justifi-
cation of restricting their limited faids on the basis of sound
business decisions. The question is: when redlining is not
the problem, what can be done to increase the supply of funds
available to mortgage lending institutions and likewise, re-
duce the excessive burdens of debt?
-178-
MHMFA:
In 1974 the State Legislature established the Massachu-
setts Home Mortgage Finance Agency (1HMFA) which was to be
administered under the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency
(MHFA) with the goal of expanding the supply of funds at low
2interest rates.* The MHMFA legislation provided a mechan-
sim by which tax exempt moral obligation bonds could be sold
to provide capital that would be passed on to local lending
institutions for loans to individuals for the rehabilitation
and acquisition of existing housing, or for the. purchase of
new housing units.3 Structures receiving these funds through
MHMFA must have four or less units. The state establishing
NMHMFA requires that at least 80% of the mortgages be made for
structures in "priority areas," specifically where neighbor-
hood preservation programs are under way or being planned;
and that at least 80% of the mortgages be for structures at
least 10 years old. 4
Contractual agreements concerning this portion of MHMFA,
known as the "Loans to Lenders Program," involves three par-
ties: (i) mortgage lenders (to utilize specific amount of
MHMFA funds to make mortgage and home improvement loars), (ii)
municipalities (to provide visible investment of public funds
and services to upgrade the designated area, and (iii) other
public entities (to provide interest subsidies, rental subsi-
dies, mortgage insurance, code enforcement, technical assis-
tance, etc.). The minimum Loan to a Lender is $100,000, and
* Chapter 846 of the Acts of 1974.
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may be of two types: a) 10-15 yea loans, with the proceeds
to be used for new mortgage loans (25-year term) to home-
owners, and b) 4-5 year loans, with the proceeds to be used
for home improvement loans (7-10 year terms) to homeowners.
Mortgage loans must be made to present or prospectiVe - owner
occupants with maximum amounts of $35,000 for single-family
dwellings, $50,000 for two-to-four family structures, and
$10,000 for home improvement loans. 5
The lenders will assume the underwriting risk and all
loans to them will be fully collateralized according to MHMFA
regulations. MHFIIWA will charge lenders 1/2 - 3/4 percent a-
bove bond rates. Higher rates may be charged, pending cur-
rent legislative amendment, on these mortgage loans to cover
the lender's expenses and FHA, VA or private mortgage insur-
ance premiums, but in no case shall total rates to borrowers
exceed 1.5% above the rate paid to MHPMFA. 6 Lenders may
charge fees covering all closing costs not exceeding $300 for
a conventional mortgage and $500 for an FHA or VA mortgage.
No additional fees or points may be charged to the borrowers
at the time of closing or application, although delinquency
charges are permissible. 7
MHMFA also administers a Mortgage Insurance Program to
insure those loans provided for by the Loans to Lenbrs Pro-
gran and those conventional mortgage loans to resident own-
ers made for purposes of acquisition and rehabilitation in
areas designated for neighborhood preservation programs.
MAHMFA in addition provides for Technical Assistance by con-
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tracting such services from non-profit organizations incorpor-
ated under the laws of the Commonwealth or qualified public
agencies. Under this program homeowners are provided with a
wide range of consultant services in the selection of subcon-
tractors, nature of regulating codes, evaluation of the qual-
ity of work undertaken, debt management and many more.
Last but not least MHMFA provides for a Resident Owner-
ship Subsidy Program to assist low-income families or persons
who own single-family or multi-family homes or cooperative
housing shares or condominium units. The subsidies to be pro-
vided under this program covers the difference between the
amount required annually to pay interest and debt service,
real property taxes, fire insurance, reasonable- management
costs and reasonable maintenance costs and twenty-five per
cent of the annual income of such families or person. As of
February of 1976 language for this program was written into
existing MHMFA legislation, but actual funding for these sub-
sidies has not been appropriated.
MHMFA Update:
Though IMHMFA was created in 1974, actual program opera-
tions have been stalled. The program required the sale of
bonds by the Massachusetts Housing Finance Administration
(MHFA). Unfortunately the bond market fell on troubled times
soon after MHMFA was created. 8 Though Gary Jeffersai and Joel
had anticipated MFMFA to have been an important component in
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strategy, yet instead TMHMIPFA faltered in its early stages.
Currently a great deal of effort and activity is being
applied to activate and redesign MHMFA. The agency has re-
ceived start-up funds of $150,000 through the FY 1977 DCA
budget to hire staff and an Executive Director. Proposed
changes in MHMFA legislation have been introduced by Senator
Timilty in the Legislature along with recommended amendments
drafted by DCA in conjunction with the Governor's Office. 9
Recent amendments slated for legislation involve a num-
ber of revisions for MHMFA. Foremost the new bill would spin
the neighborhood mortgage agency out from under the MHFA, and
expand the size and composition of the board. Second, revis-
ions would extend the invitation of applicants beyond munici-
pglities to "self-selected community groups that may initiate
a neighborhood stabilization program in conjunction with mort-
gage lenders in a designated area."* 10
Perhaps the most important amendment to MHMFA c. 846 of
the Acts of 1974 that would concern DCA is the recommended
change of the Final Application appraal process. DCA has rec-
ommended that "prior to authorizing the preparation of Final
Application, MHMFA will submit the Preliminary Application to
the Secretary of Communities and Development for review.""
This review is meant to assure that proposals introduced to
MHMFA are consistent with state and local growth and housing
policy. The Secretary is given thirty (30) days in which to
conduct his review. If disapproval is not indicated within
*'Additional legislation may-add ". . Drovidedi there
is a letter of endorsement from the local chief
executive."
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thirty days, the~Application shall be approved for processing
by MHMFA.
MHMFA/A Closer Analysis of:
Created as it were in 1974, MHMFA was originally design-
ed to expand the source of funds for lending institutions in
times of tight credit money. It was believed that under such
economic circumstances lenders could be enticed to participate
to utilize'a source of readily available funds and thus aid
neighborhood improvement efforts. The tax exempt status of
municipal bonds would make them attractive to buyers, and the
percentage given to the lender for loan Processing coupled
with a reasonable fee would serve as an incentive for partici-
pation to lenders. The incentives to utilize MHMFA funds
were provided for lenders, but whether these would be enough
or maintain their attractiveness in more abundant times of
credit money still remains to be seen.
The State on the other hand can accrue definite benefits
for itself in this partnership between the public and private
sector. Foremost, lenders are the party that mut assume the
risk of default. This no doubt instills an intense interest
on the lender's part to see their investments secure and the
neighborhoods in which these investments lie "succeed." Len-
ders may assume the role, along with local residents, of pres-
suring and monitoring municipal services and facilities. The
State can likewise hope to benefit from the utilization of the
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lender's "expertise" in the area of granting and processing
loans (i.e. assessment of applicant's capability for payment,
risk determination, administration of funds)
Though many positive elements of MHMFA can be pinpointed,
drawbacks can be noted that may greatly diminish the benefits
of MHMFA loans if language in the legislation is not clarified.
MHMFA is aimed to aid "primarily transitional neigforhoods,"
those neighborhoods previously considered to be in good condi-
tion but approaching decline. 12 Strictly defined this could
in effect exclude a lot of neighborkods from receiving these
funds, neighborhoods already in various stages of serious de-
cline that nonetheless may have the potential to be "turned-
around" with additional funds and that need the money the most.
Lenders, through M-THMFA, are expected to serve particular
neighborhoods designated as neighborhood preservation areas,
not necessarily individuals. The statute specifies low and
moderate income persons and families but in practice MHMFA
loans nonetheless are geared for those "credit-worthy" appli-
cants that lenders themselves would grant loans to in their
normal evaluation procedures. 13 In other words, MHMFA loans
for the most part are not expected to serve any different pop-
ulation group than those who would otherwise be granted loans
if lending institutions had the available private funds. Home-
owners with Section 8 and Chapter 707 subsidies th& would be
given special consideration, under the legislation and those
few that would be facilitated by the lower interest rates of
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MHMFA loans would be exceptions.
There is also the possibility that MHMFA could follow a
similar path as that taken by the Federal National Mortgage
Association (FNDMA) . In Section 304 (a) of FNMA's Charter Act
(12 USCl71a) it states that FNMA's operations are to be con-
fined to mortgages which are of such~ "quality, type and class
as to meet, generally, the purchase standards imposed by pri-
vate institutional mortgage investors." This provision great-
ly restricts the inclination and freedom of the agency to fin-
ance margianal loans that do not quite meet such standards.
MHMFA, in the same mode, could unintentionally and indirectly
be redlining other neighborhoods as areas of "risky investments"
by excluding them from funding, thus flagging local lending in-
stitutions of its poor status.
An analysis of the assets and shortcomings of MHMFA as it
relates to DCA would not be complete without comparing it to a
similar program of funds and services that would be provided
under DCA's current proposed legislation to create a revolving
loan account. Known as the "Comprehensive Neighborhood Pres-
ervation Program" and outlined in the amendments proposed for
Chapter 23B of the General Laws, DCA's program offers a varie-
ty of program options among which are grants to homeowners for
a percentage of rehabilitation costs or as interest reduction
grants, funds for a community established revolving loan, and
technical assistance.*
* This amendment proposes to add after Section 10A a new
Section 10B which shall read: "State Financial Assis-
tance to Cities and Towns for Housing Rehabilitation."
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DCA's CNPP is expected to be administered at the local
level. The legislation is loosely worded so as to provide
much lat/itude for the local sector to devise their own
guidelines, procedures for application processing, and mode
for decision-making. Unlike MDMFA, in the DCA proposal the
local lending institutions are not required to participate
at all, nor is it legislated that community input is required.
Unless additional guidelines or regulatios are provided, there
exists within the current DCA legislation the potential for
abuse on the local level.
MHMFA on the other hand emphasizes the participation of
lending institutions, and attempts to centralize the adminis-
tration of funds into one state agency governed by a state-
wide board composed of both public and private sector repre-
sentatives. Whereas DCA's revolving loan would be financed
out of the existing housing funds within its department, MHMFA
would be a new source of funds, thus not a drain to existing
resources of DCA.
MHMFA/Implications for NIP:
MHMFA's major utility to NIP is that it is a rich source
of home improvement, rehabilitation and mortgage funds. Funds
such as these are sorely needed in the NIP neighborhoods, es-
pecially when considering that present allocation of Chapter
705 and 707 funds are not adequate enough to help the large
majority of dwelling units in need of renovation monies, but
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which are not facilitated by State NIP funds. These funds
could be all the more accessible to the NIP impact areAs
given the approval powers to be bestowed on the Secretary
of the DCA if proposed DCA amendments are to be passed by
the legislature.
When measured against DCA's revolving loan program,
the merits of the MHMFA program become more apparent. Per-
haps Vmost attractive features are: a more centralized con-
trol over program administration, required lender partici-
pation, and its utility as a source of funds which do not
deplete DCA resources.
Recommendations for DCA in relationship to MHMFA would
be to:
- (When and if such DCA amended legislation is passed)
utilize Secretary Flynn's advantageous position to
get NIP target areas designated as Neighborhood
Presexvation areas;
- encourage local NIP communities (and lending insti-
tutions) to apply for MHMFA funds;
(if appropriate DCA legislation is passed) coordin-
ate. DCA revolving loan pool furls with MHMFA funds
for maximum impact upon the various NIP neighborhoods;
perform outreach to NIP community residents (par-
ticularly 707 and other owner-occupants) to apply
for MHMFA funds through participating local banks;
encourage community monitoring of MHMFA lending
activities.
-187-
EXHIBIT IV-3
Mechanisms to Activate
Private Lending Institution Participation
The Problem:
Lender disinvestment,or "redlining", assumes many forms.
By setting appraisals in amounts below what the market value
has been established between the seller and buyer(s) , banks
can effectively redline areas in a subtle and sophisticated
manner. Such under-appraisal of properties being negotiated
for purchase often prevent buyers from securing the loan amount
required for them to successfully complete a home purchase
transaction. Richard. Seibert, administrative secretary of the
year-old Boston Urban Mortgage Review Board (a voluntary group
organized to review mortgage denials) , says, "Appraisal prac-
13
tices are the biggest continuing oroblem we see." As of yet
under-appraisal is not defined leaally as redlining, and no
legislation bars its practice.
Term restrictions on home mortgage loans on particular
housing types likewise effectively redline entire neighbor-
hoods. Unusually high downpayments, or offering loan maturi-
ties below the number of years set for most mortgages in
other areas make it exceedingly difficult if not impossible
for many prospective buyers to afford or manage loans. The
Boston Five Cents Saving Bank requires a 30-nercent downpay-
ment on any home other than a single-family. Such a policy
would no doubt be detrimental to many of the NIP neighborhoods
since most of the residential housing in these areas consists
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of three-decker type multiple dwellings.
The refusal to grant conventional mortqages in an area
may not completely cut off lending funds to a neighborhood
but nonetheless it often forces potential homebuyers to se-
cure a mortgage only if it's insured through the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA). In Roxbury, for instance, at
least 80% of the home sales that occurred i the area were
financed by other sources than a bank; most often, these
were FHA-insured mortgages written by private mortgage com-
panies. Though FHA loans require lower downpayments than.
conventional loans (only 10% of the purchase price), FHA loans
prove more expensive than conventional, 20% - down mortgages.
When a lending institution grants an FHA mortgage, it charges
"points" - administrative costs paid at the time of the sale.
Each point represents one percent of the purchase price. Up
to four points can be charged to the seller with a maximum of
15
two points likewise chargedto the buyer. Thus, if one were
to purchase a $20,000 house in Highland Park, the seller may
have to pay up to $1000 and the buyer as much as $500 to the
lending institutions. -With FHA loans the banks do not risk
any of their money. If the mortgaqe should foreclose, it is
the federal government's money, not the lending institutions'.
Most lending institutions have been willing to partici-
pate in the Neighborhood Improvement Program at the local
level however minimally. Nonetheless, this participation
has been largely passive. The local lending institutions
have not initiated any innovative leding programs, providad
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any special technical assistance, altered any of their usual
lending practices, or actively soliciteted for loan appli-
cants in the various NIP areas (except for Cambridge which
has been actively supportive of the Chapter 707 program).
The spirit of their "commitment" reflects a certain sense of
reservation. They have commited words of encouragement for
the NIP efforts, and occasionally offer "commitments" largely
comprised of conventional mortgages (to clients that meet up
to their "usual" credit standards) and FHA loans. Such fund-
ing for the most part have always been available to residents
of the NIP areas and provide no new source of funds.
Though lending institutions have been very successful
through the years to avoid any alterations in their lending
practices, and to likewise, even avoid admitting that such a
practice as "redlining" exists, much can and should be done
to pressure and encourage the banks to cooperate in combating
disinvestment in older, declining neighborhoods such as those
designated NIP target areas. The following is a discussion
of a few of the mechanisms in existence, or which are pres-
ently being planned, that could provide the impetus for such
action, or generate ideas for further investigation on the
part of the Atate.
Legislative Mechanisms Currently Operating or Planned:
At present, banks are required by state and federal
mandates to make public very specific information about home
improvement loans and mortgages. The disclosure of such vital
information attempts to facilitate public monitoring of the
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lending practices by organizing data by bank, geographic area,
volume and loan type. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of
1975 regulates the federally chartered banks and savings and
loans. The disclosure practices of state-chartered cooper-
ative banks, credit unions, trust companies and savings
banks are regulated by a directive issued on August 1. 1975
by the Massachusetts Commisioner of Banking, Carol Greenwald.
Since most mortgage lending banks operating within
Massachusetts are state chartered, the state directive is
more imoortant for the use of community people than the fed-
eral legislation. Under the Commissioner's directive, state
chartered banks and credit unions that have their maii office
in the Greater Boston area, and also have deposits of twenty
million dollars or more, are required to disclose investment
information. The directive required data to be listed for
the cities of Boston and Lynn (by census tract) and for the
Greater Boston area (by zipcode) . Banks were also required
to list figures for investments made in other areas of the
state as well. 16
For each of these geographical areas, the banks are to
disclose among other things, the total number of applications
for both conventional home improvement loans and mortgages,
and for federally insure home improvement loans and FHA as
well as VA mortgages. The banks were required to have all
the requested data on file at the Office of the Commisioner
of Banks and at all of their banking offices as of August 8,
1976. 17
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Outside the Greater Boston area, where most of the
NIP's are located, this information can be obtained if twenty-
five or more of a banks depositors, having an average of fifty
dollars or more in their savings accounts for a period of six
months, petition the office of the Commissioner of Banking.
If the Commissioner approves the petition, then that bank will
be required to disclose relevant information for that area. 18
To interpret the disclosure information the atate should
advise the NIP residents and cities to look for indicators
of redlining such as: the high concentration of FHA mort-
gages in NIP areas, the ratio of borrower's income to home
value in low-income areas as compared to the equivalent ratio
for uppern-in come areas, and large investments in affluent
areas with small investments in low-income areas. Tee Taggart,
Director of Research at the Massachusetts Banking Department
warn that "simply juxtaposing mortgage and deposit dollars,
however, is meaningless unless one can prove that demand for
mortgages is -not being met." 1 9
In Roxbury, where data is available to prove that a
large proportion of home sales have been completed without
conventional funding, this demand for mortgages is demonstrat-
ed. Many cases of kedlining, where potential applicants
are initially discouraged to even pick up an application for
a loan, are nonetheless undocumented.
What utility such disclosure acts and directives provide
are largely to indicate after the fact where reinvestment
remedies may be necessary. No doubt, through such mechanisms,
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the NIP community can be better equipped to find out what
exactly is going on in their neighborhood, thus exposing the
banks to greater criticism and pressure on the part of the
local residents as well as what criticism and pressure can
be brought to bear by city and state interests in these
neighborhoods (i.e. local NIP cities, and DCA).
Lending institution disclosures nevertheless do not
provide direct prevention action against disinvestment. Fed-
eral legislation in the form of Senate Bill 406 is currently
being proposed to deal with private lending disinvestment
in a more preventive manner. Presented to the Senate as the
Community Reinvestment Act by Senator Proxmire, the-act at-
tempts to "establish a system of requlatory incentives to
encourage banks and savings institutions to more effectively
meet the credit--needs of localities they are chartered to
20
serve, consistent with sound lending practices."
At present banks are chartered to meet the "convenience
and needs" of the community. Though the "needs" of a com-
munity clearly include the need for credit services as well
as deposit services, the practice has been for regulators to
ignore the credit needs of certain communities with exclus-
ive focus aimed at the deposit needs. Thus far, previous
performance in meeting the credit needs of the community
have not been weighed heavily in decisions to award a charter
or a branch to banks or savings institutions. This in es-
sence provided financial institutions with the "license to
all but ignore the credit needs of a locality." 2 1 Senator
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Proximire's bill attempts to remedy this situation by direct-
ing the bank regulatory agencies to give due consideration
to the applicant's past record in meetincg comunity credit
needs and its willingness to do so in the future. The bill
does not propose to inject any significantly new element
into the deposit facility application approval process.
Instead, it merely attempts to amplify the "community need"
criteria already contained in existing law and regulation. 22
If this Community Reinvestment Act should be implemented
in the near future such a provision could open new avenues
for more responsive lending practices among lending institu-
tions throughout communities across the country. Instead of
residents like those in the NIP neighborhoods permitting loc-
al banks to invest large amounts of their deposits in profit-
able investment ventures, the local banks in turn must meet
its commitments to serve the community's credit needs ( eg.
home improvement and mortgage loans) as well, or suffer the
consequences of its neglect.
To strike closer to home, the Massachusetts legislature
is presently considering three bills that would ban redlining
in one form or another. They vary in strength with the
weakest of the three being drafted by the House Banking Chair-
man Aguiar. This bill (perhaps by being the weakest)- seems
to have the best chance of passage in modified form. Under
the Aguiar bill, a disappointed borrower could appeal to a
mortgage review board which cities would be "encouraged" to
set up. The board, composed of bankers and community repre-
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sentatives, would have no binding authority. Appeals to
descisions handed down by this board would have to go to the
heavily backlogged Superior Court for reconsideration.
Since bankers have said that they will not join review boards
if their decisions could eventually be used in court against
their colleagues, the Aguiar bill could mean that the Sup-
erior Court would be the only avenue of repeal for distressed
borrowers claiming redlining disdrimindtion.23
State Senate Bill No. 34,introduced by Senator Joseph
Timilty, is specifically aimed at combatting redlining by
geographic designation. Additional legislation by imilty calls
for the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination to
act as a mortgage review board. It could impose penalties
up to $1000 as well as order a mortgage granted. If the MCAD
failed to act in 90 days, a court appeal could be filed.
This legislation recently passed the Senate,. 34 to 0, a very
unusual show of anti-redlining support for the state senate. 2 4
The strongest anti-redlining bill to be introduced thus
far is a bill authored by four Boston legislators - Rep. Don-
nelly of Dorchestor, Galvin of Brighton, Bolling of Mattapan,
and Walsh of Jamaica Plain. Some of its major features are:
- anyone expressing interest in a mortgage immediately
be given an application form, thus barring verbal
denials;
- home appraisals for lending pruposes must be roughly
comparable to recent sales prices of comparable
homes in a neighborhood;
- a denied applicant could appeal to a local mortgage
review board, which could be established anywhere
in the state and have completGe binding authority
plus include mandatory bank participation.
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This Bill would also govern commercial loans, while the Aguiar
bill would deal only with one-to-four-family homes. 25
In the past anti-redlining bills have been introduced
and debated in the Legislature without much success. Nonethe-
less one of these state anti-redlininq bills is exoected to be
passed in one form or another this year. Recent controversy
over legislative corruption and conflict of interest has pres-
sured the Massachusetts Leaislature to be more responsive to
issues of banking policy as it relates to disinvestment and
redlining. One particular incident in September of 1976 be-
came particularly embarrassing when it was discovered that the
Savings Bank Association had paid fcr the entire expenses in-
curred by the House and Senate Bankincr Committee chairmans and
their wives during their visit to a banking convention held in
Bermuda. There is speculation that such scandel facilitated
the unprededented 34 to 0 in favor vote for Sen. Timilty's
bill. 26 This sudden change in legislative climate up "on the
hill" seems to have created an onoortune time for the State
to push forth with anti-redlining legislation.
Linked Deposit System for Massachusetts:
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts at any one time has
approximately $350 to $500 million in short term investments.
These investments are in bonds, notes , bills, and the like,
maturing anywhere from a few days to a year or so after the
date of purchase (most mature under 6 months) . Eig1y-percent
of the State's investments are in effect sterile, either being
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directly exported to out-of -state corporations, or beinq
loaned to the big Boston commercial banks, which in turn
exoort the bulk of their money out-of-state. These two
catagories, from which the largest amounts of State money
are presently being allocated, proide the lowest rate of
return to the Commonwealth.
The "Linked Deposit System," proposed for Massachu-
setts as the "Massachusetts First" Bank Bill H3253, in-
tends to utilize portions of these State funds in a depos-
it network wherein private financial institutions bid com-
petitively for public dePosits with additional credit giv-
en to lending activity considered benefibial to the commun-
ity and State. This credit is then added to the baik's rate
bid (rates paid by the bank) so as to rank lending institu-
tions such that the bank with the highest equivalent yield
to the State is accepted to receive a portion of the State's
deposits.
Two states, Illinois and Colorado, have adopted link-
ed deposit systems with apparent positive results. The Col-
orado system permits banks to bid against each other on a
geographical and economic region basis, with the exception
of chartered savings and loan associations which bid on a
state-wide basis. Among the credit catagories set up by the
Colorado system are:
- in-state loans on housinq with a purchase price of
less than $35,000 regardless of age, or of more than
35 years of age regardless of price, and in both
cases rehab and improvement loais are included;
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- low cost single-family and multi-family housing loans;
- older single-family housing loans.2 7
The Illinois' linked deposit Program was enacted -in
1968. This system also incorporated a formula of ranking
bids by taking into consideration the interest rate at which
each bank applied, and the loan activity areas of community
service. Community service loans were identified as: loans
to medical and health care facilities, residential redevelop-
ment loans, student loans, loans to non-profit corporations
working in the public interest, and small business loans.
In both Illinois and Colorado, the linked deposit systems
were implemented at the initiative of the State Treasurer,
without either the benefit, or the compulsion, of any special
enabling legislation. Likewise both states have maintained
that through the competitive bidding process the average yield
of these deposits have earned additional funds for the state.
In Colorado the Treasurer anticipates that the linked deposit
system will earn an additional $345,000 in interest this year.
In Illinois the average yield on these "linked" deposits is
at 7.15% versus the 5.99% under their Basic Deposit Program.
There remhins other plausible positive spillover effects
that linked deposits may foster: increases in jobs, incomes,
housing construction and rehab, income taxes and other revenue
for the government. No doubt such benefis, if realized, would
certainly aid many economic aspects of the state and its resi-
dents.
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At present a Special Commission on State Investment is
presently working on a study investigatir the feasibility and
potential economic and social impact of a linked deposit sys-
tem in Massachusetts. The Commission was developed after the
defeat of the proposed "Massachusetts First" Bank Bill in an
effort to keep the issue alive and to gather more data. The
study is to be completed and presented to the Social Economic
Opportunity Council (SEOC) by June 30, 1977.
When this study is issued more will be known about what
possible application and utility can be derived from such a
link deposit system in Massachusetts. Many supporters of the
concept believe that many benefits to the State and community-
at-large could be reaped by such a policy with special atten-
tion given to the needs of old and declining residential areas
and low-income families. Lenders would be encouraged to per-
form certain "deeds" of good-will by directing funds to areas
of public need and interest. Other deposits as well could al-
so be "linked" into the state deposit system by encouraging
large religious, philanthropical, educational and other insti-
tutions to allocate their deposits to banks with socially use-
ful lending behavior. Many different formulas and program el-
ements can be designed into a linked deposit system to maxi-
mize its impact and utility. Thus, support for the linked de-
posit concept by interested parties is needed if a thorough
study of the multiple alternatives is to be completed.
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Neighborhood Housing Services Approach:
Neighborhod Housing Services (NHS) combining citizens,
city government, and lenders in a team effort aimed to stem
neighborhood decline - was a unique cooperative effort pio-
neered by the neighborhood residents~ and financial institu-
tions of Pittsburgh's Central North Side in 1968. Presently
a nation-wide program being implemented by the Urban Rein-
vestment Task Force (a joint organization of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board and H.U.D.) , the program has 18 opera-
tional NHS's and another 14 in the developmental stage.
An NHS program is a small-scale, neighborhood-based
private program that provides technical assistance, and a
high-risk revolving loan to borrowers of particular target
areas. The Urban Reinvestment Task Force serves as the ca-
talyst for the program by first providing informative work-
shops on the detailed aspects of the program to the inter-
ested communities. As local capacity develops, and commit-
ments from local government, financial institutions, and
residents begin to fall into place, the role of the Task
Force gradually diminishes. By the time the local director
and a small staff ('usually 2 or 3 persons) is hired and
trained, the Task Force's role is reduced to that of only
responding to the local NHS's special requests for assistance.
The NHS' s are operated as private, non-profit corpora-
tions, each controlled by a board of directors comprised pri-
marily of community residents and representatives from the
local financial institutions. There are no governmental reg-
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ulations to adhere to , and governmental representaion, if
any, is usually limited to one member. The operational bud-
get is expected to be underwrittenhy the local financial
institutions, while the Task Force, the city, private foun-
dations and corporations are expected to contribute funds to
NHS to carry out their high-risk -eVolving loan. Other con-
tributions in the form of increased code enforcement (on the
part of the city) , and active participation in NHS programs
by all the parties involved are expected.
The revolving loan operates with flexible terms and in-
terest rates that vary from case to case. No applicant should
expect a "free ride" on the revolving loan, even the "hard-
ship" cases are expected to repay their loans in one form or
another, however flexible monthly payment schedules, no-in-
terest rates, or nominal payments can be arranged. Most loans
are secured by a lien on the property.
Two NHS's presently operate. in Boston, one in Mission
Hill and the other in Dorchester. The NHS in Dorclester is
called Columbia Savin Hill Neighborhood Services (CSHNS). In
a recent interview with David Solomon, Director for the CSHNS,
he highlighted the features and issues of the Dorchester NH4S.
The CSHNS has been in operation for approximately two and
one half years. The local community had originally initiated
the NHS funding request in the Dorchester area, well-known for
its redlining problem. The program is presently under the con-
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trol of a neighborhood Board of Directors comprised of 9 res-
idents, one -representative from the University of Massachu-
setts (a large contributor to the program) , three bankers,
and two city representatives.
Equipped with a staff of four (a financial advisor, re-
hab soecialist, office manager and program director) CSNHS
offers counseling, and technical assistance as well as the
high-risk revolving loan. Attempts are always made for loan
applicants to first seek conventional financing in all cases.
Unless conventional financing cannot be secured the applicant
is then referred to the high-risk loan review board which is
comprised of three bankers and three community residents.
Processing of loan requests usually takes 3 weeks, and terms
and interest rates are.extremely flexible.
In addition to providing counseling services for those
who wish to secure loans and perform rehab or home improve-
ment, counseling is also provided for families facing fore-
closure. Such counseling, often overlooked by other revolv-
ing loan type programs, serves a vital need to many trouble
homeowners. The local banks have also found the service in-
valuable, and often refer financially troubled clients risk-
inq foreclosure to seek additional advice from the CSNHS.
The most foKidable problem confronti- the Dorchester NHS, and
as David Solomon noted among all the NHS s, is the constant
search for funds for both operational expenses, and for the
high-risk revolving loan. At present the operational funds
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are composed of contributions from such sources as Univ. of
Mass., Harvard University, the Boston Globe, and banks from
the Boston community. The ooerational funds for this year
total approximately $80,000, but an additional $50,000 is
needed. The high-risk loan pool is -derived from cotributions
from city CDBG funds, the Poloroid Corporation and several
permanent local foundations. How the program will finan-
cially stay afloat seems to be a constant worry of the CSNHS
because the program's funding precariously depends on the con-
tinual good-will intentions of its many contributors.
The Neighborhodd Housing Service program indeed depends
almost exclusively on "outside", non-public funds to operate
and maintain its high-risk loan pool. Nonetheless because of
this dependency, NHS is able to "play" on the goodwill tend-
encies of the local banks to carry the operational expenses
of the program as well as actively participate and provide in-
put into various aspects ofvoperation (through the Board of
Directors and the loan review board).
Within the last few years, lending institutions have been
under a great deal of pressure to respond to community accusa-
tions of redlining. In an effort to dispel its "bad guy" im-
age in the community, banks are gradually seeking ways and
means by which they can minimize risking their assets and in-
dependence, while maximizing their public image as providers
of community service and goodwill. The threat of anti-red-
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lining legislation, city-wide mortgaae review boards with
binding power to bring banks into court if need. be, and
mechanisms such as the link deposit system have moved banks
to enter into more "voluntary-type" rograms such as the
Neighborhood Housing Services.
The Urban Reinvestment Task Force believes it will be
at least another four to five years. before NHS can be expec-
ted to demonstrate any results in its attempts to combat
neighborhood decline. Nonetheless a preliminary analysis
of the NHS programs across the country (performed for HUD
by ACTION-Housina, Inc.) indicate a high probability of suc-
cess:
"All of the essential components of the model are in
place, commitments are being fulfilled, and thee is
evidence tat private investment is begining to in-
crease.
lending Institution Participation Mechanisms/Implications
for NIP:
As mentioned before, DCA,W/as the central coordinating
focii of the Neighborhood Improvement Program, must take the
initiative to demonstrate to those at the local and coaunity
level that "implementation cannot be carried on empty hopes
and good intentions alone." The "how" of the strategy to
"spurn disinvestment and nurture reinvestment by private
lending institutions" must be sought out and analyzed and
implemented.
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The overview conducted of these three different types of
mechanisms , points to certain specific recommendations for
the State to activate in relation to NIP:
- ud-ij,' the state disclosure directive to assertain
more precise information on lending practices and pat-
terns in and around the NIP target neighborhoods;
- Activate continual efforts to keep abreast of anti-
redlining legislation both at the federal and state
level, and to provide ample support where appropriate;
- notify and educate city officials and community res-
idents of legislated mechanisms within their grasp;
- research incentive/leverage systems (e.g. linked de-
posit systems) for their potential impact on private
lending behavior; (follow-up on study to be issued
by special commission on state disinvestment)
- encourage NHS type programs within NIP communities
so as to actively involve, as well as secure commit-
ments, on the part of the local community and pri-
vate lending institutions, thus lessening the need
for governmental intervention and subsidization.
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EXHIBIT iv-4
State and Local Initiated Improvements
for the Tax Title Process
The Problem:
When owner disinvestment occurs, but the nroperty has
not yet been abandoned, the NIP strategy is to halt progres-
sive disinvestment and avoid abandonment, and to encourage
repair, rehabilitation and maintenance. Many of the offi-
cals at the local level involved with the Neighborhood In-
provement Program have implemented reassesment, sensitive
code enforcement and abatement programs in its NIP communi-
ties. Efforts by the NIP communities are presently being
funded (i.e. grants, subsidies) for home improvement and re-
habilitation through the utilization of CDBG funds. Regard-
less of these efforts, progressive deterioration, abandon-
ment and/or tax delinquency persist in many of these neigh-
borhoods, often providing them with their most visable forms
of blight. Deteriorated "tax abandoned" property are often
blatant warnings to potential homebuyers. to avoid the area.
They likewise serve as a depressing element to neighborhood
confidence; declining confidence in a neighborhood's vital-
ity.is in itself a powerful stimulus to further disinvest-7
ment and, abhndonment. 3 6
When property has been abandoned or has become seriously
tax delinquent, the city attempts to assume control over the
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property as soon as possible so a to minimize furtlEr deteri-
oration, and thus also minimizing the adverse effects such
property may have on other surroupding property within the
neighborhood. It is a well documented fact that abandoned
property invites vandalism and destruction by fire. In the
City of Boston alone 18% of all structural fires in 1969 oc-
curred in vacant buildings. 37 The costs associated with a-
bandoned buildings only continue to rise when one considers
that it costs approximately $700 per structure to board up
abandoned buildings and $3,000 per structure to demolish the
most seriously deteriorated of the buildings (according to
1975 cost estimates for Fitchburg). 38
The cost incurred by tax abandoned property that concerns
municipalities the most is that of foregone property tax rev-
enue. Many cities throughout the country are presently fac-
ing a revenue crunch, thus revenue raising in general is as-
suming greater importance. 9 Since prooerty tax is a primary
source of revenue for many cities, and the tax title process
is basically the cities' only method of property tax collec-
tion, the process is expected to perform its collection role
efficiently and effectively. By acquiring firm, legal,title
to property withvminimum of delay (and expense) the city is
in a better position to preserve the condition of the proper-
ty uoon acquisition, thus the better the possibility for re-
sale and for recouping the full amount of taxes owed upon sale.
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The Tax Title Process:
The tax title process has been described as a two-prong-
ed approach: "It is a means of coercion as well as a mode
of obtaining satisfaction." '0 The municioality may coerce the
owner of tax delinquent property to pay taxes or face acqui-
sition or transfer of title. And, if the owner does not pay
his or her taxes, the municipality may seek satisfaction on
his/her tax debt through the acquisition and sale of the tax
delinquent property. Regardless of the approach the primary
role of the tax title process is the generation of municipal
revenue, both as a collection device for unpaid real proper-
ty taxes and as a mechanism for transfering property from non-
taxpaying ownership to taxpaying ownership.
Such changes in ownership for many parcels of tax title
property have at times been found to have little effect on tax
payment. They often continue to become delinquent because the
original tax payment problem was not related to the owner's
personal financial condition, but rather from the land's in-
ability to generate enough of a return to sustain its tax
costs. 4 1 This de ]/mma is often attributed to land use oblems
often involving inappropiate location, parking, encroachment
of mixed uses, and density. Such consequences of "maladjust-
ed" land use patterns often provide properties with little ec-
onomic use. 4 2 In such an instance the city is. faced with two
tasks: 1) to find a viable reuse for the pronerty, and 2) to
possibly fulfill an existing land use need in the community.
Tax abandoned properties with land use problems can be conver-
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ted by the city to facilities for relocated residents, parks,
community centers , parking lots and other general municipal
uses. Prime examples of the reuse or community utility of
previously tax delinquent land can be found in Lowell's plan-
ned conversion of NIP target area parcels into passive open
space to relieve density, and Fitchburg's utility of vacant
lots to provide sites for relocated building structures "pur-
chased" from the local state college. Such effective land
reuse leads to a frequently perceived secondary role of the
tax title process, that of providing land for general devel-
opment, urban renewal or neighborhood revitalizatin purposes.
Thus the acquisition of title to delinquent property is
important for both revenue and development reasons. It is
unlikely a viable market would exist. for property which had
a questionable title. Likewise, a good title would be es-
sential for any long-term municipal reuse of the property.
The tax title process must not only yield a good, insurable
title, but must do it reasona1y quickly with minimum expo-
sure to liability. In actuality such an "ideal tax title
process" does not exist in an operational sense, it is in-
stead a cumbersome and drawn-out process.
The "tax title process" involves a myraid of procedures
by which a municipality can place a lien on property for
which real property taxes are overdue, sell or take the pro-
perty subject to the owner's right of redemption, fore-close
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the right of redemption, if necessary, and, if the property
is acquired by the municipality, use or dispose of the pro-
perty. In theory this entire process sltuld take 3 months
from the time demands for payment are mailed out to the time
of the taking of title. In practice, however, considerable
delay can be expected at each step of the tax title process.
As a result, instead of the tax title process taking 3 months
the collecting division of a city presently takes almost two
years from the date demands are mailed to the date when tax
title is actually obtained. '
To determine where delays occur within the tax title
process a more detailed look at the steps involved is neces-
sary. Foremost is the mailing of the tax bills which by
statute are to be sent out twice a year: by June 14 and the
following January 14. One-half of the.total taxes on a
piece of property must be paid in full by November 1, or in-
terest on the unpaid portion begins to accrue at 8% per year
(computed from the immediately preceding October 1) . 44 The
remaining one-half of total taxes on a piece of property and
any amount still unpaid from the first one-half must be paid
in full by May 1 or interest on the unpaid portion of -the to-
tal tax due begins to accrue at 8% per year, computed from
the immediately preceding April 1.
The city, for practical reasons, usually waits until
there has been a delinquency of the second payment before be-
gining tax title procedings. At this point the city's col-
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lecting division mails a demand for payment.46 After demands
are mailed, the collecting division prepares a "Collector's
Manuscript" which includes the taxes, charges, and interest
(less abatements) for all delinquent parcels. A "description"
of each parcel is prepared and assembled into "galley proofs"
to go to press in a notice of taking to be published in the
City Record two weeks before the taking of title. The tax
lien statute permits the city collector to levy the taxes due
if still unpaid fourteen days after demand, by "sale of taking"
of the property "if the liens thereon have not been termina-
ted." 47
When the city's collector utilizes the taking process to
vest title with the city, it is still nonetheless subject to
the owner's right of redemption. 4 At this point the city may
decide. to utilize the sales provision that permits the proper-
ty to be sold at public auction. 49 Such a sale really only
sells a first lien upon the land, sice the buyer may not take
possession of the property until the owners right of redemp-
tion is foreclosed. Because of this, little public interest
is usually solicitated. through these sales, thus most cities
do not use the sales provision since the taking device yields
title to the city, but with less time, expense and trouble than
the sales process.
After a tax title has been obtaked, the city may proceed
in a number of ways. A petition may be filed with the Land
Court to foreclose all rights of redemption,50 a process that
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may only be initiated six months after a sale or takinq; or
the city can initiate one of two options that provide for im-
mediate foreclosure after sale or taking. The first option
permits the city treasurer to sell "low value" property (pres-
ently stated as a market value of less than $2,500) if the
taxes, interest, and charges on it exceed its value. 5 1 The
second option permits the taking of the building or- property
if it is "found to be abandoned". 52
Both options for "immediate" foreclosure are rarely used
because of the oroblems related to low value sales and the
formal determination of properties as "abandoned". Few pro-
perties fall under the $2,500 limit for low value sales, and
titles obtained through this process are considered to be of
questionable validity. Moreover the administrative procedures
involved with both process options are complicated and time-
consuming. This is especially so when determining whether a
building is in fact abandoned. Such a determination. by law
requires the participation of several city and state officials
(i.e. city treasurer, building inspector, state commissioner
of taxation). To utilize either of these options would no
doubt take a few months, thus it seems wiser to just proceed
through the Land Court.
During the six month interim between taking and foreclo-
sure, the bity is empowered to posess, control, maintain, and
collect the rents from tax title property it holds.5 3  Recent
amendments to the foreclosure statute are responsible for
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shortening the waiting oeriod from three years to six months.
Once the petition to foreclose is filed in the Land Court,
foreclosure proceedings "should" take three to six months.
The bulk of this time is spent on notifying all pemns inter-
ested in the property. The Land Court, prior to notification,
must conduct its own title search to ascertain all interested
persons. This examination, done by one of the Court's "offi-
cial examiners," usually takes several months. 5 4
The title conveyed by a taking of property for taxes or
by a tax collector's deed (the result of a tax sale) is "para-
mount to any existing estate" in the property 5 5 and becomes
absolute after a foreclosure decree is entered. 5 .6 When the
city perfects title to tax title property, a Real Property
Board (as it is designated in the City of Boston) is responsi-
ble for its control and management. 5 7 The Board, in general,
is allowed to lease the property or sell it at a public auction.
A Casestudy/Tax Title Process in the City of Boston:
In January of 1976 a study of the tax title process in the
City of Boston was issued to the Collector-Treasurer of Boston.
The study is entitled: "The Tax Title Process in Boston: An-
alysis, Evaluation and Suggestions for Reform." It is a very
revealing study with important implications for othe- cities be-
yond Boston and throughout Massachusetts that share the common
delimma of an ineffective and inefficint tax title process. A
summary of this study's recommendations follows, supported by
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additional material gathered in interviTs with Newl Cook and
Steven Chu of the Boston Collecting Division, and research
conducted on current tax title legislation.
The entire tax title process from the mailing of the
final tax bill to foreclosure on the property could theore-
tically be accomplished in about a year to a year and a half.*
The process presently operates in fact from three to three
and a half years. Almost every stage in the process takes
longer than it legally must, with the longest delays occurr-
ing between demand and taking, and immediately prior to and
during foreclosure proceedings. 58 Certain phases of the pro-
cess can be accelerated without jeoordizing the legal safe-
guards that are necessary. The following proposals attemot
to greatly reduce the time and complexities of the present
tax title system.
A priority system should be a part of any tax title pro-
cess. The city should identify those parcels it feels, if
acquired, it can use or easily sell. If the property has a.
good chance of recouping the tax debt owed to the city through
an early sale, or the city desires the property for its own
municipal needs, it is recommended that desired parcels be i-
dentified as such and given first priority in handling and be
guided through each phase for quick processing at every step.
* This depends on whether the six-month wait between
taking and foreclosure is observed or whether either
of the two options mentioned earlier are utilized.
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Priority parcels could be identified by a computer entry if
the Collector's records are computerized, and if not, a sim-
ple stamp of color-coded tag could be olaced on the appropri-
ate parcels. Other city agencies or departments should noti-
fy the collections office if it likewise desires to utilize
certain tax title property for its purposes, or wishes to be
notified if a particular parcel it is interested in has become
delinquent. To save the collector the trouble of interacting
with every department of every tax delinquency, it should be
incumbent on each department to notify the collectr of those
parcels or areas in which it holds an interest.
The steps which have shown to be most time-comsuming in
the phase between the mailing of demands and the taking of ti-
tle are the preparation of the Collector's Manuscript, and the
oreparation, checking, and assembling into galley proofs of
the parcel descriptions.59 The processing at each of these
steps in the past has been done "by hand" from handwirtten
ledgers and journals.
These time-comsuming steps have been greatly reduced,
from 2 years to about 2-3 months, by the Boston's Collecting
Division through the assistance of a computerized system that
can generate a current manuscript in far less time than it
presently takes to create one by hand. Unfortunately not all
cities can afford to computerize their tax title data like
the City of Boston. Boston has spent approximately $150,000
to $250,000 on its computerized system, 60% of the cost which
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was allocated to loading the Collectcr's files into the compu-
ter. Nonetheless some interest has been shown by others in
the computer program utilized in Boston's tax title process,
but as of yet it is not known whether other municipalities
can"buy into" portions of such a program. Such a possibili-
ty nonetheless warrants further investigation. 6 0
Often descritptions of delinquent parcels have been form-
ulated from "abuttor's descriptions", which describe a parcel
by refering it to abutting parcels. To reduce time in this
phase of the tax title process the city may wish to use a less
detailed description based on the Assesor's parcel number. The
notice provisions for taking require "a substantially accurate
description of the land to be sold" (Ch. 60, secs. 53 and 40,
Mass. Gen.Laws). The City of Boston's Law Department is of
the opinion that parcel description by the Assesor's parcel
number is not below the minimum requirements set by law.6 1
A bill was filed in the General Court in 1970 providing
for a "simplified judicial forfeiture" proceeding, which es-
sentially eliminated the steps reqtiring demand, taking, and
the recording of a tax deed altogether. Six months after pay-
ment is due, the Collector could file a forfeiture petition
in Land Court, and after notifying interested partis and con-
ducting a hearing for those who wish to appear before the
Court, the Court could enter a forfeiture decree. This would
no doubt eliminate the entire drawn-out process between demand
and taking. This bill was given a favorable report in commit-
tee but allowed to fade into obscurity from the official re-
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cords. Consideration miaht be given to the idea of revivina
it in some form for re-filing.
After the taking stage, the City is faced with the op-
tion of attemptina a "low Value" sale under Sections 79 and
80. However rare3lv low value sales occur, the orovision
nonetheless orovides an excellent method for qTuick acquisi-
tion as it may be instituted only ninety days after taking,
thus altogether avoiding the cumbersome foreclosure proceed-
ings. Certain problems orevent low value tales from becom-
ing a viable mechanism by which speedy taking can be imple-
mented. Foremost legislative amendments to raise the $2500
limit and reduce the administrative requirements to effect
a low value sale are recommended. The ootion could be freed
of its various administrative entanglements (e.g. State Com-
missioner of Taxation inquiries to the "value of such oar
cels") yet contain safeguards aaainst abuse by municipalities
in search of shortcuts to foreclosure. The Boston study sug-
gests the city itself could make the determination as to the
value of parcels and the validity of its tax title, record
the determination in affidavit form in the registry of deeds,
and then oroceed to sale by public auction. The safeguard
could be the provision of a hearing (with a right of appeal
to the Land Court) for those with an interest in the property
62
who wish to challenge the city's determination. Notice of
the sale would be by registered mail to the owner of record,
as well as by oublication and oublic nostina to insure fur-
ther safeguards to the orocess. Increasina the $2500 limit
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is not viewed as a major obstacle considering the limit has
not been increased sini 1968 though oroperty values have
risen significantly. 63
Revisions to greatly simplify the "abandoned building"
option provided under the tax title process are likewise
strongly recommended if it is to be made viable to cities for
convenient processing. The statutory requirements for desia-
nating a building as abandoned are as comolicated as those
for low value sales, and involve not only the Treasurer and
the Commissioner of Taxation, but also the city's building
inspectors * 64
When foreclosure proceedings finally begin, they usually
take three to six months to complete, largely because of the
time involved in giving the required notice to all parties
with an interest in the prooerty.65 Since the 1930's, discus-
sion in many states have concerned the strict notice require-
ments in tax foreclosure proceedings. A frequent suggestion
is to convert the foreclosure action from an in personam to
an in rem proceeding, thus notice by oublication with certi-
fied mailing to the owner of record would suffice. A number
of states have adopted one variation or another of the in rem
* Unless the low value sales and abandonment options can
be simplified most parcels will have to wait out the
mandatory six month "grace period" before foreclosure
proceedings can begin. Those interviewed believe it is
unlikely that this period can be reduced by any leais-
lative amendment because of the desire to orotect the
owner from any oossibility of municipal abuse of its
powers,- and to afford the owner the oooortiinity to pay
his/her debt.
-218-
66
procedures. Similar changes have been sugqested for Massa-
chusetts but past court cases have caused considerable confu-
S67
sion on the topic. It seems that as lonq as tax foreclosure
68
remains in the "exclusive jurisdictin" of the Land Court,
the notice presently required could not constitutionally be
reduced. The General Court could oass legislation providing
for foreclosure in the Land Court with notice by publication
only but the Supreme Judicial Court would have to support such
an action, and that seems unlikely given the United States
Supreme Court decisions over the past twenty-five yeas that
have been decided otherwise. 6 9
To accelerate the title search conducted by the "official
examiners" of the Land Court - who are apointed by and often
pursue their urivate searches at the expense of the Land Court
- a time limit can be enforced in which they may complete their
search. 70 If such deadlines are not met the Land Court may re-
voke their appointment as official exaniners. An elimination
of the extensive title search process altogether would be ex-
posing the city to leaal confrontation and should be avoided.
Nonetheless there is the possibility that private title search
es could be initiated by interested oarties, such as coopera-
tives or citizens, who have a special interest in processing
the parcel through the Land Court as quickly as possible so as
to be given the opportunity to purchase the building through
public auction.
The disposal of prooerty, once a decree for foreclosure has
been granted, could be greatly facilitated if the city was not
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always required to hold a public auction. The public auction
requirement in theory has two ourposes: to generate the high-
est price possible for a given piece of property and to pre-
vent city officials from making "deals" with private individ-
uals that would stand to gain at the expense of the public. 71
The City of Boston has found both of these theories "rarely
realized" in practice. 72 Thouah the Boston Real Property
Board's primary concern in its disposal of tax title property
is to get the best price possible for each parcel, there is
not a large or active market for most of this property. And,
as a result of this public disinterest in tax title property,
City officials often wait for someone to exDress interest in
a parcel before scheduling an auction for it. Such being the
case the auctions are often attended only by the City and the
one party of interest. If the interested party bids at the
City's minimum price, he/she acquires the property.
If the city were permitted to se.t an "acceptable" price
for a parcel, and an interested buyer was prepared to meet
that price, the property could be transfered to the buyer with
minimum time and expense compared to the public auction pro-
cess. To control possible municipal abuse of this provision
between the city and potential buyers these "non-pullic auction
transfers" can be restricted for property below a certain val-
ue to reduce corruption. Further restrictions or priorities
could be administered to allow prospective owner-occupants,
low-income persons, or collectives only to utilize such "non-
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public auctions." To safeguard against the deceptive low ap-
praisal of parcels it is suggested that each low value deter-
mination set forth in the Real Property Department Records be
accompanied with a short explaination outlining the basis for
determination.
Legislation should be provided to give the city the oow-
er to lease. Leasing property, scheduled for eventual rede-
velopment, would provide an interim use for the city as well
as generate revenue. The building would not have to be board-
ed up and such on-site activity would safeguard against vande-
lissm and malacious fires.
Last but not least, every provision should be made to al-
low the serious owner or other interested party early notifi-
cation of intent to take the tax delinquent property as they
might muster the funds required to protect their interests.
Technical assistance should be provided to help the financial-
ly troubled delinquent property owner. Likewise a flexible
payment scheme to accomadate for maintenance expenditures,
code enforcement and short-term cash flow problems should be
implemented. Installment payments should be allowed, and lim-
ited tax waivers for overdue taxes be granted to "special hard-
ship"cases. No doubt safeguards should be attached to each of
these provisions to insure against abuse by the private delint-
quent owner, and code compliance should be emphasized even
when taxes are paid and especially so, if tax waivers are grant-
ed.
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The City of Boston has almost completely computerized
their Collector's records and are now in the process of
utilizing their new system. They are presently backlogged
2 years in the processinq of their tax title properties.
They hope by within a year they will have caught up to a
current caseload and can process a tax title case within
9 months of its demand for payment .versus the past "re-
cord" time of approximately 3 years or more.
Tax Title Process/Implications for NIP:
Obviously a city can acquire tax delinquent property,
or any property for that matter it wishes to utilize for
its municipal needs, by eminent domain or by simply ar-
ranging to buy the land from willing owners. These meth-
ods nonetheless require the city (or the State in the case
of NIP utilized properties) to make an actual outlay of
cash. Likewise such operations often require special ad-
ministrative mechanisms to be initiated on part of the city,
whereas the tax title process is an ongoing, continual oper-
ation of any city. In essence the tax title process exists
for the city to quickly acquire tax abandoned property be-
fore it deteriorates beyond salvaqing, and its negative
spillover effects become a detriment to the surrounding
neighborhood. Numerous revisions are required befc this
process becomes as "efficient and effective" in practice as
claims to be in theory.
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A computerized tax title process is probably a distant
notion to many of the NIP areas located in the suburbs of
Massachusetts. Nonetheless the State may be in the position
to inquire into the feasibility of "borrowing" from the
Boston computerized tax title system, or in any case invest-
igate into the costs involved in developing a centralized
system for the suburban communities where the Collector's
data to be logged may differ from city to city but the basic
computer program could be shared. The Highland Park NIP area
should no doubt utilize the added adv.antages of the computer-
ized Boston tax title system to its interest, prioritizing
and quick processing parcels it may wish to purchase.
Likewise the State is in the position to advise the NIP
communities of improvements to be made in the present tax ti-
tle process that are recommended in this section that have
not yet been implemented in any form by the city itself.
Such improvements as prioritizing parcels, inter-department
notification of "special interest" parcels, simpli-
fied parcel decriptions, and privately initiated tkh searches
require no computerization, just a different approach to pro-
cessing. Since computerization is financially not feasible
to many of the NIP communities, and many of the afore men-
tioned steps nonetheless require processing by hand, perhaps
the State could temporarily emplo7 a small group of aides to
systematically update the tax title process for the NIP Im-
pact Areas in particular. They could likewise guide certain
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parcels through the Land Court "pipeline" for quick pro-
cessing and serve as a centralized resource for State in-
itiated title searches.
The most important role the State could assume in the
area of revision of the tax title process lies in initia-
ting or supporting legislative amendments that would stream-
line the presently cumbersome process considerably. Legis-
lative revisions to simplify the low value sale and abandon-
ment provisions would make both options true alternatives to
the six month lag time presently favored for its fewer ad-
ministrative clearances. The "simplified judicial forfei-
ture" bill should be closely investigated for its revival
potential in the General Court, and the public auction re-
quirement should likewise be considered for amendment.
Until tax title procedures can be effectively and ef-
ficiently used to bring action against tax einquent owners
many euch owners guilty of gross disinvestment, abandonment
and code violations can go untouched with little pressure to
meet its responsibilities. Likewise tax delinquent property
in stages of neglect or disuse will remain out of reach, ex-
cept through eminent domain, of cities that wish to utilize
such property for parks, Parking, transfer of title to coop-
erative type organizations wishing to rennovate and purchase
inexpensive housing, and other uses.
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